DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 351 313 SP 034 147

AUTHOR Strandberg, Warren, Ed.
TITLE In Other Voices: Expanding the Educational Conversation. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society (36th, Greenville, SC, October 4-5, 1991).
INSTITUTION South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society.
PUB DATE Mar 92
NOTE 138p.
PUB TYPE Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Athletics; Dialogs (Language); Educational Change; *Educational Environment; *Educational Philosophy; *Educational Principles; Educational Theories; Elementary Secondary Education; Higher Education; Instruction; Integrity; Lifelong Learning; Metaphors; Poetry
IDENTIFIERS Postmodernism

ABSTRACT

These proceedings include the following papers: "Reason and Romance in Argument and Conversation" (Margaret Buchman); "Conversation as a Romance of Reason: A Response to Margret Buchman" (James W. Garrison); "In Search of a Calling" (Thomas Buford); "Listening for the Call: A Response to Thomas Buford" (Peter Carbone); "Some Reconceptions in Educational Theory: Irony and the Art of Comedy" (Frans van der Bogert); "Educational Reform: The Role of Creativity" (Sharon Morrison); "Poets and Teaching" (William Russell); "Poetry: 'The Sun-Lit Art of the Human Heart'" (Cheryl Southworth); "Education as Hospitality: The Reclamation of Cultural Metaphor and Narrative" (William F. Losito); "Hospitality and Its Discontents: A Response to William Losito" (Robert J. Mulvaney); "Integrity of 'He Who Steals My Purse'" (Judith Witmer); "A Response to 'Integrity'" (Deborah Eaker); "Competency, Mastery, and the Destruction of Meaning" (Warren Strandberg); "A Response to Competency, Mastery and the Destruction of 'Meaning'" (Jackie Blount); "Sport and Society" (John B. Haynes); "Sport and Society" (J. Gordon Chamberlin), "Inventing Postmodern Education! Lifelong Learning or Childhood Schooling? A Proposal for Local Action" (Charles Tandy); and "What Is a Postmodern Education and What Does It Have To Do with Lifelong Learning?" (Roderic Owen). (IAH)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

In Other Voices:

Expanding The Educational Conversation

ED351313

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN OTHER THAN PAPER COPY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Warren Strandberg

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SO 23 147

The South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society

IN OTHER VOICES

EXPANDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONVERSATION

PROCEEDINGS

of the

Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting

of the

South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society

Furman University
Greenville, South Carolina
October 4-5, 1991

Published by the
South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society
March, 1992

Printed at
Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia

Warren Strandberg, Editor

Box 2020, School of Education
Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia 23284-2020
(804) 367-1332

Papers appearing in this volume are referred by a committee of peers.

Materials published in the Proceedings of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society are submitted to ERIC for abstracting and listing in *Resources in Education (RIE)* and for full publication both in paper and microfiche form. Users who wish to order a paper or micorfiche copy can do so by writing:

ERIC Document Reproduction Services
P.O. Box 190
Arlington, Virginia 22210

Proceedings papers are indexed in *The Philosopher's Index*.

Officers and Committees of the Society, 1989-90

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Earle West, President
Howard University
William Losito, Past President
College of William and Mary
Roderic Owen, Secretary/Treasurer
Mary Baldwin College
Bruce Beezer, Member-at-Large
North Carolina State University
Joseph L. Congleton, Archivist
East Carolina State University
John Haynes, Editor & Newsletter
James Madison University
Warren Strandberg
Editor of Proceedings
Virginia Commonwealth University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE:

Anthony G. Rud, Jr., Chair
North Carolina Center for Advancement in Teaching
James Garrison
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Cheryl Southworth
Meredith College

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS:

Thomas Buford
Furman University

Editor's Introduction

This is the fourth and final year of my tenure as editor of the Proceedings. I want to thank all of the program participants and officers over these last four years for their generous cooperation in helping to produce such a worthwhile publication of educational thought. Of all the professional organizations to which I have belonged over the years, none has had the intellectual intensity or seriousness of purpose which SAPES has consistently exhibited. The Proceedings has always reflected that quality of purpose. I have been proud to serve as your editor.

Due to an unfortunate illness at the last moment, our keynote speaker, Margaret Buchaman was unable to attend or have her presentation delivered. So this edition of the Proceedings contains a special surprise. Do take the time to read her paper, for you will be richly rewarded. Among the highlight of the 1991 SAPES conference was the Author's Colloquium. The presentations by James Garrison, Peter Carbone and Robert Heslep, all members of SAPES, were both stimulating and suggestive of the content in their new books. Because the colloquium is not included in the Proceedings, you are encouraged to consider the purchase of their volumes (listed in the program section in the back of this volume).

Finally, the cover of the Proceedings has changed this year to reflect the growing thematic character of our conferences. Also the Proceedings has a more uniform formated character due in large part to the cooperation of the presenters, many of whom were able to prepare their presentations in Word Perfect 5.1. Many thanks for the special effort. If you have any reaction to this year's edition and the changes that have been made, please share them with one of our offices.

Warren Strandberg
Editor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Officers and Executive Committee		ii
Editor's Introduction		iv
KEYNOTE ADDRESS		
	Margret Buchman, "Reason and Romance in Argument and Conversation"	1
	James W. Garrison, "Conversation as a Romance of Reason: A Response to Margret Buchman"	18
FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION		
1)	Thomas Buford, "In search of a Calling"	23
	Peter Carbone, "Listening for the Call: A Response to Thomas Buford"	31
2)	Frans van der Bogert, "Some Reconceptions in Educational Theory: Irony and the Art of Comedy"	34
	Sharon Morrison, "Educational Reform: The Role of Creatity"	43
3)	William Russell, "Poets and Teaching"	46
	Cheryl Southworth, "Poetry: 'The Sun-Lit Art of the Human Heart'"	57
SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION		
1)	William F. Losito, "Education as Hospitality: The Reclamation of Cultural Metaphor and Narrative"	62
	Robert J. Mulvaney, "Hospitality and its Discontents: A Response to William Losito"	70

Table of Content (cont'd)

		Page
2)	Judith Witmer, "Integrity or 'He Who Steals My Purse'"	73
	Deborah Eaker, "A Response to 'Integrity'"	81
3)	Warren Strandberg, "Competency, Mastery, and the Destruction of Meaning"	85
	Jackie Blount, "A Response to Competency, Mastery and the Destruction of 'Meaning'"	95
THIRD CONCURRENT SESSION		
1)	John B. Haynes, "Sport and Society"	98
	J. Gordon Chamberlin, "Sport and Society"	111
2)	Charles Tandy, "Inventing Postmodern Education! Lifelong Learning or Childhood Schooling? A Proposal for Local Action"	115
	Roderic Owen, "What is a Postmodern Education and What Does it Have to do With Lifelong Learning?"	123
PROGRAM OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING		126

80 *Donations of Professional Service(Legal, medical, CPA, tax prep., lectures)*

90 *Unspecified donations of money or time*

97 *Uncodable response*

99 *Refused / missing*

REASON AND ROMANCE IN ARGUMENT AND CONVERSATION

Margret Buchmann

> In this network of arguments and reflections we seem to be moving along a razor's edge--like tightrope walkers--almost as though we were on the point of falling, on the one side into triumphant, non-dialogical discourse, and on the other side into a state of irremediable passivity. In both cases we would be victims of a kind of ideological hypnosis.
>
> Gemma Corradi Fiumara, The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening

Why Talk in Education?

There is no direct route to knowledge or social action, no route that steers clear of what we say and imagine. Action and knowledge cannot be determined by impartial adherence to rules of evidence and scientific method alone. Talk can bring out the context-bound, partial, and tentative nature of educational knowledge (and this holds for practical, personal, and theoretical knowledge alike); it can make people aware of their various commitments and help them to see that educational research itself often aims to persuade (Floden, 1985).

People talk because knowledge is uncertain, because the outcomes of action are ambiguous, because their interests and beliefs differ--and because they need to learn. With different stakes in the outcomes of action and some sense that inferences from the data are rarely clear, people speculate on the course of events after the fact, connect and isolate incidents, question supposed proofs, dispute the relevance and value of evidence, and tell each other stories. The "discourse" approach to knowledge use in education and other areas of public concern fits with both the uncertainties of knowledge and the fact that people's actions proceed from their many differences. If people put aside attempts to eliminate fallibility or bolster their credibility, it seems that everyone can learn (see Cronbach et al., 1980).

Conditions for "Sweetness and Light"

People have ample reason to talk, but words can veil facts and feelings and serve those in power as well as clarify knowledge claims and grounds for action. If discourse is to contribute to greater justice and understanding, "all interested parties must be able to initiate discussion,

---

Correspondence: Insitute for Research on Teaching, College of Education, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824

to establish or influence the rules of conversation, to put forward statements, to request elaboration and clarification, and to call other statements into question" (Cohen & Garet, 1975, pp. 42-43). To meet requirements for a democratic organization of discourse, all participants must distance themselves from authoritative views of knowledge and they must listen. While the first step toward learning may therefore be silence, requirements for justification must also be met. When errors are likely and feelings conflicting, it does not follow that anything goes: a proliferation of delusions is not learning.

In groups with diverse participants, the processes and outcomes of discourse can easily drift away from what is true, right, or better. Where people do not appeal to such standards, talking may simply reinforce existing misconceptions and inequalities. And where interests conflict, there are few incentives for giving up recognized power and status. The cumulative effects of past patterns of participation are also resistant to change; thus, for instance, "The habits developed through past interactions between researchers and teachers will not incline teachers to ask questions. Their expectation is to be told what research has found to be true, not to raise questions about why they should believe research claims" (Floden, 1985, p. 31). Nor can a democratic organization of discourse make people equally good at talking, let alone understanding.

Explaining what one takes for granted is difficult, especially when one's audience is inclined to be puzzled or dismissive. People aiming to learn from each other must therefore have particular strengths and abilities. They need to be honestly attentive, flexible and firm, and somewhat detached from their given states of mind. Over time, participants will have to work out rules about what sorts of talk are appropriate for what purposes. Yet norms of communication are already working and in place; they flow from the life and work of people and the way talk tends to serve their goals. Language works differently in different groups, is about different things, and aims at different outcomes, for instance, to either clarify things--testing logical consistency and entailments--or to get them done.

Words With Power?

The notion of improving education by talking depends on a belief that one can do things with words, a belief that not all people share and that is only partially true. Words have limited powers, and expansive articulation has involved relations to morality and knowledge. Quiet attention furthers learning. Tact, caution, and kindness demand that much remains unsaid. On the other hand, spelling out one's underlying sense of the good in clear and descriptive language helps others and oneself to see and examine one's life. On this ancient perspective, logic and linguistic articulacy almost define being human: "We aren't full beings in this perspective until we can say what moves us, what our lives are built around. . . . The central notion here is that articulation can bring us closer to the good as a moral source, can give it power" (Taylor, 1989, p. 92).

Making lucid articulation central to human being and goodness gives a special place to academics. But capacities for analysis do not in themselves enhance one's scope of vision or contribute to what Aristotle termed "greatness of soul:" thinking well of others and being hopeful as well as capable of laughter. Moreover, the ability to give precise conceptual utterance--identifying clearly recognizable elements of an idea, the provenance and usages of concepts--will not in itself remove conflict or confusion. One may believe that philosophers, in the words of Rorty,

> know what is going on, in a way in which these people who don't know the genealogy of the terms, or phrases, cannot. This is a non sequitur. If a physician is torn between respect for the dignity of her patient and the need to minimize his pain, she is not confused on matters which the philosopher . . . is clear about. Being articulate is a virtue, but it is not the same as eliminating confusion, the attainment of clarity. (1982, p. 223)

The patient's and doctor's troubles are not created by lacks of analytic skills, nor susceptible to logical resolutions. The dilemma does not yield to explication or learned little lectures. Listening, rather than talking, may help the doctor to find "words with power" and the necessary silences: to comfort and be present, consider what is known, discern the needs of the patient, and look into her own heart. No outcome of articulacy, "being there" and "noticing things" are central to morality and learning.

Trusting reliance on verbal illumination is somewhat naive. Can criticism and public debate, for another instance, be free and blind with regard to social authority and personal interest (Popper, 1975)? The willingness to be proven wrong, over and over again, and impartial attention to the merits of a case, no matter where it comes from, presuppose a distinctive purity of motives and capaciousness of mind. J. S. Mill (1840/1962) was not sanguine about the process and outcomes of debate among people who differ: "In truth, a system of consequences from an opinion, drawn by an adversary, is seldom of much worth. Disputants are rarely sufficiently masters of each other's doctrines, to be good judges of what is fairly deducible from them, or how a consequence which seems to flow from one part of the theory may or may not be defeated by another part" (pp. 130-131).

To think of knowledge use as equitable and enlightening discourse may be desirable and inspiring, but how well founded is this conception? I will consider this question by comparing argument and conversation, examining presuppositions, limits, and relations of both approaches to communication.

Control and Progress Through Arguments?

When social scientists regard arguments and rationally motivated consensus as the best way to legitimate and successful reforms, they believe that talk can uncover assumptions and

values that shape and distort the production and use of knowledge (see Dunn, 1982). I have already mentioned some reasons why talk will not always illuminate; silence as "the other side of language" (Fiumara, 1990) is obviously important. Nor is consensus always rationally motivated, especially in attempts at social change. And does the better argument have a peculiar force? Perhaps, but so have the memories of people and the anecdotes they hear.

Arguments at their best move critically and efficiently in the realm of concepts within theories as systems of deliberated thought. They involve opponents, testable claims, and rules of cool reasoning. Social reforms, however, have to do with "practical imagining", which aims to fill the world with things we both desire and approve (Oakeshott, 1962). Moral sentiments are established by custom and tested by time, while people are supposed to mind them; take care to remember, for instance, the kinds of concerns and dispositions their clients and the public have a right to expect of doctors and teachers. Thus, we cannot account for social improvements by the powers of arguments alone. Good sense and feeling are also necessary.

People determine what to do about problems of individual and social life based on the information available to them, personal beliefs, and traditions. Popper (1962) emphasizes tradition--in point of quality and quantity--as "by far the most important source of our knowledge . . . . Most things we know we have learned by example, by being told, by reading books, by learning how to criticize, how to take and accept criticism, how to respect truth" (p. 56). While this fact makes anti-traditionalism futile, it does not entail taking a passive attitude toward tradition. Of all the multitudinous things we have absorbed implicitly, however, only some can be brought to awareness and even fewer tested as to their full and fair grounding. In many ways, people keep each other company, wandering in the dark; as Locke (1959) wrote in 1690:

> Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information! And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on one side or the other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge. (p. 371)

Locke concludes that our shared ignorance calls for "friendship, in the diversity of opinions" and "the gentle and fair ways of information" (p. 372). Where people argue, instead, for the sake of winning, arguments can distort the facts and mislead intentions, just as unexamined beliefs can do.

Though some consensus is necessary for social reform, it is not true that arguments make their distinctive contributions to the agreement of people with one another, enabling them to act. Other limitations of argument as a discourse model of knowledge use derive from the influence of argumentative rules on subject matter (not everything on people's minds is discussable), from

hierarchical relations (differences in power and status), as well as from the outcomes one can expect when people are contestants, fighting for different things and wrangling for victory, with a certain cold hardness.

Argument is a dress rehearsal of speech with its own dramatic purposes; its performance requirements determine chances at success. Moreover, differences in power, status, and skills count already when people settle what should be discussed; not every group has what it takes to make a social problem an issue of public notice and debate. It is useful to recall that disputation flourished in the Middle Ages, when crucial issues--such as what is true and right or who is entitled to power and rewards--had already been settled, as it were, out of court. Social predestination and unequal patterns of participation are factors still present.

Contemporary philosophers and social theorists nevertheless show faith in the redeeming power of argument. Thus Habermas (1971, 1973) posits an "ideal speech situation" undistorted by power and interests; he makes the strange claim that beliefs capable of legitimating action can be formed only under conditions of absolutely free and unlimited debate. If one took this seriously, one would have to write off most things people do as either unjustified or unjustifiable. Neither is public debate likely to expose scientific error. People find it difficult to understand why scientists take only some evidence seriously (Polanyi, 1967), and scientists pay little attention to notions they find lacking in rigor, or otherwise distasteful (Boring, 1963).

Argument as an Adversarial Practice

People are more just to their own, whether kith and kin or ideas. Lacks of impartiality limit the viability of an argument model of knowledge use when people differ not only in opinions, but in power, status, and the requisite skills. For argumentative fencing depends on verbal agility and vigilance, on guarding oneself while carrying devastation into the enemy's camp by cross-examination and logical blows. The use of mind is strategic and tactical, and the name of the game, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain, is war:

> We don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his position and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. . . . It is in this sense that the 'argument is war' metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. (p. 109)

Arguments among different people are likely to draw on different kinds of knowledge, yet the party winning the battle may not have the best knowledge or intentions. Distinct from wisdom and sensitivity, levels of sophistication shape argumentative outcomes, and the possession of a special or latinized vocabulary strengthens one's position--regardless of whether its use is informative, ornamental, or coercive. Meehl's (1971) hierarchical example makes this vivid:

"The parish priest can refute the theological objections of an unlettered Hausfrau parishioner. The priest, in turn, will lose a debate with the intellectual village atheist. C. S. Lewis will come out ahead of the village atheist. But when C. S. Lewis tangles with Bertrand Russell, it gets pretty difficult to award prizes" (p. 71). All down the line, rich or well-founded ideas do not guarantee winning the dispute; and someone who maintains an attitude of openness in questioning and seeking truth may come off worse (see Gadamer, 1979, p. 330). Hence, appearing defeated in an argument may not be a good reason to give up practices or beliefs.

We have no reason to assume that warm feelings, buried premises, oblique references, and beliefs that are inarticulate must be associated with indefensible ideas or lines of action. Argument models of knowledge use equate the love of clarity and argument with the pursuit of wisdom--a confusion that stems from the beginnings of philosophy. The genuine continuity of argument models of knowledge use with the classic and medieval tradition of disputation is a continuity, too, in that the way of argument is seldom that of the mother tongue. People can be shrewd and, for that matter, right without mastering argumentative moves or feeling confined by them. While some commitments are too elusive and firmly engrained for debates, they can steady people in their pursuit of truth or goodness. On the other hand, an absence of intellectual curiosity, vigorous sensitivity, and ethical circumspection is compatible with acuteness and success in argument. We cannot equate wanting to say things with wanting to discover them.

Romance and Illusions Surrounding Arguments

Rorty (1982) stresses the difference between the love of argument and the pursuit of wisdom, maintaining that adversarial modes of discourse substitute the goal of winning for that of understanding, while fostering illusions of professorial competence. People whose academic socialization has taught them to despise history as well as stories, may take some pride in being keen and clever. Yet the self-esteem and public image of academics must be adjusted to what they actually learn and practice. If philosophy professors, for instance, "were traditionally thought of as wise because they were believed to have read and experienced much, traveled far in the realms of thought, pondered the great problems which have always troubled the human spirit" (p. 221), this contemplative image has vanishing foundations.

In the argumentative mode, thought turns upon itself with little mercy; this is the proof of its strength and incisive quality. "A clear logical conscience," Peirce (1955) stresses, "does cost something--just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, costs us dear"; this notwithstanding,

> the genius of a man's logical method should be loved and reverenced as his bride, whom he has chosen from all the world. . . . She is the one that he has chosen, and he knows that he was right in making that choice [italics added]. And having made it, he will work and fight for her . . . and will strive to be the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of whose splendours he draws his inspiration and his courage. (pp. 21-22)

Somewhat startling but instructive, Peirce's fervent phrases carry us into realms of chivalry, romance, and noble virtue, in hopes that (pure) logos will be glorious in the end. The story of knights and maidens in their castles--of fearless endurance crowned by the yielding of the (pure) object of desire--has, of course, transcendent and consoling appeal. But it does not follow that this elevating story is true, or that its inspiration and lessons have much of an application to the seeking, gaining, and using of knowledge.

A rapturous monogamy of the mind--being wedded to logic and argumentation as the purifying, right method--may not yield its rewards in terms of good sense or good science. In his historical work on the discipline of psychology, Boring (1963) concludes that people's halting progress toward understanding needs overconfidence and batlike blindness as well as Peirce's clear logical conscience. He warns that a scientist must not "be the judge too often, for then the assured, prejudiced, productive personality might get 'squeezed out,' and science would be the loser" (p. 83). Knowledge in itself and for the social world cannot depend on the aspirations of argument alone. Pure reasoning may not be faultless. While argumentation brings virtues into play, its heroics can be divisive, restrictive, and punitive; besides, people who seem hard-headed can be obtuse and given to gratifying illusions. What is sacrificed by argument and for its purposes may be central to action and learning. For reason to realize its modest rewards, it must negotiate the dark and unnerving terrain between people:

> This terrain is uneven, full of sudden faults and dangerous passages where accidents can and do happen, and crossing it, or trying to, does little or nothing to smooth it out to a level, safe, unbroken plain, but simply makes visible its clefts and contours. (Geertz, 1986, p. 119)

Conversation, Silence, and the Spirit of Life

If convincing other people is the aim, subduing them by argument is often a poor means. For one cannot convince others of something without knowing their ways of thinking, including how they have reached their conclusions. Such matters are found out by listening, not talking, and may require a delayed response or no response at all; thus a young man reflects:

> My education was all a preparation for a certain mental virtuosity, a very hard, clear, reasoned way of thinking, and examining evidence, and defending a logical position. I was taught to regard anybody who didn't bear the hall-mark of this training as wooly-minded and half-educated. It's a useful training in its way as far as it goes. But . . . . You can argue the hind leg off a donkey, but that won't teach you any more about donkeys. Whatever method you may have used in forming your own opinions, you must understand other people's methods before you can hope to get anyone to agree with you. You'll never induce a man to change his mind by making him look silly. You merely put his back up. (Kennedy, 1981, p. 300)

Implacable or evasive, silence can increase distance. It can signal boredom, yet also an expectant openness or kinship and affection beyond words. Silence can mean contempt as well as revealing attention. "A person who simply listens is possibly not much, but he is not isolated in the sense that he is connected once again to a network of vivid, moving and complex dynamics" (Fiumara, 1990, p. 61). Martin Buber (1965) notes that--just as eager talking does not entail communication--so silence can be speaking; and actually finding a listener who matches one's own thoughts tone by tone can paradoxically turn one's own assertions into questions. Hence attacks are not always needed for boundaries of understanding to recede.

Talkers often delude themselves about the implications of silence. If listeners seem unable to answer or challenge them, this need not mean that they have given way or changed their minds. In being evasive, softness can be unyielding. If one is busy finding holes in what other people are saying or is eager to score a point, what one can learn is restricted by these purposes. Thus, one is also not likely to change one's mind. In either case, if the knowledge being offered is valuable and unequally shared, these outcomes are disappointing. They also throw doubt on the belief that arguments will uniquely contribute to equity and learning.

Far from representing an undistorted speech situation, the concept of argument may be an emblem of group differences. Arguments import their own distortions--adversarial attitude, goal substitution (winning instead of understanding), censorship--into discourse. Fiumara (1990) suggests that these distortions involve dominating and defensive responses to the abundance and unruliness of life; trying to construct a theoretical or conceptual net from which nothing can escape is a "relentless battle . . . as an attempt . . . to organize everything in the light, or shadow, of the 'best' principles of knowledge: a chronic struggle of territorial conquest" (p. 21). Thus, Wittgenstein (1980) recalls that, in the course of their conversations, Russell would often exclaim: "Logic's hell!":

> I believe our main reason for feeling like this was the following fact: that every time some new linguistic phenomenon occurred to us, it could retrospectively show that our previous explanation was unworkable. (We felt that language could always make new, and impossible, demands; and that this made all explanation futile.) (p. 30e)

This sense of defeat and futility stems from the conquering pretensions of argument: the heroic struggles of logic and lucidity. "In the annals of philosophy the hope of mental control of the Absolute recurs in the euphorias of fearless reason and dies in melancholy skepticism" (Kolakowski, 1972, p. 54). Heroes stand alone, seeing other in their own light.

The Pastoral Romance of Conversation

The move from argument to conversation involves shifting metaphorical grounds from battlefields to country meadows, where disorder need not be rebelliousness. We pass from romances featuring strong (though not silent) heroes to the company of ordinary people, "trivial

and irreplaceable," as Martin Buber (1965, p. 35) calls them. Conversation is no intellectual privilege: "It does not begin in the upper story of humanity. It begins no higher than where humanity begins" (p. 35). Like life, conversation can be busy with many things and vibrant with a sense of different directions. Conversation is close to the comic spirit which embraces people's frailty, tolerant laughter, and emotional release.

If conversations are uniting and disarming, they can still inspire apprehension and do not divest communication of its formidable character. Nor is emotional release a deliverance from pain, for we have feelings about what we value: things we desire and rightly fear to lose. Hence emotions such as fear, grief, love, and anger

> are webs of connection and acknowledgment [italics added], linking the agent with the worth of the unstable context of objects and persons in which human life is lived. Fear involves the belief that there are big important things that may damage us, and that we are powerless . . . . Love involves the ascription of a very high value to a being who is separate from us and not fully controlled. (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 387).

The other is, for us, "a free being in all personal situations: in trust, in love, in hate, in the bitterness of refusal and the disaster of parting, in the risk of fascination, in the submission of rapture, in the pangs of disenchantment" (Kolakowski, 1972, p. 55). Lifting restraints on feelings will remind one of being needy, incomplete, and vulnerable in a general sense; it also keeps one open to grief and reproaches. People's hopes are based on experiences of inadequacy and unbearable separation.

As an expression of life and hope, conversation brings to mind a poetic pastoral, where people have mother wit, the setting is natural and simple, and amiability will carry the day. The "hero" of pastoral romance is no "exceptionally brave or strong person, but only a modest and pleasant young man[,] . . . a shepherd with no social pretensions, except that he is also a poet and a lover" (Frye, 1967, p. 24). Wordsworth (1800/1904) explains that, in such poetry, "humble and rustic life was generally chosen, because in that condition the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language . . . and, consequently, may be more accurately [italics added] contemplated" (p. 791). Related to this, Wordsworth describes the poet as "a more comprehensive [italics added] soul, . . . pleased with his own passions and volitions, and . . . [rejoicing] more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him" (pp. 793-794).

Acknowledgement and connection, comprehensiveness and accuracy are related to truth and illumination. Otherwise, there is nothing particularly pure or exalted about conversation. Being less guarded, ideas and feelings collide and mingle with one another and are diluted, rounded off, and complicated in the process. Conversational tones are rarely steely. People do not insist that partners follow: it is enough that they enter into conversation.

The Charm and Freedom of Conversation

Conversations can be long, intermittent, inconclusive as in marriage, and they are continued in the absence of one's partners. Arguments are driven by hopes of coming to rest upon conclusions, but conversations are not driven at all. To some extent following laws of indirection, they begin with differences or notions often vaguely apprehended and, after a while, do not so much end as are abandoned. Arguments favor the here and now, but conversations assign importance to stories and history.

What makes conversations attractive is their enveloping quality, and a capacity for turns that are surprising. Conversations have flexible rules of relevance, evidence, and progression. Condensing fables and finely detailed observations have their place--and so have stretches of argument. Conversations therefore broaden one's conceptual repertoire and moral imagination. They thrive on readiness of speech and language, yet sidelong glances, repeated starts, and arm-waving allusions are all right.

Although they can be elegant rather than awkward, conversational exchanges are thus not disconcerted by ideals of perfection in clarity, parsimony, and coherence. One may get answers to questions one never thought of asking (but ought to have asked) or have one's answers answered in odd little gusts of inconsecutive thought that interrupt one's plans and preconceptions. The progress of conversation need not be linear: "Like writing, saying might also go from right to left, or even from bottom to top, from forwards backwards, or in still other directions that we are not even able to envisage" (Fiumara, 1990, p. 177). But conversations are not "mere talk": they presuppose good faith, some common purposes or emergent directions, and the assumptions that people say things they believe to be relevant and will attend (in some fashion) to what others are saying (see Grice, 1975). In short, conversations require being decent and sensible in ways that establish and maintain connections, diversity, and openness.

While conversations sidestep competition, they are encounters in which the power of mind, good sense, and moral sentiments of a person come to be revealed. As Johnson said, "Men might be very eminent in a profession, without our perceiving any particular power of mind in them in conversation" (Boswell, 1966, p. 1078). In conversation, one listens to persons, not just utterances. Here one comes close to people, to what they know, desire, imagine, and can barely say--and a person who simply listens can be profoundly connected and filled with living force. In the end, silent attention can communicate "the general and surprising apprehension of the precariousness of all language, meaning, knowledge" (Nemerov, 1978, p. 109).

In conversation, people of thought and people of action can please themselves and be true to type, although self-constituted elites or self-impressed individuals will not fare well. One can imagine conversation to be, ideally, like writing at its best, where, as T. S. Eliot (1942/1970) wrote, "every word is at home":

> Taking its place to support the others,
> The word neither diffident nor ostentatious,
> An easy commerce of the old and the new,
> The common word exact without vulgarity,
> The formal word precise but not pedantic,
> The complete consort dancing together.
>
> (pp. 207-208, "Little Gidding")

Practice "is recognized not as an isolated activity but as a partner in a conversation, and the final measure of intellectual achievement is in terms of its contribution to the conversation in which all universes of discourse meet" (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 199). Science likewise need not be anything other than itself: It can speak to the mind and about truth with the understanding that meaning in the realm of science is not that of everyday discourse. Conversations accordingly respect not only differences but the limits of meaning, knowing and speaking--realistically including some awareness of their own limitations.

Facile and Erratic Tendencies of Conversation

Conversation can yield insights and astonishing connections; yet it cannot establish knowledge. As Johnson said, "General principles must be had from books, which, however, must be brought to the test of real life. In conversation, you never get a system" (Boswell, 1966, p. 621). Likewise, if people please themselves and remain true to type, they will be comfortable but vulnerable to denseness and inertia. As Thomas Traherne (1675/1966) put it, "Contentment is a sleepy thing" (p. 146).

Erratic tendencies of conversation are associated with a decline into obscurity and rigidity. If one never examines one's vastly deep convictions, they remain hazy and disconnected; if one never singles out certain things to pursue them, they remain fugitive fancies. Hence, although

> lack of clarity and focus does not preclude useful verbal interchanges, it does make it more difficult to sort the erroneous ideas from the muddled but proper convictions. Doing that requires removing some lack of clarity and filling some gaps in an argument. That takes effort. (Floden, 1985, p. 26)

Tranquil satisfaction with one's doings, thoughts, and feelings can be complacent. If one never presses one's points, one may founder on one's fallacies and expansive vagaries--or do one's partner the disservice of tolerating what is ill-judged or fantastic, though strongly felt. The other side of peaceful acquiescence is passive compliance or submission.

Lack of discrimination verges toward indifference and, in being indifferent, people fail themselves, their partners, and their principles. Differences should not always be smoothed out. Geertz (1986) concludes that "'understanding' in the sense of comprehension, perception, and

insight needs to be distinguished from 'understanding' in the sense of agreement of opinion, union of sentiment, or commonality of commitment . . . . We must learn to grasp what we cannot embrace" (p. 122). The admirable George Meredith put it like this in his prelude to The Egoist (1879/1947): "Why, to be alive, to be quick in soul, there should be diversity in the companion throbs of our pulses. Interrogate them" (p. 3).

To ward off or delimit facile and erratic tendencies of conversation, one must be alert and distinguish between attention and assent or submission--either indiscriminate or insincere. To submit quietly can be quite wrong. One must insist upon the differences between openness, vacuous tolerance, and eventual repression. In other words, one must take recourse to lucid articulation and argumentation, in addition to listening and silence in conversation. Guarded acceptance can be appropriate. As arguments mislead where they remain impoverished communication, so cozily confirming conversations are vulnerable to a capitulation of reason or to its "dispersive flaking away" (Fiumara, 1990, p. 182). While thus some monitoring is needed, overwhelming logical measures are not required. Instead, we should attempt a conversational posture "both accepting and critical, trusting and diffident, irrepressible and yet consoling" (Fiumara, 1990, p. 90). And a little dryness won't hurt.

The Canopy of Conversation

One might conclude that argument and conversation as discourse models of knowledge use are each equally truncated, each being a view of communication reduced by its better half: the first detached from propensities to receive and listen; the second diminished by a waning of principles: "The grey shades of science, laws and principles . . . vanish like a lifeless mist" (Hegel, 1931/1807, p. 385). On this symmetrical proposition, we have light without sweetness and sweetness without light--and the solution seems an equal partnership, as a modern connubial model primly remote from heroic and pastoral romances.

Yet I cannot give much credence to this model. Its symmetry is wanting in ease and freedom; its abstract conception has a gloss that does not reflect the inexplicable and ominous in ordinary experience. Listening to party talk, a protagonist in Virginia Woolf's novel, The Years, thus slips into a nightmare: "He felt that he had been in the middle of a jungle; in the heart of darkness; cutting his way towards the light; but provided only with broken sentences, single words, with which to break through the briarbush of human bodies, human wills and voices, that bent over him, binding him, blinding him" (p. 411). Pretending that all conversational entries can be sorted out by bright arguments fails to admit of impending darkness and fragility and, accordingly, of the need for miracles and grace in communication.

Areas of meaning, Berger (1967) avers, are "carved out of a vast mass of meaninglessness, a small clearing of lucidity in a formless, dark, always ominous jungle" (p. 24); although talking may hold our world together, the "thread of conversation" is thin and wavering. In his lyrical poem, "Two in the Campagna," Robert Browning (1887/1895) offers the image of a "floating

weft," but puts his conclusions with a lighter touch, more wonderingly, and with less a sense of desolation:

Must I go

Still like the thistle-ball, no bar,
  Onward, whenever light winds blow,
Fixed by no friendly star?

Just when I seemed about to learn!
  Where is the thread now? Off again!
The old trick! Only I discern--
  Infinite passion, and the pain

Of finite hearts that yearn. (p. 189)

Pitted against the "heart of darkness" is not sheer intellect but hope, not sophistication but a second innocence of reason. "The sense of the congenial, of a genuine human communication . . . comes from the innocent vision at the heart of all human creation and the response to it" (Frye, 1990, pp. 88-89). In the consort of communicative modes, argument cannot be an equal partner for, in its refiner's fire, variations become, again, impurities--"divergencies from some ideal non-idiomatic manner of speaking" (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 206). On the other hand, conversations can accommodate varieties of voices, including judicious passages of argument. Hence I will opt for conversation as a tender romance of reason, where discourse, shining with warmth from within, holds a promise of congeniality and comfort, if not light. Understanding is no trophy of pride: It is in this spirit, I believe, that Buber (1965) speaks of the "tiny strictness and grace of every day" (p. 36) as the breakthrough in dialogue.

Peirce (1955) concedes that people are not, in the main, logical animals, but rather naturally inclined towards being more hopeful and sanguine than experience and logic would warrant; yet "it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth" (p. 8). The yields of conversation are different from those of heroic romances: there are no translucent perfections, no transcendent victories. Like life, conversation grants no irreversible clarification. Under its canopy, gifts and risks are commensurate with the scope of conversation: they are the promises and dangers of our kind. "The reason why most of us are unaware of this precariousness most of the time is grounded in the continuity of our conversation with significant others. The maintenance of such continuity is one of the most important imperatives of the social order" (Berger, 1967, p. 16).

There are good reasons for preferring companionable to war-like visions, fallibilism to perfectionism, the middling to the conquering classes and pretensions, hope and tolerant laughter to the cynicism and destruction induced by raging attempts at controlling the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of life. While conversations cannot make them pure, they can make one's fixed

thoughts fluid and permeable to the mystery of difference. Auerbach (1946/1953, p. 13) points out that, in the epics of Homer, we are always reminded of the real world which means nothing but itself; ordinary life with its shepherds' huts, washing days, feasts, and palaces must be imagined as enveloping the heroic struggles. Let argument, likewise, be nested in conversation as an encompassing romance of reason, on the understanding that "any story which we tell ourselves consoles us since it imposes pattern upon something which might otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete" (Murdoch, 1970, p. 87).

REFERENCES

Auerbach, E. (1953). Mimesis: The representation of reality in Western literature (W. R. Trask, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1946)

Berger, P. L. (1967). The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion. New York: Doubleday.

Boring, E. G. (1963). Psychology of controversy. In his History, psychology, and science: Selected papers (pp. 67 - 84). New York: John Wiley.

Boswell, J. (1966). Life of Johnson. London: Oxford University Press.

Browning, R. (1895). The complete poetic and dramatic works of Robert Browning. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Buber, M. (1965). Between man and man (M. Friedman and R. G. Smith, Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

Campbell, D. T. (1982). Experiments as arguments. Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 3, 327 - 337.

Cohen, D. K., & Garet, M. S. (1975). Reforming educational policy with applied social research. Harvard Educational Review, 45, 17 - 43.

Cronbach, L. J., & [specify] et al. (1980). Toward reform of program evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Dunn, W. (1982). Reforms as arguments. Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 3, 293 - 326.

Eliot, T. S. (1970). Collected poems 1909-1962. San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Fiumara, G. C. (1990). The other side of language: A philosophy of listening (C. Lambert, Trans.). London: Routledge.

Floden, R. E. (1985). The role of rhetoric in changing teachers' beliefs. Teaching & Teacher Education, 1, 19-32.

Frye, N. (1990). Words with power. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Frye, N. (1967). The knowledge of good and evil. In M. Black (Ed.), The morality of scholarship (pp. 3 - 28). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gadamer, H. G. (1975). Truth and method (Trans. Ed. G. Barden and E. Cumming). New York: Seabury.

Geertz, C. (1986). The uses of diversity. Michigan Quarterly Review, 25, 105-123.

Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics: Speech acts (Vol. 3) (pp. 41 - 58). New York: Academic Press.

Habermas, J. (1973). Wahrheitstheorien. In Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag (pp. 211 - 265). Pfullingen, Germany: Neske.

Habermas, J., & Luhnmann, N. (1971). Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie--Was leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1967/1807). The phenomenology of mind (J. B. Baillie, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.

Kennedy, M. (1981). Together and apart. New York: Dial Press.

Kolakowski, L. (1972). The presence of myth (A. Czerniawski, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Locke, J. (1959). An essay concerning human understanding. Vol. 2. New York: Dover.

Meehl, P. E. (1971). Law and the fireside inductions: Some reflections of a clinical psychologist. Journal of Social Issues, 27, 65-100.

Meredith, G. (1947). The egoist: A comedy in narrative. London: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1879)

Mill, J. S. (1962). Coleridge. In G. Himmelfarb (Ed.), Essays on politics and culture (pp. 121 - 172). Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (Original work published 1840)

Murdoch, I. (1970). The sovereignty of good. London: Ark Paperbacks.

Nemerov, H. (1978). Figures of thought: speculations on the meaning of poetry and other essays. Boston: David R. Godine.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1990). Love's knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.

Oakeshott, M. (1962). The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind. In his Rationalism in politics (pp. 197-247). New York: Basic Books.

Peirce, C. S. (1955). The fixation of belief. In J. Buchler (Ed.), Philosophical writings of Peirce (pp. 5-22). New York: Dover.

Polanyi, M. (1967). The growth of knowledge in society. Minerva, 55, 533-545.

Popper, K. R. (1962). On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance. Encounter, 19(3), 42-57.

Popper, K. R. (1975). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Traherne, T. (1966). Poems, centuries and three thanksgivings (A. Ridler, Ed.). London: Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1980). G. H. Von Wright, (Ed.), Culture and value (P. Winch, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Woolf, V. (1965). The years. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World.

Wordsworth, W. (1904). Preface. In A. J. George (Ed.), The complete poetical works of William Wordsworth (pp. 790-799). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Original work published 1800)

CONVERSATION AS A ROMANCE OF REASON:

A RESPONSE TO BUCHMANN

James W. Garrison
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

What follows will be a strange response for this society. Why? Because it is a response to a paper that I have not read and did not hear before today. Actually it is not a response to a paper at all. Rather it is a response to a paper proposal that I received from Margret about a month ago.1 My response will follow her outline and depends on some of the bibliographical materials that Margret provided me prior to this conference, although more basically it follows the course of the ongoing conversation that I have had with the author in the past. I perceive this response as merely a moment in our continuing conversation for I am quite sure I have failed to anticipate many of her most important points. Allow me to add that my present predicament is not the fault of Professor Buchmann, she had prior commitments that kept her out of the country until just before our conference and we knew that this might happen. And it did.

Since I could gather no image of the final form or content of Margret's paper, and since she always surprises me anyway, I preferred not to attempt to integrate my response, but instead, to simply play with some of the isolated possibilities offered by her outline. The goal of my response is not part of the usual critical role taken by the respondent in the commonplace language game of academic conferences. In part the critical role is not required in the present case because the author is herself engaged in self-critique. What I want to do is open up a public space wherein we can playfully consider some of the imaginative possibilities for conversation. And that is my first point. One role for conversation may not be communication at all; rather it may be to open up public spaces for possible subsequent communication and action. Rather than being merely rationally informative in the usual information theoretic sense; that is, decreasing uncertainty bit by bit; I want, instead, to increase uncertainly.

Buchmann begins with a quote from Peirce. I will begin with one from Dewey. It reads, "Logic in its fulfillment recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue. Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought."2 Dewey's etymology here is right, as far as it goes. Later I will suggest a second Heideggerian etymology that may take us beyond conversation as communication alone, to poesis, that is, the making of primordial meaning.

Correspondence: James W. Garrison, Division of Curriculum and Instruction, College of Education, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0313

Dewey's insight, however, allows us to see why conversation may be a romance of reason in many senses of the word "romance" to which we will return. Conversations have many moments. Only sometimes are they dialogues and oftentimes even good conversations are pointless or seemingly so. They may be carried out simply for the sake of companionship and good company. Conversations have silences and sometimes should; they also have moments of soliloquy. Shakespeare's soliloquies are often magnificent interludes within powerfully dramatic narratives. Sometimes the drama alone can carry the narrative. Sometimes nothing is said.

Some things can only be shown. There is what George Herbert Mead called the conversation of gestures. Think about the pantomime, or what happens when lovers touch. We must resist any attempt to reduce conversation to an exclusively or even mostly a cognitive or intellectual function; it is mostly about mood and making things happen. The adjective "thoughtful" that picks up careful solicitude as well as cognition can restore the connection between detached moments of conversation. There is more to thoughtful conversations than a rational report of ideas can realize. Margret does not think that we can separate conversation and argument nor can we simply associate argument with "combat" and conversation with "kind and cozy." I feel that she is right. To see this point more clearly let us pause to consider Jerome Bruner's distinction between "two modes of thought."

Bruner thinks that there "are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two (though complementary) are irreducible to one another;" Bruner continues, "Each of the ways of knowing, moreover, has operating principles of its own and its own criteria of well-formedness. They differ radically in their procedures of verification. A good story [narrative] and a well formed argument are different kinds,"3 Bruner argues that narratives seek "versimilitude" in portraying the "the vicissitudes of human intention" while argument is concerned with truth. I think that narratives can reveal truth. I was forced to realize a truth about myself when I read Vivian Gussin Paley's "the boy who would be a helicopter."4 Any atheist that accepts St. Anselm's ontological argument will have their lives dramatically changed. Arguments are probably just an especially precise kind of narrative and narratives just a moment in a continuing conversation.

We have taken a brief look at conversation as a romance of reason and dismissed the sharp distinctions between argument and conversation while suggesting that reason or even communication is only one of the purposes conversation can serve (largely Margret's A1, and B.). Before turning to the poetic consequences (Margret's B2) of all of this let us consider some senses of the word romance, guess which one Margret is interested in and suggest how the other senses might apply.

The unabridged Oxford English Dictionary includes several definitions of romance. We will only look at the most relevant. One definition is, "A tale in verse, embodying the adventures of some hero of chivalry..." The hero of medieval quest romance typically set off on some adventure, slew the dragon, won the woman and lost her, due to his self-ignorance. After a period of madness won her again when he finally came to self-knowledge. Substitute "reason" for "woman" and take "man" generically and the tale may not change all that much.

Two more definitions of romance are, "A fictitious narrative in phrase in which the scene and incidents are very remote from those of ordinary life" and "an extravagant fiction, invention, or story; a wild or wanton exaggeration". What I imagine Margret wants most from conversation is its ordinary life-likeness, and that is what will be lost if we limit its function exclusively to the logical or even the communicative; although we should not lose sight of the logical moments conversations can have also. Said differently, conversation as logic alone or perhaps even as always excluding logic is a "romance of reason," that is, it involves "romantic ideas," to use a subdefinition from OED, that may be "extravagant exaggeration."

For Heidegger "the logos as declarative predication; the logic of reason is itself the organization of the dominion of purposeful self-assertion...." Heidegger attempted to transcend the modern Western Enlightenment tradition that leads from Francis Bacon's "Knowledge is Power" to Richard Rorty's reaffirmation of Baconian willful self-assertion. Heidegger sought to escape what he saw as the end of Western metaphysics, that is, Nietzshe's "will to power," though the self-eclipsing qualities of poetry that allowed things, events and their infinite possibility to act upon us. Dewey's instrumentalism, insofar as he is instrumentalist, limits his understanding of logic (logos) to discourse.

In his An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger observes: "Logos means the word, discourse... But originally logos did not mean speech, discourse. It's fundamental meaning stands in no direct relation to language."5 Instead, "the basic meaning of logos, [is] collection, to collect" or what he also calls "gathering."6 At this level we move beyond philosophy to poetry. As he concludes: "We do not learn who man is by learned definitions [e.g., Aristotle's "rational animal" or "featherless biped"]; we learn it only when man contends with the essent ["Endering presence" or "things that art"], striving to bring it into being...when he projects something new (not yet present), when he creates original poetry, when he builds poetically."7 Beauty discloses itself, for Heidegger, in the essents, in the gathering that poetry reveals. Poetry for Heidegger is making meaning, or more exactly, bringing into existence. In "The Question Concerning Technology" (remember techne is the form of knowledge appropriate to poesis), Heidegger makes much of a passage occurring at Plato's Symposium 205b.8 The Symposium is a dialogue about love and Socrates acknowledges that it was a woman, Diotima the Mantinean, who "taught me the philosophy of love." In the middle of the dialogue Diotima breaks off to tell Socrates that "there is more than one kind of poetry in the true sense of the word -- that is to say, calling something into existence that was not there before, so that every kind of artistic creation is poetry, and every artist is a poet." At first it might seem odd that Diotima would interrupt her dialogue with Socrates regarding the philosophy of love to speak of poetry; however, making love includes making children, making a family, making a community, and making a conversation. After all, that is as much making meaning as other social activities as metallurgy, music, sculpting or statecraft. Equity and equality are among things made. Their making involve claims about procedural, contextual and outcome factors, and since the pratices of making invoke the virtures of the practice, there must be an underlying ethic.

Rather than trying to anticipate Buchmann's detailed discussion of Robert Elsmere and False Dawn, the latter of which I read and was ravished by, I will wait for now (Wednesday, October 14, 1991) until today to listen to what she has to say next Friday (today) and talk to her

them. As for the gaps in the conversation between Margret and myself, the failures to anticipate what she said today, the irrelevances and misunderstandings, of these I can only ask that you and she ignore some things, indulge others, forgive a few, think about one or two things, feel not too upset and if moved, to act, please do not do it right now by walking out on the rest of today's conversation. Thank you.

---

1. The following is a personal correspondence from Margret Buchmann, September, 1991.

CONVERSATION AS A ROMANCE OF REASON
Margret Buchmann

A. Introduction

1. Start with Peirce quote on "bride"--are we now as bewitched by conversation as Peirce by logic?

2. Conversation as a "romance of reason" is celebrated widely, and also in my own work

a) What I mean by "romance"

b) How my TCR piece on conversation and argument is a case in point

B. Look at Conversation as a Romance of Reason from the Point of View of Logic and of Experience

1. Is the distinction between conversation and argument watertight--or even all that useful?

a) My own points--and those of others (e.g., Cohen & Garet*)-- certainly offered as an argument; moreover, I admit that conversation can include stretches of argument.

b) Do ways of talking and certain ethics really come as a "package deal": argument combative, conversation kind and cosy?

2. Examples from fiction used to test claims about conversation against experience. My texts centrally involve truth (logic, facts) and beauty--two of the great ideas of philosophy, poetry, and humankind--and the advancement of those ideas in conversation.

a) Mrs. H. Ward, Robert Elsmere

b) Edith Wharton, False Dawn
I draw on (but by no means exhaust!) these texts to test claims about conversation in conversation with them, including

i. Presumptions of equity/equality

ii. claims about procedural, contextual, and outcome factors

iii. underlying ethic

*Cohen, D. K., & Garet, M. s. (1975). Reforming educational policy with applied social research. Harvard Educational Review, 45, 17-43.

2. John Dewey, The Public and its Problems. Chicago, Swallow Press, (1954) p. 218.
3. Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 11.
4. Vivian Gussin Paley "the boy who would be a helicopter" Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1990.
5. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. New York, Doubleday & Company, 1959, pp. 104-5.
6. Ibid., p. 105.
7. Ibid., p. 121.
8. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology. Harper Torchbooks, 1977, p. 10.

IN SEARCH OF A CALLING

Thomas O. Buford
Furman University

Introduction

Higher education is presently undergoing intense scrutiny. The universities, in particular, are cited for increasingly emphasizing research while decreasing the value of teaching, particularly that of undergraduates. This has found its way to the small liberal arts college. Fifty of them banded together under the title, "research colleges," and schools such as Colorado College, Grinnell, Wellesley, and Furman reduced faculty loads to give faculty more time to do "their own work."[1] Something is wrong with higher education. In this paper I continue my participation in the conversation about higher education in America by giving my own analysis of why it has gone awry, by offering a suggestion for bringing it back on course, and giving some reasons to make that suggestion credible. My claim is that the American college has abandoned its mission to educate students to find and prepare for what they are to do and be. To do that I suggest that we recall from our collective memory and refurbish a framework for thinking about persons and their education that has fallen from use in the American college. That way of thinking is the CALLING.

Visualize Puritan New England, particularly Harvard in 1640's, and watch Michael Wigglesworth walk onto the campus, matriculate, and settle in. Placed in the second floor 'Long Chamber' that served as the freshmen dormitory, he slept two-a-bed, four to a chamber with a tutor to keep order. Close by and still on the second floor was the library. Below in the dining hall fifty could sit in a pinch. The decencies of English college were observed with high table where the fellows dined with the commoners. Harvard was not a democratic institution, as the New England community was not. Freshmen were placed in an Order of Seniority. This ranking was based on scholastic merit as tested during the first term or two in college. By 1720 the practice grew of placing sons of royal governors and councilors at the top, sons of college graduates next, and the rest at the bottom. Punishment by the faculty often included degradation in this order. And the cost of educating young Michael for his calling? About 10 pounds, for which one could buy a house with three fireplaces and some land, or pay two years' salary for a hired hand to work on the place; 10 pounds was the amount the average working man in New England earned in a year (the relative costs about the same today). How were accounts settled? Sometimes in cash, but often in goods ranging from wheat to chickens.

But what was Michael Wigglesworth expecting from Harvard? The 1650 charter of Harvard declares the purpose of the college to be "The advancement of all good literature, arts and Sciences," "the advancement and education of youth in all manner of good literature Arts

Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, Furman University, Greenville, SC 29613

and Sciences," and "all other necessary provisions that may conduce to the education of the English and Indian youth of this Country in knowledge and godliness."[2] And what was Michael seeking? An education, it is easy to say. But look deeply into the metaphysical, moral framework that is assumed by the charter and which defined and clarified Michael's behavior and you find that he was preparing himself to serve God and man by fulfilling his calling.

Am I suggesting that we become Puritans and enter their world, witch hunts and all? No, but I do believe something significant occurred among these people and that we should carefully consider claiming it for our own. Why should we want to do that? The reason is simple: institutions of higher learning, particularly the American college, fail properly to educate its students; specifically they do not prepare students to live their callings. To support this claim I must explain what I mean by calling, how it is connected to education, why and how the college fails in that regard, and why a calling is important to a student's full and proper education. I must leave to another time a discussion of the differences this educational vision would make to a college that took it seriously. To get our bearings lets turn to a discussion of the

I. Meaning of calling and its connection to education

1. Historical framework of calling and its relation to education -- The roots of calling are both social and moral. It first arises in the Western tradition among the Hebrews who believed that God called them from the land of Abraham to the promised land and to perform a priestly function. The Hebrews believed God called judges or military leaders such as Joshua to lead them in battle against their oppressors and prophets to call a straying people back to their moral vision. This tradition of the call continued among Christians, who thought of the church as the community of called out ones, the eklesia, the root of which is klesia, call. Usually calling was not an economic term, though Paul did use it in I Cor. 7:22 in that manner.

In the Middle Ages calling was usually associated with monks, those who believed they had been set aside for spiritual purposes. However, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas calling was set in the framework of the great chain of being, a "cosmos of callings," to use Troeltsch's apt expression. But this was more a matter of accepting ones destiny in the created order and not resisting it. Any person who fails to recognize who they are, what they are to do, and what they are to be runs the risk of upsetting the cosmic order of things and bringing evil on oneself and others. The economic implications are also significant; if one does not stay in ones place the economic order will be upset and great harm can come to all. These people lived on the assumption that goods are limited. So find ones place, the place of one's father, and stay there. In so doing one serves the whole community.

However, the Reformers expanded the meaning of calling, though retaining much of its past. Luther attacked the monastic system by dignifying common labor. Every work is as pleasing to God as every other one. But Luther was also a son of the middle ages, and he advocated the status quo -- stand and grow in the shadow of one's father. Calvin continued Luther's emphasis on the dignity of every type of labor, but significantly developed the idea of calling. Persons have two callings: the general one, to salvation and right relation to God, and

a particular one, to a station in society. Both of these must be seen within Calvin's view of election and the significance of work in the life of the saints. Calvin believed that the sovereign God chose before creation those who will receive salvation. All others do not receive grace and are by their sin doomed to eternal damnation. The work of the saints is to love God and their fellowman; through them God works for the salvation of the world.

From the point of view of the sojourner, however, it is not clear whether or not one is a member of the invisible saints. In an effort to resolve that pastoral problem, the Calvinists determined that both inner certainty of salvation and the manifestation of God through ones works attest to ones religious safety. Since God works through the redeemed for the redemption of the world, God assigned each of them a niche in the total scheme of things that is good for society. That "purpose of one's days" is ones particular calling, and one must submit to it. By obeying God's call combined with the hard work that allows God to manifest that he is working his way through us, our fears are quieted, our confidence is bolstered; we are safe in the everlasting arms. Here we see behavior become highly organized, efficient, effective -- rationalized -- under the vision of the sovereignty of God and the Calling. (Remember, however, that Calvin was deeply influenced by Seneca and Stoicism. His world view is difficult to understand if one ignores the impact of Stoicism on it.)

In contrast, the Humanists argued that persons have the ability to mold their own lives and can be whatever they want to be. Nothing prohibits them from so doing, so thought Pico della Mirandola. Humanists such as Vives and Erasmus, under the influence of classical writers such as Cicero and Quintillian, emphasized the wide range of human capabilities. Parents and educators should carefully consider the talents, inborn tendencies, and interests of the young before they embark on an education. There is no need to educate a person for a task for which they are unsuited. The educational significance of this line of thought is obvious, and its impact is felt today.

Both lines of thought came together in England in the sixteenth century. We see it among the Puritans in Cambridge, particularly in the writings of William ("Painful") Perkins. Perkins, a professor of theology at Cambridge who died in 1602, believed that Calvin was right about the Calling, "A vocation or calling, is a certain kind of life, ordained and imposed on man by God, for the common good."[3] But so were the humanists. Perkins recognized both the general and the particular calling, but he believed that parents must guide their young into those kinds of work that best suit their talents and contribute to the good of all. In addition he offered suggestions for deciding among possible types of work and overcoming the problem of the conflict of callings.

Once a person finds his calling he must prepare for it. Those entering the position in the directive class must gain the knowledge and develop the skills necessary to assume the responsibilities and perform the duties of their various stations. This required a university education. There a young man identified himself with what he learned and the station he was to occupy; his identity was being formed. His calling formed his identity. He was expected rationally to govern his emotions, feelings, desires and behavior. These can divert one from the calling, leading to increased sin and to additional doubts about ones salvation. The university's

contribution to preparing one to occupy ones divinely appointed niche was to train the mind and to lead to a mastery of theology and classical studies, the liberal arts and sciences.

The influence of Perkins and Calvinism at Cambridge on the early American colleges was profound. Though the Anglicans established the College of William and Mary and the Catholics later formed their own institutions, Harvard and the other small colleges in New England set the framework that defined higher education in America through the nineteenth century. For example, the purpose of Harvard's curriculum was to prepare a student to serve God and man through obedience to and the proper exercise of his calling. True to the Cambridge influence, as well as Oxford's, this required the study of both theology and the liberal arts; Calvin and the Renaissance Humanists were alive and well at Harvard. Thus, the calling as Perkins understood it deeply influenced the curriculum of the American college before the revolution.

2. Characteristics of living within and according to ones niche in relation to the Puritan ideal of the CALLING --- Before we proceed any further let's think through the meaning of calling. What does it come down to in the final analysis? A calling, as understood by the Puritans, is the commitment of ones life to loving and obeying God and to the service to other persons. First, in Calvin's theology God is the absolute Sovereign Creator who works his mysterious purposes through a hierarchically ordered world in which everyone has an appointed place and to which each is called. (A version of the great chain of being was alive and well in Calvin's thought). A person's place was not only to be subordinate to God but also to commit ones life to the assigned station in society and its duties. Second, calling implied that one develop a particular kind of personality. The nature of personality assumed by that vision was often articulated by seventeenth century followers of Calvin in Cartesian terms.

In the language of Descartes, the self is a created substance that is independent of all changes that occur in the person. The particular changing thoughts, feelings, desires, hopes, and dreams are dependent on the self or person. These changing mental events form our personality. The person does not change but her personality does. Thus as I prepare for my calling I am forming a personality. (Calvinism and Cartesianism are two tap roots of the modern notion of personality; subjectivity as it sometimes called today.) Now, the proper personality manifests God's way; it is an instrument of God's working his will in the world. That requires that my own interests, feelings, hopes, fears, desires must through strong moral discipline be totally subordinated to God's commandments. One's doubts about redemption are allayed by a properly formed personality. Here we find the two distinguishable but inseparable aspects of a calling: one practical and the other moral. Together they constitute who one is, ones personal identity. (Note: this identity is the identity of personality, not of person. The identity of person is a theological- metaphysical issue. The person was a creature of God whether under grace or under sin and damnation.) We can call the practical/moral identity constituted by the calling rich identity.

What is required to form this personality? First, the theological-moral vision of a Sovereign God's expectations for humans; second, the discipline of the rational agent; and third, an education in theology and the liberal arts. We have discussed the first two; let us now turn to the third. The Puritan believed that to find and prepare for ones calling required the ability

to read the Scriptures, an understanding of theology (catechizing the young continued at least until the Revolution), and an understanding of the arts and sciences. Only through the latter could one understand properly God's created world and find ones way in it; in other words, find your calling and prepare for it. Keep in mind that most young men who went to college prepared for the calling of God to preach.

Now we can understand the connection between calling and education in American college through the mid-18th century. The early American college aspired to educate students to fulfill their calling. Though its mission was to form the rich identity of its students, it did not dictate to them what that identity must be (the college was not a Calvinistic Sovereign Transcendent All-knowing God).

II. How and why the college abdicated its task of educating the young regarding their rich identity

1. The history of American education from the mid- 17th century through the twentieth century -- With this background we can understand the story of the American college turning away from educating for the calling. The unity of the curriculum as formed by the calling felt its first major challenge in the mid-1700's as the New Learning came to America. The writings of Descartes, Locke, Newton, Gassendi, Malebranche, LeClerc, Norris, Clarke, and the Cambridge Platonists such as More arrived at Yale College in the Dummer collection in 1717-1718, and they made it the finest library in the colonies. Yale soon revised its curriculum to include the latest of seventeenth century continental thought. And usurping the preferred place of theology, the ethics course that read Hutchinson among others became the focal point as well as the most popular one in the curriculum.

Slowly through the eighteenth century under the impact of settling and developing a new land as well as the impact of the insights of the new learning the theological-metaphysical framework (the great chain of being) that undergirded calling eroded. Yet the understanding of a well lived life remained the same, in form at least: rationalized actions, but now under a problematic theological vision. God is still God, but not understood as the Medievalists and Reformers understood God. In the thought of Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin we find the form of personality demanded by the calling but without the chassis of the Puritan theological vision. The theological framework for these men as for others of the American Enlightenment was Deistic. It is also interesting and important to point out that the metaphysical framework began to shift under the New Learning from God and the created world to thinking things and extended things, the mind -- nature dichotomy so clearly articulated by Descartes.

Further encouragements to abandon the calling occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1820 colleges that continued the patterns of the 1700's struggled, but those that opened their curriculum and modified their mission found a way to survive. With the impact of growing industrialization in America opportunities for work challenged the narrow, traditional vision of the Puritan world. Soon young people began to look not to the calling in a traditional society but to a career in a industrial society. With the development of industry

came a change in the life arc of persons; the notion of "youth" arose. Colleges had to face the fact that young people saw their years after secondary schooling and before entering a chosen career as a period of their youth. And they expected colleges to guide them through their youth and to educate them to a career.

Third, in the late nineteenth century the theological infrastructure of liberal learning began to feel the heat of the developing and highly successful sciences. Knowledge was defined in terms of the deliverances of the sciences. The ideal for every discipline was to emulate the sciences, and that included research. In particular, the spread of evolutionary theory by Herbert Spencer helped undercut the traditional theological view of God and the world. Now forming a career required competition, and only the fittest survived. Finally, in the late 1800's careers came under the criteria of the newly formed professional organizations, whose work was to standardize the credentials of the different types of work from Law to Medicine to Teaching. The college felt the deep and far-reaching impact of the New Learning, of industrialization and the demand for education for a career, of the scientific view of knowledge, and of the credentialing professions. By the turn of the twentieth century collegiate education fell under the exclusive spell of powerful scientific, social, political, economic forces. The colleges were expected to provide leadership for a nation facing complex and difficult problems. An animating theological and metaphysical vision and educating for a calling became relics of the past.

What is the point of this quick survey? It places in historical context the present day commitments within which colleges educate students, and it helps us to understand what these commitments mean. We learn that the college today seeks to educate only for work, for intelligent participation in the life of our democracy, that is, for what one does. In that understanding of its mission the college educates for a truncated identity: practical, rationalized behavior. It rejects as intellectually irresponsible any attempt to formulate and defend a metaphysical and/or theological vision that can morally constitute behavior. Under the impact of skepticism and positivism many academicians no longer believe that such a culturally shared vision is possible, though it is always possible for anyone to believe whatever they want. Even if it could be formulated adequately, there would be no way to determine if it is correct. There are no commonly accepted criteria to which all of us must appeal to adjudicate disputes in the area of a moral, theological, metaphysical vision. And some believe there is no framework at all, that we are alone. Anxiety, angst is the signal characteristic of our day, they say. Given its lack of confidence in any coherent moral vision and powerful forces restricting its imagination the college has abandoned the mission to educate its students to a rich identity, to find work good for them and to morally stake it out. The college does not educate a student regarding who she is, what she is to do, what she is to be.

III. Why is a Calling Important to a Student's Full and Proper Education?

1. The problem of identity and a calling -- It can reasonably be asked why colleges should pay attention to the rich identity I have been discussing? Don't they have enough to do preparing students for careers, for the professions, for research, and for public service? Unfortunately, a careful consideration of the nature of persons must lead us to say no. If the

college in its attempt to be rational, objective, and value free limits its educational mission to the practical identity of persons, it adopts an incoherent view of the person. It fails to recognize that what persons do is never simply rational, objective, and value free; a person's practical life necessarily involves a moral vision of some sort. If that is correct and the college claims to educate persons, it cannot leave to chance a student's critically adopting a moral vision. And it must aid students in integrating their moral and practical lives. But how shall we conceive of that rich identity? My claim is that a calling is a fruitful way of doing so. But how shall we conceive of calling that does not necessarily embroil us in a particular theology or metaphysics? We gain some help if we set calling within a narrative view of the person.

2. A narrative view of the person -- It seems clear to me that the starting point, square one, for all philosophical investigation is a transcendental radical empiricism. Experience is always structured by language. Experience as mine and meaningful to me is narrative in form. Our first memories are family stories; but we soon learn the narratives of other families, of our communities, of our nation. As we understand more and more of our culture we take the soundings of its sacred stories. Those interpretations become our mundane stories. We find our way within them through our own individual narratives, and those narratives form our identity.

If we examine the categorical structure of a life-narrative we find a purposive, complex, time-binding, unifying, embodied agent with regnant ideals who creatively finds her practical/moral identity; that is, we find a person. A person's personality or narrative is the result of creatively exploring through linguistic form the surrounding "medium," the physical, narrative environment in which one finds oneself. How does calling fit within this view of person?

Calling in the life of persons (both male and female) is the theme of their narrative, where theme is understood as the characteristic or mark that distinguishes and identifies the particular narrative and is that around which and for the sake of which narratives are crafted. The key ingredient of calling is a theme (1) that is one's own but interwoven with the narratives of other persons and that are crafted within social, historical, and physical relationships (this constitutes one's "place" in the world), (2) that includes a regnant ideal (traditionally known as the good and that on which a person takes a moral stand), (3) that identifies a career or work to which a person is pulled and is committed and that serves others, (4) that fits one's gifts (talents and competencies), and (5) that must be learned and enacted (including imaginatively constructing, telling, remembering, and living it).

Given the contingencies of our lives it is unlikely that we have one and only one regnant calling remaining constant throughout our lives (though one ingredient such as a commitment to a regnant ideal may remain constant). First, most of us have many themes available to us in terms of which we can construct our life narrative (for example, a theme at one time of one's life may give way to another one marking a change in one's life such as a marriage or a divorce). Second, each of us has many "gifts" or talents that can be legitimately developed. Third, learning must be understood within the framework of persons developmentally moving through stages or "chapters." Fourth, a calling is always communal in nature (themes are never constructed and entered into apart from the narratives of others, both past and present). All of these suggest

both that a person has a calling and not the calling and that a person will most likely be creatively searching for an identity at different stages of life. Thus, the search for a calling is for answers to the deepest questions persons ask about themselves: who am I? What am I to do? What am I to be? In their callings persons find their practical/moral identities. Without a calling their lives would be rickety constructions without deep moral significance and meaning.

Calling understood within the narrative view of the person provides a vision which should guide the college as it builds its educational program. Such a vision requires careful examination of both extracurricular and curricular activities regarding their contribution to the developing narrative theme of the student. In addition to focusing on a body of knowledge, courses must meet the requirement of enabling students to search for a calling, to develop thematically their own narratives.

Teaching in the college must be modified in light of student developmental patterns. The teaching act must address students with full recognition both that students, in developing their narratives, go through various stages of development in their college career and that they will continue to develop through the remainder of their lives. Teachers must start where students are in their developmental-narrative arc and guide them to grapple with the fundamental questions of their own identity.

Conclusion

The college by focusing on a person's callings has a vision around which it can develop its educational program and thereby reclaim its legacy of educating the whole person. Its failure to do so leaves unaddressed that which constitutes ones identity in the rich sense of that word. If colleges continue to do that they graduate students to their careers who have not thought carefully about the moral significance of their practice and the conduct of the institutions of their society. Students lacking that kind of education are ripe for the efficient, the effective, the functional, the self-centered life. Their rickety, airy moral structure is easily ignored under the pressure of the practical, the expedient. But the college in developing its curriculum must pay attention to the moral dimension of students' lives. It is time the university regains its legacy of preparing students in their search for a calling.

---

1. Lynne Cheney. Tyrannical Machines, A Report on Educational Practices Gone Wrong and Our Best Hopes for Setting Them Right (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for the Humanities, 1990), 26.

2. Samuel Eliot Morison. Intellectual Life of Colonial New England (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), 31-32.

3. William Perkins, quoted by Robert B. Shaw. The Call of God, The Theme of Vocation in the Poetry of Donne and Herbert (New York: Cowley Publications, 1981), 19.

LISTENING FOR THE CALL

(RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR BUFORD)

Peter F. Carbone, Jr.
Duke University

Professor Buford argues that "the American college has abandoned its mission to educate students to find and prepare for what they are to do and be." Instead, the modern American college "seeks to educate only for work, for intelligent participation in the life of our democracy . . . " In other words, our colleges are more interested in what our students will do in a decidedly narrow, practical sense than what they will be when their formal education has been completed.

In recent years this sort of criticism has become a familiar refrain in the educational literature, as liberal arts programs have grown increasingly amorphous. Since they lack an underlying foundation of beliefs and values or a unifying principle of organization, colleges, lately, have experienced much difficulty in devising coherent programs of liberal studies. The consensus of attitudes, ideals, and convictions that once lent support to the classical curriculum simply no longer exists. Due to factors familiar to all of us -- the exponential proliferation of knowledge, steadily increasing specialization, the lack of any real agreement concerning the nature, meaning, and justification of value judgments, the absence of belief in eternal truths or perennial values (the very terms sound quaint to us) -- we simply have no basis for agreement regarding the subject matter that is essential (as distinct from merely desirable) to a liberal arts curriculum. As a result, colleges that are still committed to the ideal tend to waver between wide-open elective systems (hoping that students will somehow range broadly yet judiciously over the curriculum) and somewhat arbitrary distributional requirements, depending on which of the two are in vogue when curricular revisions are undertaken.

As a possible remedy to the situation Professor Buford recommends a recommitment to an educational ideal that once enjoyed a respected position among educational aims, namely the notion of "a calling." In this connection, Buford points out that preparing students to live their callings was indeed one of the primary aims of the early American college, notably 17th century Harvard.

But how exactly are we to understand the concept of "a calling?" Well, the 17th century view, according to Buford, included religious, social, and economic elements, some of which (notably the religious components) originated with the ancient Hebrews and early Christians, and were later adopted, in some cases with modifications, by later thinkers such as St. Thomas, Luther, and Calvin. In any event, the theological idea of a calling finally culminating in Calvinistic doctrine was two-fold: a general relationship to God, hopefully leading to salvation, and a particular call to one's proper station in life. Thus the call, for those who heard it, carried socio-economic (to use a contemporary term) as well as spiritual connotations. To answer the call meant being of service to both God and community.

Professor Buford goes on to explain that yet another important contribution to the meaning of the term "calling" was furnished by humanists such as Pico della Mirandola and Erasmus who emphasized human will, potential, talents, and interests in finding and pursuing one's calling. Thus the notion of calling by the time of its arrival in 16th Century England included both Divine imposition and human agency. Callings were ordained by God, but human perception and cognition were required in order to find and pursue them. This was the view, Buford tell us, that profoundly influenced the Puritans and also early American higher education, for it was the role of the college "to prepare a student to serve God and man through obedience to and the proper exercise of his calling."

Finally, according to Professor Buford, the notion of calling implied "a properly formed personality," one that mirrored the will of God in a person's feelings, interests and desires. Such a personality included a certain moral discipline coupled with the exercise of rationality, both of which could be fostered by a liberal arts education. Liberal education was designed not to dictate a particular calling to 17th and 18th Century students, but rather to assist them in finding and fulfilling their personal identities. Gradually, however, as Tom notes, a number of forces converged to undermine the privileged place accorded to the pursuit of a calling in American higher education. These forces included an influx of new philosophical and scientific thought from the Continent, the practical exigencies of "developing a new land," and increasing industrialization along with its attendant careerism, all of which eroded the theological-moral framework supportive of this particular educational aim. The upshot of all this is that the American college has long since abandoned its metaphysical/theological vision of higher education and settles for preparing students to be successful in their chosen professions. No longer does the contemporary college seek to guide students in their search for a sense of what Tom refers to as "a rich identity," an integration of students' moral and practical lives. Instead, the current emphasis in higher education is on practical and (at best) civic considerations.

Well, then, is there anything that can be done to integrate students' practical and moral lives? Tom, if I am interpreting him correctly, wants to say that a revival of the notion of calling is not out of the question, provided that we can divest it of the no-longer generally convincing metaphysical-theological connotations that sustained it in earlier times. Thus he introduces the idea of "a narrative view of the person." As I understand the concept, one's individual narrative is an outgrowth of one's personal experience and shapes one's identify in a truly profound manner. That is to say, our personal narratives indicate just who we are and what we aspire to become. Further, at the core of one's narrative rests a characteristic, definitive theme, which includes as its "key ingredient" one's personal calling. Thus one's calling comes very close to providing a window to one's personal essence and human potential. Hence the guidance of students in their quest to find themselves becomes a plausible educational ideal sans the metaphysical/theological trappings that contributed to the abandonment of calling as a viable educational aim in the modern university.

What Tom has provided here, then, is an imaginative and unifying conception of undergraduate education, but quite frankly I question its prospects for implementation in the foreseeable future. Basically, I have two reservations, one more or less theoretical and the other practical. In the first place, it is one thing to suggest a unifying theme for undergraduate

education, and quite another to specify course content and instructional methods, and to determine the criteria for making such choices. The notorious failure of college and university faculties to arrive at anything approaching a consensus regarding the courses to be included, or a convincing rationale for the selection process itself, in the plethora of liberal arts programs that have emerged over the past 20 years or so is eloquent testimony to the difficulty of the problem. One suspects that the adoption of specific course requirements is more often than not the result of a series of curricular trade- offs between folks with vested academic interests.

Secondly, I cannot help wondering whether curricular decisions in American higher education are so heavily influenced by external funding that reforms based on educational and philosophical principles almost inevitably carry less weight than the needs and desires of the grant-givers. More than a half century ago, Robert Hutchins suggested that higher education in America had already sold its soul in the frantic quest for outside funding, that rather than establishing educational policy and then seeking to finance it, universities, as he put it, were "letting financial accidents determine their educational policy."[1] Hutchins saw little hope for a reversal of this trend, and were he still among us, I suspect that he would probably find it difficult to resist saying "I told you so." Moreover, the spate of books and articles critical of higher education over the past several years suggests that his analysis may have been closer to the mark than many of his contemporaries suspected. Thus I fear that given the forces currently at work in "the groves of academe," proposals such as Tom's just might be too sensible to secure serious consideration, even as statements of overall institutional mission.

In any event, it is always both a privilege and a pleasure to respond to one of Tom's carefully-crafted, thought-provoking papers, and I hope that at some point my fears with regard to the probable still-birth of his proposal will turn out to have been groundless.

---

1. Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 5.

SOME RECONCEPTIONS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY:

IRONY AND THE ART OF COMEDY

Frans van der Bogert
Appalachian State University

Over the past few decades, Nelson Goodman has engaged in an extended critique of conventional ways of distinguishing between the arts and the sciences.[1] He has proposed that there are profoundly creative aspects of scientific knowledge, as well as fundamentally cognitive dimensions of the arts. To articulate the real differences and describe the extensive similarities between the arts and the sciences, he has investigated many particular areas where art appears to have a cognitive character. Most recently, he has pursued this line of investigation in collaboration with Catherine Z. Elgin. In Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Goodman and Elgin criticize traditional epistemology for its obsessive concern with certainty and its narrow conception of knowledge.[2] As they see it, the identification of knowledge with true belief justified by reasoning from incontrovertible premises has led epistemologists to exclude from their consideration much of what is ordinarily (and rightly) taken to have a knowledge-bearing character. The views of Goodman and Elgin have direct connections to questions of educational policy and practice. Their ideas provide a standpoint from which we may profitably reexamine the debate over the place of the arts and literature in education.

Aware of the implications of his views, Goodman established an interdisciplinary basic research program at the Harvard Graduate School of Education called "Project Zero".[3] The initial mission of the project was to study the philosophy and psychology of the arts with the aim of better understanding arts education. This remains one of the central points of focus of the project. A recent product of Project Zero research is The Point of Words: Children's Understanding of Metaphor and Irony, by Ellen Winner.[4] Although Winner's work is primarily an empirical psychological study of the development of children's ability to recognize and interpret metaphor and irony, and this essay concentrates instead upon the philosophical character of irony, I will draw frequently on her findings, using them to establish some points about comedy as well.

When school systems face budgetary problems, as they periodically do, arts programs are frequently the first to be cut back. Some critics of arts programs characterize them as "luxury" items, and contrast them to educational "basics" such as reading, spelling, grammar, mathematics, science and history. Others see the arts as involving such a great degree of personal taste or opinion that they cannot be taught "objectively," unlike other subjects where there are definite

Correspondence: Department of Philosophy and Religion, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608: E-mail VANDERBGERTF@APPSTATE

right or wrong answers. The arts, some say, are connected with emotion rather than with cognition; to teach the arts is to impose a false authority on one's students since there is a fundamental right to feel and to express whatever emotions one has. When we are forced to make cuts ineducational programs, the argument goes, we should cut "soft" programs first, and educational "basics" where objective standards apply are not as soft as the ones we can characterize as "merely entertaining," as luxuries where personal tastes and emotions are important factors.

However, according to Goodman and Elgin, the arts are best distinguished from the sciences not by focusing on their content, but on the modes of symbolism they employ; the arts are symbolic modes of expression, a collection of "languages" employing different means of communication than history or the sciences. Further, Goodman and Elgin argue that the sciences are less objective than is usually assumed; the sciences are not simply collections of facts, but selective systems of facts creatively organized. If so, the question whether arts programs should be cut (before, say, mathematics courses) should be debated in terms very different from those suggested above. We can't settle this question with a blanket characterization of the arts as subjective, emotive, "mere entertainment," "just luxuries," and the sciences as objective, factual, cognitive, "basic," but we have to do better justice to the complexity of the relation of the arts and the sciences. It is a question rather about what cognitive skills are associated with the arts and how these compare to the cognitive skills associated with other supposedly more "basic" subjects that should concern us.

In Reconceptions in Philosophy, the authors engage in "explorations," designed to expose the cognitive dimensions of art forms, aspects of the arts or artistic devices. There is a chapter on meaning in architecture, for example, where it is argued that buildings may represent parts or wholes of other objects, allude to other architecture or symbolize complex ideas. There is a discussion of musical and visual variations, where variations are said both to refer to an original theme (or picture) and to express interpretations of it. These and other essays supplement similar explorations in Goodman's earlier works (noteworthy are discussions of visual perspective, fiction, metaphor and forgery in Languages of Art; of forgery and authenticity in Problems and Projects; of style and quotation in Ways of Worldmaking; and of metaphor, pictorial reference, order, realism and style in Of Mind and other Matters).

Some familiarity with the approach to epistemology adopted by Goodman and Elgin is needed to understand the implications their detailed studies have for our view of knowledge and the arts and what further consequences exist for the philosophy of education. Goodman and Elgin think that traditional epistemology has distorted our conception of knowledge. As they put it:

> Epistemology once sought certainty through derivation from incontrovertible basic statements. Whatever could be so derived, and nothing else, qualified as knowledge. Plainly this meant excluding much of what seems to have some claim to being considered knowledge. Since only sentences are subject to derivation, none of the insight, information, or understanding imparted by nonverbal symbols could count as knowledge.[5]

If we think of knowledge as consisting only of justified true belief held with certainty, then nothing counts as knowledge unless it is a belief (a proposition expressible as a sentence). The consequences of this are quite extreme. It follows, for instance, that a student's ability to point out Iraq on a map of the Middle East does not count as knowledge unless the student can verbalize the process. As Goodman and Elgin argue, this is much too narrow. Skill (even nonverbal) in the use of maps should count as knowledge; it is the theory of knowledge adopted here that is suspect, not the characterization of map reading as a cognitive skill. Other examples of cognitively significant activity that is not necessarily accompanied by skill at producing fact-stating sentences are a student's capacity to group things together in useful ways (say, to sort the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle by color preparatory to putting the puzzle together), or to find and display a good example of something (say, to locate and collect both a typical simple leaf and a typical compound one). Activities such as categorization and exemplification have cognitive value even if they are not accompanied by the production of belief stating claims and justifications for them. Traditional grounds for excluding these manifestations of cognition from the sphere of knowledge are no longer valid:

> Since by now most of us are aware that mistakes are always possible, the quest for certainty has been abandoned, No sentences are incontrovertible, and no modes of reasoning infallible. Even so, the traditional restrictions on the application of "knowledge" and on the scope and methods of epistemology have largely been retained. As a result, cognitively significant affinities between verbal and nonverbal symbols, between literal and metaphorical sentences, between descriptive and normative sentences have often been overlooked. ... We want here to sketch an alternative epistemology that begins with release from these restrictions, Epistemology, as we conceive it, comprehends understanding or cognition in all its modes --- including perception, depiction, and emotion, as well as description.[6]

The creation, interpretation and appreciation of art provide abundant examples of processes of understanding that lie outside the scope of traditional epistemology.

In what follows here, I will explore a pair of concepts, namely irony and comedy, in order to expose some of their cognitive content and begin to incorporate an account of them within an expanded conception of knowledge. My account of comedy will touch both on ordinary humor (e.g. jokes) and the art of comic drama. Goodman devotes a brief section of Languages of Art to drama, but to my knowledge this is his only discussion of it and all that he does there is to characterize the syntactical and semantic character of dramatic performances and texts.[7] There are scattered references to irony in Languages of Art and Of Mind and Other Matters, but none in his other works, and the topic of comedy is not considered anywhere by Goodman or by Goodman/Elgin.[8] However, these are rich fields for exploration and for the extension of Goodman and Elgin's overall program. Let us begin by asking some questions about what goes on in the members of an audience who attend the performance of a comedy, pay to see a funny movie, or watch comedy on television. As a starting point for discussion, let's imagine that a hypothetical audience member consider it wrong to think that comedy has a knowledge-bearing character and skeptical about its relation to education.

"I don't go to a play, watch television or go to the movies to be educated but to be entertained and diverted. I go to see a comedy not to be taught lessons about life, but just to have a good laugh. Education is a serious business. Children need to learn the facts necessary for them to survive in a competitive world. Let's leave funny stories and comic productions for leisure time and reserve the school day for what's more basic and essential than this." So speaks the hypothetical critic. Following the lead of Goodman and Elgin, we should ask what assumptions underly the use of words like "to be educated," "to be taught lessons," and "what's more basic and essential" in this discourse.

If "to be educated" or "to be taught lessons" mean "to be presented with justified true beliefs" then comedy does not educate or teach lessons because it does not report facts in the manner of a history or documentary. As fiction, it describes imaginary events and characters rather than real ones. Of course, any fictional story contains many propositions that are both true and well-justified, otherwise it would not bear enough resemblance to reality to be called a "story" or to have "characters" or a "plot," yet there are no markers in fiction to tell us where facts are literally stated and where what is presented is imaginary instead. So on the narrow view, comedy is a best a poor vehicle for conveying knowledge, one in which truth and fiction are mixed up together in a puzzling way. Assuming that a correct account of knowledge and education is much broader than this, however, we need to look more carefully at this question. Certainly, it is common enough to encounter the claim that comedy, tragedy and other forms of fiction have an instructive effect. If they instruct, however, it is not through the direct statement of facts. What then are the cognitive aspects of comedy?

A brief examination of irony will provide us with some clues helpful in answering this question. In ironic language, "fact-stating" claims are used non-literally to express meanings differing from what is literally meant. In ironic language as well as in drama, there is a complex relationship between the content of what is said and what the speaker actually means. According to Winner:

> Irony has traditionally been considered a form of meaning substitution in which the speaker says one thing to imply something contradictory. ... Recently, there have been two attempts to go beyond meaning substitution theories [the "pretense" theory and the "mention" theory]. ... According to the pretense theory, an ironic utterance does not have two levels of meaning (the one said and the one meant). Rather, the ironic speaker is pretending to mean what he says. ... Those who espouse the mention theory also reject the assumption that there are two levels of meaning, asserting that the only meaning is the literal one. The speaker does not <u>use</u> his utterance to convey meaning [but] <u>mentions</u> an utterance ... and simultaneously ... conveys his negative <u>attitude</u> toward those who would say or believe such a thing.[9]

The complex character of irony is revealed by these accounts. Regardless of which theory of irony we accept, the ability to use and to interpret irony goes well beyond a first-level knowledge of the literal meaning of words. To imply rather than say directly, to pretend to mean something one does not, or to mention a claim while expressing disagreement with it, all these are more complicated than simply saying what one means. A more detailed picture of the cognitive character of irony is presented when one considers the steps necessary to decipher an ironic statement.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

First, the literal meaning of the statement must be understood. Next, an incongruity must be detected between what is said and the factual situation in which it is said. However, a statement may be incongruous with a situation because the speaker has made an error, or because the speaker is lying. The possibility that the speaker is simply mistaken must be eliminated, identifying the statement as intentionally false. Finally, the speaker's intention must be identified as ironic rather than deception. So understanding irony is a complex exercise in which various kinds of cognition are involved, one that requires integrating an account of literal meaning with knowledge about a situation and the speaker's relationship to it. For instance, to interpret the statement "Nice weather we're having today" as ironic, the listener must know not just what this statement means literally, but that the weather is in fact bad and that the speaker is in a position to know it is bad. Further, some knowledge about the attitudes and intentions of the speaker is required. The listener must know that the speaker is not simply lying about the weather.

It follows that irony may be misunderstood where the speaker and the listener do not share the same knowledge of the statement's context. Both speaker and listener must know those facts that make a literal interpretation of the statement false. Thus, among other points that can be made about irony, a successful use of it involves a sort of "tuning" between persons, where each makes a correct assumption about the other's state of knowledge. The importance of this kind of tuning for knowledge considered more broadly cannot be overemphasized. Even the fact-stating process earlier taken to on the narrow account of education to be the only means for transmitting knowledge from one person to another presupposes the existence of assumptions about what knowledge is already held in common by the parties in the transaction. That the listener knows the language in which the speaker formulates the belief, does not find the terms in which the belief is formulated to be drastically ambiguous and does not require background briefing for the statement to make sense, these are normally assumed in a fact-stating transaction. Someone who learns the skills necessary for success in interpreting irony therefore also learns skills fundamental to understanding those literal uses of language with which irony was initially contrasted here.

Winner reports some relevant empirical findings from her own and others' studies of children's capacities for and difficulties with interpreting irony. Although very young children have difficulty discriminating ironic from mistaken or deceptive claims, and understand metaphorical language use at an earlier age, the ability to understand irony emerges sometime around the age of six.[10] So although this is a higher order cognitive skill the capacity to exercise it is typically already present in first graders. In studies that examined both adults and children, insults expressed ironically were consistently rated both less confrontational and funnier than direct insults.[11] More will be said about this a bit later, but let us now turn our atention to comedy.

While philosophers and psychologists generally despair of finding a complete explanation why some situations evoke laughter while others do not, and lack a full account of the origins and functions of comedy, it is possible to make some limited observations about it. One of these is that for comedy to move us to laughter (as when irony works) there must be an attunement between the author of the comedy and the audience, an attunement consisting in part of a shared set of assumptions, a shared set of beliefs, some common knowledge about the world. For example, Moliere's character, Tartuffe, will not evoke laughter from someone who has no familiarity at all with the actions and pretensions of real hypocrites; John Belushi's samurai laundryman will not seem funny to someone unfamiliar with real

samurai warriors and laundry operators; much of the humor of Woody Allen's film, Love and Death, will be lost on those who have never read Tolstoy, Nietzsche or Kant.

Where comedy finds verbal expression only, as in, say, a humorous story by Fielding or by Twain, understanding it presupposes the usual ability to interpret the language (quite apart from its humorous content). Where comedy takes dramatic form, one must be able to distinguish what is pretended from what is real. Comedy may fail because the language in which it is expressed is simply not understood, or because (say) a pretended accident is perceived as real. Certainly, it is not uncommon to see young children frightened by what adults may find funny, and one source of this difference is the ability to distinguish playacting from other behavior.

These observations are sufficient to show that the successful use and interpretation of comedy (humorous language or comic drama) involves a complex set of cognitive skills. Other claims are often made about comedy, that it "shows us as we really are," "helps us to perceive our own ridiculous qualities," "helps us to understand the differences between what is really and what is only seemingly good," and so on.[12] We need not pursue these assertions here, although they suggest that further points about the cognitive content of comedy could be made. What I wish to focus on is the dependence of humor on a shared body of knowledge. Since humor generally, like irony, depends for its effectiveness on this cognitive "tuning" between the comedian and the members of the audience, the comic process provides a means of testing whether this tuning exists. When a joke fails to provoke laughter, that is a sign that there is a discrepancy between what is believed or known by the comedian and by the members of the audience. A reference to "The Montauk Fishing News" in Neil Simon's God's Favorite gets laughs from some members of the audience and not from others. This signals that some audience members know what Simon knows about Montauk, New York, and others don't.

Sometimes, the cognitive test of comedy rewards those who have the knowledge necessary to share the joke by moving them to laughter. When people laugh together, they are rewarded for what they know in common. At other times, the failure of a joke is a warning sign that not all members of a group possess the same beliefs. This may signal a deficiency of knowledge in audience members, but it can also happen because the joke itself embodies false beliefs. In either case, the characterization of comedy as mere entertainment, contrasted sharply to the real work of knowing and learning, turns out to be quite misleading. In the process of creating or enjoying comedy, the persons involved receive constant feedback about the quality and range of their knowledge, warnings that what they think they know may not receive general assent, indications that they know things others don't, and the reward of laughter for knowing the same things others do. Thus comedy can provide both a useful check on and a motivation for the fact-stating process earlier contrasted with it.

A fact about irony that needs examination is noted in Winner's study:

> Irony ... can be used to polarize an audience into initiates and noninitiates. The ironist conveys one meaning to uninitiated and another to the initiated. ... For instance, one might say, "there's nothing wrong with spending money on defense and cutting back on programs to help the poor" in the presence of two persons, one of whom is a fiscal conservative and one of whom is a New Deal Democrat. The speaker intends the liberal (whose political views he shares) to recognize his

> utterance as ironic; but he intends the conservative (who will agree with the literal meaning of his remarks) to take him literally.[13]

This phenomenon is paralleled by the use of "in" jokes that are designed to be funny to only a part of the humorist's audience (those who share the speaker's beliefs or attitudes) and to pass by everyone else. Irony may function in this way as an important part of the rhetoric of oppressed peoples. The ironic humor of Russian novelists or jewish comics, and some aspects of the dialect of the American inner cities ("bad" serving as a compliment rather than to evaluate negatively) can be understood in this light. Where the dynamics of society separate people into more and less powerful classes, irony helps to protect the weak by providing them with a means to veil their communications among each other and to protect them against retaliation when they express criticisms of the social system. It is easier to punish someone for saying something literally false (or overtly critical) than for saying something true (complimentary) and meaning the opposite. As Winner observes, Swift's ironic essay ("A Modest Proposal") advocating cannibalism as a means for solving the problem of overpopulation seems at first to express horrifyingly cruel attitudes towards the poor, but once understood ironically, conveys Swift's sympathy for the Irish population and his antagonism to those who were collaborating with the English ruling classes in their policies of oppression.

Although both irony and comedy sometimes have this polarizing effect, it should be remembered that in Winner's work, irony was found to be a less confrontational way to express criticism than direct insults. Perhaps this is because it presents an intellectual challenge even to those at whom it is directed. Because interpreting them is more complex, both irony and comedy demand a higher degree of intellectual participation on the part of listeners than do literally meant, serious statements of fact. The power to polarize an audience into groups implies that irony and comedy have group-building power. Unlike simple fact-stating which has a very one-directional character, irony and especially comedy involve interactions that flow from from listeners to speakers as well as the other way.

Perhaps it is not only false assumptions about the nature of knowledge but also traditional ways of structuring classroom interactions that reinforce narrowness in models of education and make it appear that to make jokes or to experience comedy together is not an appropriate way to spend class time. Old habits die hard, and it is still all too common for teachers to spend an entire class period standing in front of students constrained to sit in rows and columns of seats so that they all face the teacher. While lecturing is at times an extremely efficient way to teach, what lecturing does best is to create a rapid one-directional flow of propositions. Lecture-discussion makes the flow of words multi-directional, but if it consists of propositions voiced by the teacher interrupted by questions that are then followed by more propositions, this format is still limited almost entirely to knowledge in the narrow sense. Even when lectures are supplemented by visual materials these are often used merely to reinforce propositional content by supplementing verbalization with another form of symbolization. Goodman and Elgin are right to suggest that many kinds of knowledge are best conveyed by vehicles other than propositions literally meant. Some kinds of learning can take place only where the educational environment allows a broader range of interactions and experiences to occur. Ironic and comic interactions have a power to decenter authority and to place all members of a group at least momentarily on the same footing.

Humor may be an effective tool even when teaching takes lecture form. When a lecturer tells a joke, this does not have to be viewed as a simple interruption in the flow of knowledge. One member of the audience laughs, another frowns, another looks puzzled, and yet another looks bored. This is quite properly described as a moment of truth: it is a moment when all the members of the group are in a position to learn more about the others' beliefs and attitudes. A sensitive teacher can use humor both to energize a group of students and to gain insights that facilitate the flow of knowledge otherwise conveyed.

When lecture format is abandoned entirely, and the teacher becomes part of an audience along with the students, authority is decentered in yet another way. This experience should quickly dispel the notion that there is one way to understand a comedy, that one person in the audience knows exactly what is funny about it and what is not, that there are right and wrong places to laugh. What is true of comedy here is true of art works in general. Since they are made to engage the attention of others and employ forms of symbolism that often support a wide variety of interpretations, one person's response to art can usually be enriched by others.[14] Whether the teacher shows a movie in class, takes students to an art gallery, or asks them to put on a play of their own, the environment becomes much more conducive to one-on-one contact between teacher and individual students. Student-student interaction is also facilitated. The participatory character of these activities encourages students to learn skills through direct performance and to integrate propositional knowledge with other forms.

The real differences between the arts and sciences are not captured by describing the arts as subjective, emotive, merely entertaining, and the sciences as objective, factual, embodying knowledge. It is not correct to say that literal fact-stating language conveys knowledge, but non literal language does not. Instead, non-literal language (specifically irony) and the arts (specifically comedy) embody and convey knowlege in their special ways. Although fact-stating is an effective way to teach, it is not the only way to transmit knowledge from one person to another or to facilitate cognitive growth. Enriching the curriculum with experiences of the arts is not an interruption in the educational process, but a way to supplement one means of knowledge transmission with other sometimes more powerful educational tools.

---

1. Works in which Goodman has pursued this line of investigation include: Languages of Art: an Approach to a Theory of Symbols, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968; Problems and Projects, Hackett Publishing Co., 1972; Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett Publishing Co., 1978; Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard University Press, 1984.
2. Goodman, Nelson, and Elgin, Catherine Z., Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Hackett Publishing Company, 1988.
3. See Art, Mind, and Education: Research from Project Zero, ed. Howard Gardner and D.N. Perkins, U. of Illinois Press, 1989, p. vii.
4. Ellen Winner, The Point of Words: Children's Understanding of Metaphor and Irony, Harvard University Press, 1988.
5. Reconceptions in Philosophy, p.3.
6. Ibid., p. 4.
7. Languages of Art, pp. 210-211.

8. Cf. Languages of Art, p. 83, p. 86, and Of Mind and Other Matters, p. 72.
9. Winner, pp. 29-30.
10. Ibid., pp. 184-188.
11. Ibid., pp. 155-159.
12. These are not direct quotations, but I think they capture the spirit of what many classical and contemporary commentators have said about comedy. Many such remarks are found, for instance, in Robert W. Corrigan, ed. Comedy: Meaning and Form, Chandler Publishing Company, 1965, or in Paul Lauter, ed., Theories of Comedy: Critical Writings from the Classical Period to the Present, Doubleday and Company, 1964.

13. Winner, p.28.
14. Goodman's views about the ways artistic symbols differ from ordinary propositional/verbal symbols, and how both propositions and artistic products differ symbolically from scripts, scores and other "notations" are too complex to discuss here, but they are interesting and pertinent to this part of the discussion. The reader might want to look at Chapter IV of Languages of Art, where Goodman sets out some of the critical distinctions at length, or consult Chapter I, sections 3-6 of Reconceptions in Philosophy, which contains Elgin's succinct account of many of the same distinctions.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM: THE ROLE OF CREATIVITY

Sharon Morrison
Marietta Schools

In current thinking about educational reform, liberal education tends to be neglected as a priority in curriculum planning. Music, arts and drama are viewed as superfluous and "extra" curricular activities. Dr. van der Bogert has demonstrated an interesting anomaly in this thinking by providing an epistemological analysis of comedy. While comedy is usually characterized as entertainment, we are now able to recognize it as a useful tool in acquiring knowledge or reinstating prior knowledge. From observing examples demonstrating the use of irony, we become aware of the complex cognitive process involved in interpretation. This brings to mind the importance of intellectual challenges that can provide alternative avenues for the development of cognitive skills such as problem solving and logical analysis. One may question the worth of comedy in education but if we look at the intellectual skills it requires to interpret humor or to understand its content, comedy takes on quite a different character. Since van der Bogert draws primarily on philosophical sources in his paper, it may prove helpful to relate his concerns to some recent research on creativity by educational theorists.

The relationship between intelligence and creativity has not been completely resolved. According to Gary Davis and Sylvia Rimm, many experts accept the threshold concept which holds that there is a moderate positive correlation between intelligence and creativity over the widest range of intellectual ability but that above a threshold I.Q. of 120, the correlation disappears. Among the most gifted students creative talent and I.Q. may be quite independent of each other.[1]

This account does not rule out the existence of a close relationship between creativity and learning. Paul Torrance, a major contributor to the study of creativity, defines creativity as a mental process that requires questioning, quessing, hypothesizing, testing and communicating results. Torrance emphasizes the need to be sensitive to problems and define gaps in information. He asserts that people are more favorable to learning by creative approaches such as "exploring, manipulating, questioning, experimenting, risking, testing and modifying ideas."[2] Further, Torrance claims learning creatively takes place during the processes of sensing problems, deficiencies, or gaps in information; formulating hypotheses or guesses about a problem; testing the hypotheses; revising and retesting the hypotheses; and then communicating the results. He explains that problems arouse tension, thus motivating the learner to ask questions, make guesses and test the adequacy of the guesses, correcting errors and modifying conclusions if necessary.[3] He argues that creative learning strengthens abilities such as problem-solving, fluency, originality, flexibility and elaboration in contrast to learning by authority which tends to strengthen memory and logical reasoning.

Davis and Rimm use words such as 'defining,' 'analyzing,' 'comparing,' 'contrasting,' 'evaluating,' 'inferring,' and 'interpreting' to describe creative and critical thinking abilities.[4] All of the skills identified by these words are involved in teaching critical thinking and in enhancing creativity. Moreover, these

---

Correspondence: Marietta City Schools, 311 Aviation Road, Pine Forest Elementary School, Marietta, GA 30060

skills are also useful in understanding metaphor and irony: they are necessary for audiences of comedy and other forms of drama. Davis and Rimm list characteristics of creative individuals which include "adventurousness, curiosity, playfulness, humor, [a tendency] to have artistic and aesthetic interests [and] to be attracted to the complex and mysterious."[5] Most of these characteristics were discovered by Frank Baron and Donald Mackinnon in their Berkeley studies of creative architects, writers and mathematicians. These studies also revealed frequent performances in dramatic productions requiring important creative traits such as humor, energy, aesthetic interests and risk taking.[6]

J.P. Guilford's structure of intellect (SOI) model is a well established theory of intelligence which is summarized as a cube comprised of three dimensions, contents, products, and operations. Content may be figural, symbolic, semantic or behavioral.[7] According to Guilford's model humor is an SOI ability involving the divergent production of semantic transformations.[8]

In Creativity is Forever, Gary Davis recommends using creative thinking techniques as a process. This harmonizes with Torrance's definition of creativity as a mental process. Davis argues that artists develop their works by extending core ideas from sources such as mythology, history and the Bible. Some of his examples are the work of Paul Gaugin with its use of South Pacific natives and settings, and that of Picasso where metaphorical thinking is evident in African, Harlequin, blue and pink (rose) periods, in which certain themes were grounded.[9] Davis explains that creative thinking techniques often involve modifications of earlier ideas, a combination of ideas, or borrowing from idea sources like those mentioned above.[10] Metaphorical thinking, involving the transfer of an idea from one realm to another, is therefore essential to the creative process.

Davis goes on to describe how comedians use unique sources for their humor. He discusses Joan Rivers and Rodney Dangerfield who both constantly put themselves down, Norm Crosby, who is famous for using funny malapropisms, and Don Rickles who insults people with the same insult repeatedly. The humor in these acts does not lie on the surface; in order for audiences to understand it they must interpret the non-literal content. Comedy and other forms of drama are at best a great way to produce non-literal thinking. Drama can stimulate metaphorical thinking in addition to facilitating the detection of metaphorically related problems in real life situations. Davis describes the creative process as a "change in perception -- literally 'seeing' new idea combinations, new relationships, new meanings, or new applications that simply were not perceived a moment before."[11]

The highest educational goal is to teach students how to think. Richard Paul, one of the most widely recognized leaders of the critical thinking movement, claims that we can improve student performance only by improving thinking.[12] He claims that the root of the problem lies in our confidence in didactic thinking which confuses acquiring knowledge with memorization. He writes,

> Critical thinking requires thinkers to continually monitor their thinking by means of questions that test for clarity, accuracy, specificity, relevance, consistency, logic, depth, and significance. Since critical thinking often involves thinking from within multiple points of view and frames of reference, it often yields multiple possible solutions.[13]

Thus, teaching for thinking is essential to educational reform. We can see from a consideration of metaphor and irony that understanding non-literal language is much more complex than understanding literal statments. Similarly, van der Bogert has pointed out that comedy can be an effective tool in producing a multifaceted viewpoint when humor evokes a variety of reactions from its audience. Thus, comedy can serve to strengthen creativity, open mindedness, metaphorical thinking, problem solving skills and a unique understanding of language and meaning.

Davis asserts that "emphasizing the deferred judgment principle (which is also essential for critical thinking) should strengthen the tendency to consider many ideas and thus to resist premature closure on a problem.[14] Strengthening creative abilities fosters higher order thinking. Creativity awareness is beneficial to educational reform, as is the recognition that the arts provide an avenue for strengthening creative and critical thinking.

---

1. Gary A. Davis and Sylvia B. Rimm, Education of the Gifted and Talented, 2md ed., Prentice-Hall, 1989, p.27.
2. Paul Torrance in Davis and Rimm, p. 245.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, p. 253.
5. Davis and Rimm, p. 206.
6. Gary Davis, Creativity is Forever, 2nd ed., Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1986, p. 47.
7. Davis and Rimm, p. 172.
8. Ibid., p. 209.
9. Davis, p. 83.
10. Ibid.
11. Davis and Rimm, p. 210.
12. Richard Paul, Critical Thinking: What every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World,, Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, Sonoma State University, 1990, p. 231.
13. Ibid., p. 238.
14. Davis, p. 224.

POETS AND TEACHING

William E. Russell
Merrimack College

This paper, Poets and Teaching, concerns a distinct poetic idiom: poems about teaching. The intent is not an historical or literary study; rather it is a reflective look at teaching using an imaginative source. The assumption is that imaginative literature, in this instance poetry, can contribute themes and topics to educational discourse that more positivistic approaches cannot match.

"What other disciplines besides philosophy can help us understand how we think and speak about education?" Imaginative literature, synthesizing the distinction between emotion and intellect, emerging as it does from the necessity and desire to express what this life feels like, can help us understand how we think and talk about education. The power of poetic diction, unlike the sterile, devitalized, and humorless prescriptive language of an attempted science of educational practice, a training based on abstraction, is rooted in "primary concerns" such as the drive to live, to love, to be free, to work, to live a richer life, or as expressed Biblically, to experience "life more abundantly." The immediacy of poems, dense and concrete, aimed at the heart as well as the mind, intensifying consciousness, often connect with our own personal experience in a manner difficult to ignore or forget. Poems may corner the careful and thoughtful reader, awakening and cueing new ways of perceiving, experiencing, thinking, and imagining.

The paper hypothesizes, or more accurately asserts, that scientific epistemology, rather than the educational humanities, preoccupied with management, measurement, and control dominates much of educational thinking. If these are the dominant features of educational discourse, young people seem considered more as commodities or human resources, a description that infers a conception of human nature that has no place for the inclusion of an imagination envisioning alternatives or not thinking in terms of efficiency and production. Topics, not compatible with calculative thinking - - "hospitality, irony, style, reverence, tragedy, love, beauty, wonder and awe" - - seldom discussed publicly in educational discourse, though they intrude persistently in the day to day conversation of educators, are recurring themes in the poetry of teaching.

The behaviorist and technicist approach, so dominant in the education of teachers, evidenced by the concentration on psychology in the curriculum of teacher education, may well lead to a convergent practice, to framing problems from an extremely narrow and limiting perspective. Viewing questions and problems from the vantage of the specifically trained professional may well reduce the range of responses. Since this paper is about the poetry of teaching, the dialectical should not be judged superior to the metaphorical expression, or prose seen as a better vehicle of discourse or of truth. The final stanza from Wallace Stevens' "Six Significant Landscapes" captures imaginatively with a comical twist a dimension of these assertions about the confinement of "technical rationalists," and the open possibilities of imagination. Stevens' metaphors, suggestive of imagination as a way of knowledge more powerful than the calculative faculty, may resonate with all who wear, at least once each year, "square hats."

Rationalists, wearing square hats,
Think, in square rooms,
looking at the floor,
Looking at the ceiling.

They confine themselves
To right-angled triangles.
If they tried rhomboids,
Cones, waving lines, ellipses-
As for example, the ellipse of the half-moon-
Rationalists would wear sombreros.

Perhaps Stevens, the Hartford insurance executive, knew something of academic life that strikes a spark of recognition for readers who are teachers. Maxine Greene finds this verse summoning up a "range of ideas relating to knowledge and the life of meaning." She writes:

> Each time I read that verse, I find myself experience a true shock of recognition, and, at once, an actual release from confinement. In this case, it is a confinement to the logical and linear, and to a particular kind of academic order that imposes its own forms on what is felt and perceived. Unexpectedly, every time I read the verse, the triangles begin to reform themselves and actually become rhomboids; then there is an opening to a multiplicity of anticipated shapes and forms. The surprise comes with the move to the half-moon, which can only become visible through a window the rationalists (with their solemn mortarboards) did not suspect was there. And then there is the other, comical surprise at the image of those mortarboards somehow curving into sombreros. Why not? They are not required to give up their work in the square rooms; but they are offered new possibilities of vision, new extensions of consciousness. That is what imagination can do: create new domains, new vistas, expansions of ordinary awareness. For me, this seems profoundly important in a time of formulated pieties and glittering reassurances that stun audiences into silence and make it difficult to believe that anything is susceptible any longer to critical examination or to change. [1]

The "formulated pieties and glittering reassurances" may silence other voices, contracting the educational conversation. Poetry, however, moves beyond the domain that submits to experimental proof or confirmation while considering those seldom discussed topics such as hospitality, irony, style reverence, tragedy, love, beauty, wonder, and awe. This paper presents a sample of poems and list of titles of other poems relating to teaching, all of which have been used in classes, that may suggest to some a valuable way to expand the educational conversation.

Not only are wonder and awe not a part of the educational lexicon, but may also be an endangered human emotion. Pulitzer Prize poet Charles Simic stated in an interview: "What is curious to me is that we are no longer astonished at being alive. Wonder is getting to be a rare emotion." [2]

Seeing the world by the light of poetry may for the sympathetic soul create or restore this passion where it did not exist, at least momentarily, and perhaps the feeling will linger. *For Eminent Physicists*, Patrick Kavanagh's almost sacramental, slight poem of momentary insight, awe, wit, humility, and that "rare emotion," wonder, assumes a serious yet playful look at those theorists ranked close to or at the top of the academic pecking order. The poem with such apt and wonderful imagery needs no commentary.

> God must be glad to see them play
> Like kittens in the sun
> Delighted with the wisps of hay
> Blown from His haggard on a breezy day . . . .
> Time's kittens, have your fun.

Besides eminent physicists, poets have reflected upon those less exhaulted in academic rank. Howard Nemerov, for example, writes of the compromise and downward spiral to mediocrity while climbing the academic ladder of *A Full Professor*- "He has survived, and even fattened on,/The dissertation and the discipline." Miller Williams' academically set poems with lengthy, intriguing titles seem to specialize in the experiences of the associate professor, having written at least these three: *After the Revolution for Jesus the Associate Professor Prepares His Final Remarks, The Associate Professor Delivers an Exhortation to His Failing Students,* and *Paying Some Slight Attention to his Birthday the Associate Professor Goes About His Business Considering What He Sees As A Kind Of Praise.* At the entry rank, Ronald Wallace's *The Assistant Professor's Nightmare,* perhaps a biographical poem, strikes a spark with any teacher, assistant professor or not, who, after starting out a lecture brillantly - "all the pencils nodding their heads/ in astonishment: Wallace is brillant,/ Wallace is wise" - , experiences paralyzing doubt:

> Suddenly confidence
> slips out of my voice, sits down
> in the front row, snoring.
> My stomach and the room give out,
> my small words stumbling on. Soon
> all of the pencils are wagging their fingers
> shouting with their black tongues.

Other poems encourage the teacher/scholar to reflect on neglected topics and ideas. There is, for instance, a litany of poems with the word "Scholar" found in the title, each charged with passions and volitions that may awaken memories or incite unsuspected nuances in those engaged in some level of that enterprise. An abbreviated list of titles includes: *The Wandering Scholar's Prayer to St. Catherine of Egypt* (J.V. Cunningham), *The Scholar's Life* (Anonymous), *The Scholar and the Cat* (Anonymous), *Scholar I* (Seamus Deane), *Scholar II* (Seamus Deane), *Scholars* (Walter De La Mare), *Memory of a Scholar* (Richard Lattimore), *The Scholars* (William Butler Yeats), *Priests and Scholars* (Anonymous), *The Company of Scholars* (Helen Bevington), *A Poor Scholar of the Forties* (Padraic Colum), *A Scholar Looks at an Oak* (Melvin Tolson), *A Short History of Twentieth Century Scholarship* (John Wain), *To a Scholar in the Stacks* (Howard Nemerov). These poems "speak" especially to scholar/teachers attempting to put in language what is difficult to put into words. Some poems may, when closely read and reread,

introduce strangeness to the routinized and ordinary. Seamus Deane's *Scholar II* provides one example by transforming a public event -"the most brazen theft attempt in the annals of higher education"- with significant personal thought, one likely to touch and provoke teachers by putting into language what must often be inarticulately felt. On August 20, 1969 the Harvard College "yard police" found "a man lying in the court, seriously injured and very nearly unconscious. Under him was a knapsack, which proved to contain the two volume Gutenberg Bible, a ball-peen hammer, a screwdriver, a pinch bar, and a roll of masking tape." [3] The thief, having hid in the fourth floor men's room until closing time, had lowered himself by rope to the third story room housing Harvard's Gutenberg Bible. Loading them in his knapsack he attempted to climb back the way he had come; however, the weight of the volumes, about 70 pounds, proved too great. The thief fell four floors to the courtyard below breaking his leg, though his injuries would have been more serious, perhaps even fatal, had the Bibles not cushioned his fall. Seamus Deane's *Scholar II* reflects on this event ironically discovering that the scholar and this thief share certain values.

I remember at times
How irresponsible I have
Become. No ruling passion
Obsesses me, although passions
Are what I play among.
I'll know the library in a city
Before I know there is a slum.
I could wish the weight of
Learning would bring me down
To where things are done.

I remember the thief who fell
Half way down the wall
Of the Houghton Library because
His rope broke under the extra
Weight of the Gutenberg Bible.
Perhaps he came from a slum,
Hired to rifle the mint of published
Knowledge too. I could have told him
The difference a book would have made.

Saved him perhaps his broken leg.
Told him the new Faust stories
Of a thousand men who made
The same error and now lie
Under the weight of that beautiful,
Intransitive print. He had to fail.
And now he lies, perhaps for years,
With other slum-children in a jail,
The university of the third degree,

While in other circles move the frail
Inquirers, trailing printed liberty.

Many poems with education themes or images suggest the fragility of life, the mystery of death, the heartfelt effects of tragedy, sorrow, isolation, loneliness, failure, or fear. A short list includes: *April Inventory* (W.D. Snodgrass) *Elegy for Jane* (Theodore Roethke), *Dolor* (Theodore Roethke), *Death of a Student* (Karl Shapiro), *Student Dies in 100 Yard Dash* (Howard Nemerov), *To Joy our Student, Biding Adieu* (Howard Nemerov), *Dangerous Life* (Lucia Maria Perillo), *A Death in the Alumni Bulletin* (Knute Skinner), *Fears of the Eighth Grade* (Toi Derricotte), *In the Counselor's Waiting Room* (Bettie Sellers), *Home-Sickness* (Charlotte Bronte). *A Grammarian's Dilemma* (John McDermott), *The Correspondence School Instructor Says Goodbye To His Students* (Galway Kinnell), *History* (Jorie Graham), *The Burning of Paper Instead of Children* (Adrienne Rich), *Some Lines Finished Just Before Dawn at the Bedside of a Dying Student It Has Snowed all Night* (Miller Williams), *Mid-Term Break* (Seamus Heaney), *Ghost Stories Written . . .*(Charles Simic), *Ex-basketball Player* (John Updike), *An Elementary School in a Slum* (Stephen Spender), *indian school* (Norman Russell), *Teacher Between Terms* (Rachel Hadas). Though all of these poems more intensely than ordinary language may sharpen awareness and create a new experience related to those "seldom discussed topics," four from the list are explored further.

Toi Derricotte's poem *Fears of the Eighth Grade* and Charles Simic's *Ghost stories written. . .* may expand the educational conversation by imaginatively portraying the minds of children. Simic whose poems often focus on human beings and what happens to them stated in an interview: "Well my hope is to remind people of their human and mortal predicament . . . to let them reexperience what is right in front of their senses . . . to restore strangeness to the most familiar aspects of existence, all that for the sake of living more intensely. I think poetry's banner says 'More Life.'"[4] In *Ghost stories written . . . .*Simic provokes thought, "restoring strangeness to the most familiar," by drawing a surprising and unlikely relationship between an algebraic problem done at the blackboard, ghost stories, and a graveyard at night.

Ghost stories written as algebraic equations. Little
Emily at the blackboard is very frightened. The X's
look like a graveyard at night. The teacher wants her to
polk among them with a piece of chalk. All the
children hold their breath. The white chalk squeaks
once among the plus and minus signs, and then it's
quiet again.

Toi Derricotte's disturbing poem also represents the minds of children, perhaps urban children. While reading the poem, the temptation may exist to question the factual basis of the sentiments, to approach the poem as content to be tested upon because this is how schooling trains, rather than to understand and experience, though the frequency may be unfamiliar, the expression of human fear of the relatively powerless, whether children or not.

when i ask what things they fear,
their arms raise like soldiers volunteering for battle:

fear to go into a dark room, my murderer is waiting;
fear of taking a shower, someone will stab me;
fear of being kidnapped, raped;
fear of dying in war.
when i ask how many fear this,
all the children raise their hands.

i think of this little box of consecrated land,
the bombs somewhere else,
the dead children in their mothers' arms
women crying at the gates of the palace.

how thin the veneer!
the paper towels, napkins, toilet paper--everything
burned up in a day.

these children see the city after armageddon;
the demons stand visible in the air
between their friends talking;
they see fire in a spring day
the instant before conflagration:
they feel blood through closed faucets
& touch sharks crawling at the bottom of the sea.

A Grammarian's Dilemma, like *Ghost stories written . . .* and *Fears of the Eighth Grade* subtly reveals tragedy, loneliness, and sadness. John McDermott's small poem creates for the teacher a fleeting insight that may well linger into the distant future or resurface when next evaluating student exams. The poem seems to suggest that a formula and certainly habit are not a sufficient way of awareness; feeling and empathy count too.

Out of habit
I corrected
Her fragment-
The one
About her dying mother.
To me
It was not
A sentence;
To her
It must have seemed one.

Adrienne Rich expands to the social order this theme of tragedy in dual fashion, the failure of the teacher and the failure of some students. During an interview, Rich speaks of the context of her five part poem *The Burning of Paper Instead of Children* which includes prose passages, one in black English. This fervent, personal, and emotional poem dramatically connects the self, and all teachers,

with the social world. At the time Rich was teaching in the SEEK program at CCNY, attempting to help minority students speak so they would be listened to as those more privileged are:

> (the fracture of order
> the repair of speech
> to overcome this suffering)
>
> I am composing on the typewriter late at night, thinking of today. How well we all spoke.
> A language is a map of our failure.

Rich and her teaching colleagues felt the threat of failure, the failure of their students, hanging over them. Rich responds to her interviewer:

> Those students were expected to fail, they were intended to fail, and the SEEK program was trying to show that, no, they don't have to fail. And we teachers used to talk a lot about who fails - the teacher or the student. When you have a classroom situation which is rigged entirely against the student, or in which the teacher is too ignorant to teach. Not ignorant of grammar, but ignorant of the student, ignorant of their culture. So, I was thinking very much about our failures, we who consider ourselves so possessed of language, so articulate. [5]

The poems just cited have themes and tones focuing upon human frailty and tragedy. In contrast, are two poems about teaching and education that expand the educational conversation in celebratory and joyous ways. Personal memorable experiences, that is stories, need to be shared but how to find the right words. The past happy moments may even point to an objective to be recaptured in thought or to work toward in practice. Lawrence Rabb's poem HAPPINESS is a festival, perhaps a self remembering and self recovering for him and one suspects a catalyst for the recollection, awakening the spirit of long forgotten joy, for the academic reader. Rabb writes:

> I can remember only once feeling perfectly happy.
> I was eighteen, a freshman at college.
> It was October, and I was sitting on the lawn
> behind my dormitory, leaning against a tree,
> reading a book. It must have been Sunday.
> Leaves covered the grass, though the oaks and maples
> were still full of color, and the sky
> was that bright and absolute blue
> you see in photographs of peaceful country scenes.
> The musty broken smell of autumn
> floated on the air, that scent like a taste,
> like the idea of change. People walked past
> on their way to the library, others
> slept in the sun, or read their books.
> Certainly I had enough to worry about.
> I'd made no friends, was not in love, didn't like

my classes. But I felt just then
at ease, and then, lazily, quite
gradually, completely happy - as if that afternoon
might continue indefinitely,
and lead seamlessly into everything
that was going to be possible for me,
which I would one day call my life. No matter
what I thought about it, this would happen,
and I did not have to think about it.
I imagined staying until dark, when someone
might come by to ask what was wrong.
Yet there was nothing I needed to say,
since I had no reason for feeling what I felt,
since the landscape was like a beautiful picture
of where I was, and so, after a few hours,
I got up, without regret, and went back to my room.
This happened, although that doesn't matter
to you, who know about the truth of poems,
how I can't convince you by insisting on the real,
can't persuade you by claiming this I is me, or was.
And yet I am not trying to persuade you of anything.
There is no conclusion, no story to conclude.
And how poor, after all, how familiar
the details seem, without excitement, or surprise.
But I never felt that way again, nor do I expect
to feel that way again, so thoughtless
and solitary, so unaccountably happy.

Love and beauty, like happiness, are among those "topics seldom discussed in education." Ronald Wallace concretely remembers each by making a homely, taken for granted biographical scene, one very familiar since everyone has observed another doing homework, reflective and complex. Is there anything better to carry through life than good, sacred memories, the poem seems to suggest?

The Girl Writing Her English Paper
lies on one hip by the fire,
blond, in jeans.

The wreckage of her labor, elegant as Eden
or petals from a tree,
surrounds her--

a little farm, smoke rising from the ashtray,
book, notebook, papers, fields;
a poem's furrows.

> If the lights were to go out suddenly,
> stars would be overhead,
> their light come in.

Wallace describes how he happened upon the poem, answering a more significant question than what the poem means or any attempt at paraphrase.

> The Girl Writing Her English Paper" grew out of watching a girlfriend, once upon a time, sprawled before a fireplace working on a course paper about a poem. Her concentration was complete, and the clutter of her book, notebooks, papers, and ashtray made a little scene from which, though I was in the room, I felt excluded. Outside, I recall, it was a cold and snowy evening , and wind blustered around the eaves of the old house.
>
> The girls absorption both made her very beautiful to me and seemed to make the outer world irrelevant. What she was doing - attending carefully to the words of a man long dead, although her real lover was nearby - piqued my jealously. It seemed to say something, too, about the power of poetry. . . .
>
> The Girl Writing Her English Paper" is a poem I treasure for what it made me see about my own complicated feelings and about the pleasures and sadnesses of life. I know it is a good poem, not because of any craft or technical skill it may show, but because it was able to surprise me with how much more I knew than I knew I knew. The story has an ending the poem would probably understand. Later, the girl and I were married; and later, divorced. [6]

Other categories of poems about teaching might be headed educational objects and educational settings. Examples abound: *Lecture Hall* (Patrick Kavanagh), *At the Playground* (William Stafford), *Humanities Building* (Karl Shapiro), *Room 000* (William Stafford), *School* (Lucia Maria Perillo) *School -Bell* (Eleanor Farjeon), *Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackboard* (Peter Redgrove), *The Schoolhouse* (Galway Kinnell), *University* (Karl Shapiro), *The American College Dictionary* (Knute Skinner), *At My Daughter's School* (Robert McNamara), *Desks* (Dave Smith), *Desks* (David Bottoms), *Erasure* (Charles Simic), *Flash Cards* (Rita Dove), *A Latin Primer* (Derek Walcott), *Indian Boarding School* (Louise Erdrich), *An Elementary School Classroom in a Slum* (Stephen Spender), *High School* (Karl Shapiro), *The Men's Room in the College Chapel* (W.D. Snodgrass), *A Campus in Summer* (Reed Whittemore), *In a Classroom* (Adrienne Rich), *McGuffey's First Eclectic Reader* (Linda Pastan), *Nightshade on the Way to School* (Margaret Atwood), *The School in August* (Philip Larkin).

From this grouping Dave Smith's seven stanza poem *Desks* and Galway Kinnell's longer four part poem *Schoolhouse* seem biographical and open up possibilities for soul-searching. Each stirs up memories and thoughts which are worthy of an expanded educational discourse. Smith comes upon discarded desks on a loading dock now "leg-naked, empty, as if/ we might yet come, breathless, late" that signal the losses, all significant, yet unrecoverable, of many other things besides worn out desks - thin blondes, math, art, birds to stare at, loves first pain. The poem ends posing a profound philosophical question, the meaning of existence.

Piled on a loading dock where I walked,
student desks battered, staggered
by the dozens, as if all our talk
of knowledge was over,

as if there'd be no more thin blondes
with pigtails, no math, no art,
no birds to stare at . . .

I stood there like a child, scared, new,
bird-eyed, not knowing why I came.

Kinnell's poem bears a resemblance.

I find it now, the schoolhouse by the tree,
And through the broken door, in brown light,
I see the benches in rows, the floor he
Paced across, the windows where the fruit
Took the shapes of hearts, and the leaves windled
In the fall, and winter snowed its head.

In this wreak of a house we were taught
Everything we imagined a man could know,
All action, all passion, all ancient thought,
What Socrates had got from Diotima,
How Troilus laughed, in tears, in paradise,
That crowns leapfrog through blood: casts of the dice.

The poem ends with this verse making one wonder if Kinnell is thinking not only of the stars "dispersing in wild flight" but his classmates and his own destiny, an adventure that began when "constellated" in the now burned out schoolhouse:

And we are here, under the starlight. I
Remember he taught us the stars disperse
In wild flight, though constellated to the eye.
And now I can see the night in its course,
The slow sky uncoiling in exploding forms,
The stars that flee it riding free in its arms.

The intention of this paper was not to explicate a set of poems, but to suggest that imaginative literature can contribute to educational discourse. Poetry does reveal a voice and propose themes seldom heard in the educational discourse of professional journals or at professional meetings, though often heard in the conversation of individual teachers. Robert Coles, among others, in his writings consistently makes the case for literature as a catalyst for reflection, soul-searching, and the exploration of values:

> The story he (William Carlos Williams) had in mind was everyone's story, if we would only know it and have the courage to seek it out, find our own particular way of rendering it: the thoughts we have about life's purpose, if any; the questions we ask about our fate, if any; the answers we have found to such questions--again , if any. *Stories and poems are a great help in this kind of search.* They grip the moral imagination, prompt us to wonder and speculate. Instead of holding us to theories, principles, ideas, ideologies, they let us each be ourselves, creatures using language to ask about reasons, to look with some intensity (and occasional fear or alarm) at what is happening, and to wonder why."

Considering the topic perhaps it is fitting to conclude with J. V. Cunningham's "Meditation on Statistical Method."

> Plato, despair!
> We prove by norms
> How numbers bear
> Empiric forms,
>
> How random wrong
> Will average right
> If time be long
> And error slight;
>
> But in our hearts
> Hyperbole
> Curves and departs
> To infinity.
>
> Error is boundless.
> Nor hope nor doubt,
> Though both be groundless,
> Will average out.

---

1. Maxine Greene, "What Happened To Imagination," Imagination & Education editors, Egan and Nadaner (New York and London: Teacher College Press, 1988), 47.
2. Michael Klein "Interview with Jean Valentine," American Poetry Review 20 (July/August 1991): 42
3. W.H. Bond "The Gutenberg Caper," Harvard Magazine 88 (March-april 1986): 42-48
4. Charles Simic, The Uncertain Certainty (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985), 46.
5. David Montenegro, "Interview with Adrienne Rich," American Poetry Review 20 (January/February 1991): 12.
6. Paul B. Janeczko editor Poetspeak: in their work, about their work (New York: Bradbury Press, 1983), 173-174.
7. Robert Coles "Critic's Corner A Literature of Soul-Searching," Theology Today 45 (July 1988):207.

POETRY: "THE SUN-LIT ART OF THE HUMAN HEART"

Cheryl Southworth
Meredith College

I will let this poem speak a response to Russell; one of greeting, joy in the awakenings he invites us to and, perhaps, to invite a further deepening of his vision. I suggest that all poetry speaks directly to the tasks of teaching even as this poem speaks strongly to my education students about their tasks of teachers. The poem is from Arvia Mackaye Ege and is entitled: "The Sun-Lit Art of the Human Heart".

Oh, why is it
That almost everybody is afraid today
To speak out of his heart! -
But thinks that everything he has to say
Must be concise, clipped, clever and self-satisfied!
Must have appeal - oh yes! - and be at any rate undignified,
Crooned,perhaps -in some appalling, deadly way -
Or just straight modern jargon, drab and gray.

Is it their fear of ridicule?
Their horror to be thought a fool? -
Fleeing the sentimental - to at least keep cool! -
Or are they the unwitting tool
Of hidden motives,
Harbored in secreted, semi-conscious creatures
Who infest men's souls
And carry out their avid votives
To Mammon, on the altars
Of his vicious goals?

And to what end?
Whither do they lead us?
What do they portend?

Without the heart - all mankind would be bled and blind;
All inner human contact undermined;
Each sealed in isolation in his frozen cell -
A lonely hell! -

Without the heart - the will
Would rage in dark, obscene brutality.
Fester to gigantic world catastrophy -
Only to plunge into a sea of impotence,

Reduced, by its own excess and rank futility,
To nil! -

Man would be destroyed -
An empty flask
For Mammon's evil wine to fill!

'Tis only when at length all three,
The heart, the mind, the will
Can live and work in harmony, That this travesty,
This brutal storm of enmity,
Will at last be still!

And of the three -
As Mammon knows! -
It is the heart
That holds out to the others
A slender, gleaming key
To set them free! -

It is the golden mystery
Of art! -
That faculty which shields, transforms
And heals its stricken brothers;
Takes them by the hand and leads them to consort
In loving alchemy, -
That free, divine activity of man
Which foils, with beauty's brimming mastery,
The shameful aims of evil's monstrous plan.

Oh, decide! Make haste and act! - The hour is already late! -
The storm-clouds of the world-all lower wild! - Near or far -
No matter where, or what, or who you are. -
Pause! - Take breath! -And let us start
To speak, to think and to create -
With full courage and full weight -
Out of the wonder, warmth and truth,
The wisdom, power and eternal youth,
Of that tempest-torn,
Love-flooded, love-upborne,
Sun-lit art
Of the human heart? [1]

This poem speaks to me of courage. No, rather, it permeates me with courage and fills me with moral vision. With this poem, I can place my feet on the earth, dare to speak my heart's truth.

Once again, as every semester, I meet the shock, the incredulity in my young and innocent students as they discover that the myths they were raised in, their idealized middle-class version of reality, hides ugly truths destructive of their uniform vision of goodness. Depressed, many students describe themselves. They believed themselves to be the straight-seeing truth-telling boy who shouts out in the crowd: "Look the emperor has no clothes" only to discover that they are the emperor. So the question arises once again: How does one help students meet the suffering and turmoil in the world with love, courage, and vision rather than with hopelessness and despair? That is to say, how does one create the possibility for students to engage their moral imaginations in such a way as to generate inner activity from which moral activity can arise? Such an pedagogy, I suggest, must speak to a future that can arise through each student's heart-filled, courage-filled initiative. This possibility exists in the meeting of the receptive soul to the best of poetry. I take up the theme that the task of poetry is just this: to enrich the moral imagination and, thus, provide impulses for the free spiritual evolution of humanity. As such, poetry is at the heart of any true educational enterprise.

Poetry is not constrained by "strictly logical thought forms" that, alone, would seem to strangle the human soul. Through poetry, we can say the unsayable, think the unthinkable, see the invisible. The doing of poetry awakens the heart - to nature, to beauty, to each other, to the divine. Poetry speaks to the wrenching experience of our disconnection from ourselves and our world, freeing us even as it reveals. She speaks of our yearning for connection, beauty, truth, harmony and love - to our deepest moral impulses, awakening in us the will to transformation and to praxis. She calls us forth from apathy to interest-filled attention to our world - daring us to care, to love, to understand. At the same time, she calls us back from passionate abandonment in the world of sense, filling us with shame, with contemplation, reverence for the wonder of the universe we dare not lose ourselves in. At her best, she calls forth courage to dare to envision, to create a wider, more embracing view of the world, connecting all with all in infinite diversity. She dares us to create who we are.

> "Truly poetry has the power of transforming consciousness itself by holding before us icons, images of forms only partially and superficially realized in life." [2]

Poetry penetrates phenomenon and in so doing reveals the universe in relation to humanity. In so doing, she awakens us to moral impulses, which taken up freely and with love, gives "expression of a higher union of the cosmically permeated earth nature and the striving human spirit."[3] This quality, this possibility in poetry has, perhaps, never shone forth so clearly, with such foresight as in the work of the great poet of the northern lights, Theodor Daubler (1876-1934). In his poetic works Daubler gives form to his deep comprehension of the aurora, a comprehension initiated by early scientific discourse on the aurora and yet anticipating scientific discoveries newly won in our own day. Daubler was profoundly inspired by the aurora (which he never saw). In his profound epic poem, he opens the doors of the imagination to whole new worlds of human possibility through his inspired and imaginative perception of the aurora. In a moral imagination, he calls forth the human being to an evolutionary task of truly cosmic grandeur.

Daubler gifted us with his penetrating insight into the northern auroral oval which he sees as "an expression of a living earth-organism and, at the same time, as the sign of a new knowledge of the

pentecostal state of the earth." In his earlier reflections on the northern lights he declares in prosaic form:

> Once, at a masked ball (I myself wore a mask) I said to myself: Life is not merely a voluntary ascetism or constraint, a duty opposed to the sun in order that we may climb to the highest stars, and the earth is not merely an enemy, at best a vagina and grave. It occurred to me in effect: life demands abundance, the creatures ought to jubiliate dively upwards. I ran out of the ballroom on to the street. I felt happy, the earth concealed within itself yet a great amount of sun which was united with us in opposition to gravity and wanting to return to the sun. Everywhere. Even in the ice. Especially there, at the poles, where the night is deepest, longest, particularly powerful! A shining embrace of sun redemed fromearth and the sun in the sky brings the aurora to the months-long nights at the poles. The earth longs to be a shining star again. My private cosmogony had attained its completion!
>
> This idea of the northern crown would not leave me. I knew quickly that it could, in fact, be desire, joy, happiness, trust within ourselves. For me, the reason for this lay, I saw it clearly, in the earth. Perhaps in a fluid-fiery, still sunlike interior! Light's destination, the gleaming wreaths around the poles, became for me a symbol of the history of the innermost occurrences. I experienced a northern shining of the soul; what happened there made all creatures of the day dim. The sun eclipsed itself for me. At night, my confidence dawned in a final, mediating sun. The aurora can show us the way to it. It brings us closer to the archetypal light. We are descended from it, we human beings who have determined, weighted and made into our own act all visible suns. In my impulsiveness, I did not shrink back for one moment from entrusting my naive atheism to a heavenly faith in hierarchies and supernatural spirituality. The leap into the religious was, however, an act of will! Quite childishly, I wanted to embrace all my acquaintances, to see their souls as paths to the North belonging to all peoples. Thus, again, with human beings, as one who would break open the archetypal light, an equal! Often, locked up with myself, I had prayed in secret; now I admitted to myself that I prayed. Through the northern lights, I received the freedom of our race..[4]

In his epic poem of thirty-three thousand verses, Das Nordlicht, states cultural philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz, Daubler gives us "a treasure for the mastering of which life if not long enough, but for which many lives would be well spent...[we] must accept the whole of it as it is, as a new virgin forest and a cultivated forested continent."[5] Poetically, Daubler says of his experience with the Northern lights:

> The northern lights bring silence. The northern lights lower
> the eyelids.

The northern lights waft in you and surge over you,
For a world sinks gloriously down to you.

The northern lights, the son of two sun-born suns
(For slumber and consciousness have created them.)
They set, in brightness, sun, moon and stars upon the throne.
So, in you, the northern lights will snatch away the night.
They see the suns, reveal the suns, generate the suns.
The northern lights rise up where the shafts of consciousness
gape open.

The northern lights look upon you, entangled they glow
within you.

You love them graciously, they will be comforted in you:
You sleep. If you forget yourself, then the glow has won:
And soon the day will dawn, innocent and pure.[6]

In Das Nordlicht Daubler teaches us that: "Actually, existence means: return to the sun." Poetry, then, releases us from the forces of gravity, from the vulgar and ugly which tempt us not to feel, think or live. She opens up a space in our psyche where our yearning becomes a gaping hole, revealing the anguish of living - a space in our chest, from whence is revealed our sun-lit heart ever throbbing in rhythmic movement, movement that enlivens, that permeating form generates life. Life that reaches up from its deepest core in the earth, stretches forth towards the Sun, until met by the Sun, she blossoms forth in that Phoenix-like moments when, in a gesture of receptive self-sacrifice, she opens her chalice to sun - and is, thus, fulfilled. And the sun, in a soul-transforming gesture gifts life with itself, giving rise to the great cosmic dance of blossoming light - the aurora. The poet, penetrating the phenomenon of the aurora, reveals it as imagination speaking to the future of humanity. In its embrace, we can live the perpetual transformations generated through our strivings, our openings and our dyings, as we move through existence towards the sun. Such moral imaginations when taken up by each of us in freedom, speak to us out of the future.

To us as educators, charged with promulgating in ourselves and our young the seed of the future - the courage to live and the will to fulfillment; to our youth who would speak to us out of the future, poetry speaks. Poetry en-livens and en-courages us with intimations of immortality arising from the future. Poetry lives at the heart of education, as at the heart of education rests the destiny of humanity.

---

1. Arvia Mackaye Ege, The Secret Iron of the Heart: Songs at the Forge of Awakening Man. (NY: Adonis Press, 1982).
2. Kathleen Raine, Defending Ancient Springs. (Mass: Lindisfarne Press, 1985), p. 160.
3 Harold Falck-ytter, Aurora: The Northern Lights in Mythology, History and Science, (NY: Floris Books, 1985), p. 143.
4. Ibid., p. 143-144.
5. Ibid, p. 142.
6. Ibid., p. 148.

EDUCATION AS HOSPITALITY:

THE RECLAMATION OF CULTURAL METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE

William F. Losito
College of William and Mary

Much contemporary debate about quality schools assumes the validity of the implicit root metaphor education-as-production. Within this metaphoric model, effective schools transform raw material into finished products as measured by aggregate scores on standardized tests, number of merit scholars awarded, current SES of previous graduates, and the like. It is not surprising that this root metaphor has generated ancillary metaphoric discourse like "being Ivy League material" or "developing product assessment instruments." The education-as-production metaphor has had a profound effect on our conceptualization of the professional educator. For example, a recent paper sponsored by NIE explores the implications of the "teacher as CEO" model.[7] In Education and the Cult of Efficiency, Raymond Callahan persuasively explains the historical origins of the production metaphor in educational thought and practice.[8] He points out that during the early twentieth century Americans developed a euphoric confidence in the application of scientific rationality to industrial and commercial development. The faith in efficiency through the application of knowledge and reasoning in the social sciences, Callahan argues, was quickly transferred to the field of education, where the problems of urban schools in coping with the social problems of the city, booming enrollments, and assimilating culturally diverse students were reaching staggering proportions. Given that context, it is understandable that local educational leaders would adopt the metaphoric model of schools as systems for production.

Nonetheless, the education-as-production metaphor has failed us as a research/development model as well as an approach for guiding social interaction. Theoretically, it presumes that a unified applied science of the educational process is possible and that there is an objective body of measurable knowledge to be universally imparted in the curriculum. Contemporary critical epistemological theory has demonstrated both presumptions to be false. For sometime now, many thoughtful educational theorists, such as Cleo Cherryholmes, have been engaged in educational inquiry beyond the modernist presumptions.[9] But even more deeply, the education-as-production metaphor fails miserably as a conceptual model for guiding response to the deep social and personal problems which characterize American society and especially burden our young people. Despite disclaimers by its adherents, the production metaphor is inadequate for generating fruitful ways of thinking, feeling, and responding to individual existential situations of anxiety, alienation, loneliness, low self-esteem, various forms of addiction, and general value confusion. In fact, the implementation of the production model, with all of its attending emphases on the mass batching of youngsters and standardized expectations, only exacerbates our social and educational ills.

Correspondence: School of Education, College of William & Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795

Because of our cultural commitment to scientific rationality and its technocratic application to social problems, we have restricted access to metaphors and themes in our cultural heritage which could enrich our current discourse about quality education. Given the vastness and complexity of the American educational system, the technocratic focus on systems input and productive output has an appropriate role to play. But other metaphors and themes from our cultural heritage need to be reclaimed in order to serve as dramatic correctives and complements to the production metaphor.

This paper is devoted to exploring one such metaphor -- education-as-hospitality -- which is particularly relevant as a complement and corrective to the production metaphor. The theme of hospitality is deeply embedded in our Western tradition. Our literature is rich in narratives which depict the act of hospitality as a paradigm of the caring individual, group, and deity. The hospitality theme provides a conceptual and affective response to the contemporary sense of estrangement, alienation, loneliness, and anxiety. And it spawns a number of metaphors pertinent to the educational context -- the root metaphor education-as-hospitality and submetaphors school-as-hospice, teacher-as-host, and student-as-guest. The strategy here will be to identify and describe selected paradigm examples of the hospitality theme in our tradition, draw out the more important features of the meaning in the narratives/texts, and explore suggestions for the application of hospitality as a metaphor for guiding contemporary educational thought and practice. I will rely on Henri Nouwen's Reaching Out: The Three Movements of the Spiritual Life as a point of departure for the latter task, since he synthesizes nicely the main elements of the hospitality tradition and explores their relevance for contemporary life.[10]

The Hospitality Tradition

Greek literature as well as the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures give a preeminent place to the moral necessity and virtue of hospitality. Homer's Odyssey lays out the paradigmatic narrative of life-as-journey motif in our Western literature. Regularly throughout the epic, the provision of hospitality is a key ingredient in supporting the heroes and keeping them on course. The implication is that life's journey requires the compassion and caring of others for a successful outcome.

In the early part of the story, Telemakhos, the son of Odysseus, sets out with his compatriots in search of his father. They land on Lakedaimon, the domain of Menelaos. King Menelaos himself had participated in the siege of Troy and spent several treachery-filled years returning to his homeland. Upon meeting Telemakhos, King Menelaos emphatically exhorts his men:

> Could we have made it home again -- and Zeus give us no more hard roving! -- if other men had never fed us, given us lodging? These men to be our guests: unhitch their team![11]

This passage clearly indicates important characteristics of the nature and motive for hospitality. Each one of us is likely to be in need of food and lodging at some time in life; we should feel compelled, then, to offer it to others in need.

The most extended and profound treatment of hospitality centers around the initial events of Odysseus' return to his homeland Akhaia. When Odysseus first arrived after a twenty-year absence, he sought out the shelter of the swineherd, Eumaios, who had remained faithful to him for all those years.

Because of Odysseus' aging and his disguise in poor clothing, the swineherd did not recognize him. But spontaneously and generously, the Eumaios immediately offered hospitality: "Come to the cabin. You're a wanderer too. You must eat something, drink some wine, and tell me where you are from and the hard times you've seen."[12] After Odysseus thanks Eumaios profusely for the hospitality, the swineherd remonstrates him by indicating a fundamental reason for hospitality:

> Tush, friend, rudeness to a stranger is not decency. Poor though he may be, poorer than you. All wanderers and beggars come from Zeus. What we can give is slight but well-meant -- all we dare. You know that is the way of slaves, who live in dread of masters -- new ones like our own.[13]

So, ultimately, the reason for hospitality is that the strangers are sent by the gods; they are not simply accidental events in one's life. And the individual must respond accordingly.

Eumaios helped Odysseus eventually reunite with his wife, Penelope. Odysseus remained disguised, so that Penelope likewise did not recognize him. Nonetheless, she extended hospitality to the stranger and expressed eloquently another motive for extending compassion and caring:

> Men's lives are short. The hard man and his cruelties will be cursed behind his back, and mocked in death. But one whose heart and ways are kind -- of him strangers will bear report to the wide world, and distant men will praise him.[14]

Here, Penelope points out that there is a reward for the individual who provides hospitality. Not only may the hospitality be returned, but the caring and compassionate person will be esteemed as virtuous by the community.

The hospitality theme in The Odyssey spells out expectations for the guest as well as the host. While Odysseus was away for two decades, many suitors prevailed on Penelope's required hospitality to stay in the home. But they abused the hospitality badly -- squandering the food and fouling the home. Upon the return of Odysseus, he angrily confronted the suitors and, with his son, entered battle:

> You yellow dogs, thou thought I'd never make it home from the land of Troy. You took my house to plunder, twisted my maids to serve your beds. You dared bid for my wife while I was still alive. Contempt was all you had for the gods who rule wide heaven, contempt for what men say of you hereafter. Your last hour has come. You die in blood.[15]

With that, Odysseus and Telemakhos enter into mortal battle with the suitors who had abused the hospitality afforded them. But ultimately, the hospitality metaphor does not encourage violence. In the midst of the violence, Athena warns:

> Break off this bitter skirmish; end your bloodshed, Ithakans, and make peace .... Son of Laertes, and the gods of old, Odysseus, master of land ways and sea ways, command yourself. Call off this battle now, or Zeus who views the wide world may be angry."[16]

Hospitality requires the host to be a peacemaker. The narrative concluded -- Odysseus "yielded to her, and his heart was glad. Both parties later swore to terms of peace set by their arbiter, Athena, daughter of Zeus ..."[17] Thus, we see that the Odyssey sets forth in narrative form guidelines concerning the nature, importance, and motives for the practice of hospitality in life's journey, both taken individually as well as for an entire culture.

The hospitality theme is likewise found centrally in many of the religious narratives in our cultural tradition. In Hebrew Scriptures, for example, when Abraham offered hospitality to three strangers at Mamre in the forms of water, bread and a tender calf, they revealed to him that Sarah his wife would give birth to a son. (Genesis 18: 1-15) The gospel narratives in the Christian Scriptures also point up the importance of the hospitality disposition. For example, in the Emmaus story when the two travelers invited the stranger to join them for the journey, he made himself known in the breaking of the bread as Jesus (Luke 24:13-35).

For the early Christian community, because it was a persecuted sect, the practice of hospitality was critical for survival. Paul, the itinerant spiritual leader of the early Christian church, was deeply influenced by Greek and Hebrew thought. The theme of life-as-journey was central to his conception of the spiritual life. Within that context, Paul frequently exhorted the Christian communities to practice hospitality. Paul directed the Romans, for example, to "make hospitality your special care" (Romans 12:13). And, in his letter to the Corinthians, Paul indicated the motive for hospitality to the stranger: "Didn't you realize that you were God's temple and the spirit of God was living among you?" (I Corinthians 3:16). Paul blended the notion of the stranger as one sent by Zeus in The Odyssey with the Hebrew metaphor of person-as-temple.

As Western culture evolved, the hospitality theme, as part of the life-as-journey motif, became a vital part of the tradition as a whole. The development of commerce, empire building, religious warfare, etc. reinforced the critical need for offering hospitality to the stranger. The expression both in text and practice of hospitality was explicitly illustrated in the monastic orders. The Rule of Saint Benedict is paradigmatic of that tradition. Benedict insisted that hospitality to the travelling stranger be a hallmark of his monastic communities:

> Let all guests that come be received like Christ Himself, who said: "I was a stranger and you took me in." And let fitting honour be shown to all especially to such as are of the faith, and to strangers. When, therefore, a guest is announced, let him be met by the superior or the brethren, with all due charity. Let them first pray together, and so associate with one another in peace ... In this salutation let all humility be show shown. At the arrival or departure of all guests, let Christ, who indeed is received in their persons, be adored in them, by bowing the head or even prostrating on the ground.[18]

The Greek, Hebrew, and Christian texts converge on their emphasizing the necessity of ministering to those needy strangers, irrespective of their appearance and status, whose paths intersect with ours during life's journey.

Contemporary Applications to Education

With the advent of the modern industrial state and its accompanying confidence in technocratic reasoning and bureaucratic response to human need, the vitality of hospitality as a moral disposition has been trivialized into chapters in books on etiquette or bartending. Ironically, at a time when life's journey has become more treacherous for the individual, a moral disposition which has relevance for nurturing and empowering social/personal response has been discarded or minimized in our cultural consciousness. Henri Nouwen, a thoughtful contemporary religious writer, has insightfully argued in his book Reaching Out that "if there is any concept worth restoring to its original depth and evocative potential, it is the concept of hospitality."[19] The thrust of Nouwen's treatment of hospitality is to blend the various traditional themes into a reclaimed conception fruitful for guiding thought and action in contemporary society. He outlines definitional characteristics of hospitality worth quoting at length:

> Hospitality, therefore, means primarily the creation of a free space where the stranger can enter and become a friend instead of an enemy. Hospitality is not to change people, but to offer them space where change can take place... It is not an educated intimidation with good books, good stories and good works, but the liberation of fearful hearts so that words can find roots and bear ample fruit... free to sing their own songs, speak their own languages, dance their own dances; free also to leave and follow their own vocations. Hospitality is not a subtle invitation to adopt the life style of the host, but the gift of a chance for the guest to find his own.[20]

Nouwen's conceptual reclamation redirects hospitality to providing all forms of physical, psychological, educational, and spiritual nurturance to the strangers in one's life.

He then proceeds to describe how hospitality should provide the unifying dimension of all human relationships. In particular, Nouwen discusses the application to three types of relationships: parents and children, teachers and students, and helping professionals and clients/patients. Each of these applications share the emphasis on creating space for the stranger to grow. With respect to parents and children, Nouwen stresses that hospitality means "that children are not property to own and rule over, but gifts to cherish and care for...[guests] who enter into our home, ask for careful attention, stay for a while and then leave to follow their own way."[21] And the teacher's hospitality is manifested as the effort for "the creation of space where students and teachers can enter into a fearless communication with each other and allow their respective life experiences to be their primary and most valuable source of growth and maturation."[22] For other helping professionals, such as psychotherapists, hospitality expresses itself in a restraint of personal power over the client. The essence of this form of hospitality is a healing of the clients and/or patients based on a coming to know them in their existential situations -- "to know the patients fully, in all their joys and pains, pleasures and sorrows, ups and downs, highs and lows, which have given shape and form to their life and have led them through the years to their present situation."[23]

For all three of these forms of hospitality, the common theme in Nouwen's conception is the creating of space for the other to grow without an imposition or coercion toward the host's own goals and projects. It implies an openness to the "stranger" in our lives, even when the stranger is found in those closest to us, such as our children, students, and clients/patients. It is manifest in the willingness to extend caring to those who come into our lives in need, whether thought of as temples of the Holy Spirit, sent by Zeus, or simply as fellow travellers. Nouwen's conceptualization is a synthesis and a blend of the ideas found in the classical and religious narratives. For Nouwen, just as in the Odyssey, the guests (like the suitors) have an obligation and accountability. And authentic hospitality requires the host to exemplify personal standards and confront the guest with expectations within the context of supportive caring --

> To be receptive to the stranger in no way implies that we have to become neutral "nobodies." Real receptivity asks for confrontation because space can only be a welcoming space when there are clear boundaries, and boundaries are limits between which we define our own position. Flexible limits, but limits nonetheless.[24]

The host can likewise extend an invitation for the guest to participate and understand the values of the community. The effort of Nouwen to reappropriate hospitality to contemporary society is an excellent starting point for including the metaphor of education-as-hospitality into our own thinking about educational practice. The central feature of this metaphoric application would be for the educational community to help individuals create personally meaningful sets of beliefs and understandings.

The characteristics of hospitality do not imply a particular practice or policy for schools. Nonetheless, education-as-hospitality does point out very important dispositions for the teacher, qualities of the school environment/climate, and objectives of educational policy. One can, for instance, easily identify the kind of attitude exhibited by teachers who think of themselves as hosts and their students as guest-strangers. The Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, gave a vivid depiction of the teacher-as-host:

> He enters the school-room for the first time, he sees them crouching at the desks, indiscriminately flung together, the misshapen and the well-proportioned...empty faces, and noble faces in indiscriminate confusion, like the presence of the created universe; the glance of the educator accepts and receives them all.[25]

Just as easily, we can identify the many qualities of an educational climate in which the school functions as hospice and not just center of production. In her groundbreaking qualitative study of good schools, Sara Lawrence Lightfoot concluded that all the good school portraits included a good samaritan attitude toward those most in need:

> A final way of judging institutional goodness for students is to observe the regard and treatment for the weakest members. In each of these portraits, we see a strong institutional concern for saving lost souls and helping students who are most vulnerable.[26]

In recent years, researchers have started charting the magnitude of the number of homeless children who go unserved by our publicly supported school system.[17] Certainly, legislatures, school boards, and other administrative bodies which thought of schools as institutions of hospitality would address aggressively the problem of homelessness as well as other pressing issues.

Education-as-hospitality is a metaphor with useful suggestions for enriching much of our current thought about educational practice. Just as important, our analysis opens up an avenue for reclaiming and reappropriating other traditional metaphors/concepts without obligating us to some of the infelicitous aspects of earlier conceptions. In a postmodern epistemology, where narrative and metaphor have legitimacy in enhancing human understanding, we can permit a plurality of conceptions, both sacred and profane, to have relevance simultaneously. Each of these traditional perspectives can identify concepts and themes which point to, suggest, and facilitate insight into contemporary educational issues.

---

1. David C. Berliner, "The Executive Functions of Teaching," The Instructor (September 1980), 29-39.
2. Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
3. Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Power and Criticism: Poststructural Investigations in Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988).
4. Henri J.M. Nouwen, Reaching Out: The Three Movements of the Spritual Life (Garden City: NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975).
5. Homer, The Odyssey, Robert Fitzgerald trans. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 54, Bk. 4, 11.1-23. Note: For The Odyssey, the general book and line citations will be given for the convenience of the reader using a different edition.
6. The Odyssey, p. 54 (Bk. 14, 11. 1-22).
7. The Odyssey, p. 249 (Bk. 14, 11. 23-78).
8. The Odyssey, p. 364 (Bk. 19, 11. 263-332).
9. The Odyssey, p. 410 (Bk. 22, 11. 1-20).
10. The Odyssey, pp. 461-462 (Bk. 24, 11. 483-537).
11. Ibid., 462.
12. "The Spritual Practices of Saint Benedict," in M. Basil Pennington, Alan Jones, and Mark Booth, eds. The Living Testament: The Essential Writings of Christianity Since the Bible (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 99.
13. Nouwen, Reaching Out, p. 47.
14. Nouwen, Reaching Out, p. 51.
15. Nouwen, Reaching Out, p. 56.
16. Nouwen, Reaching Out, p. 63.
17. Nouwen, Reaching Out, p. 67.
18. Nouwen, Reaching Out, p. 69.

19. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 94.

20. Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, The Good High School: Portraits of Character and Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 349.

21. James H. Stronge and Cheri Tenhouse, Educating Homeless Children: Issues and Answers (Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1990).

HOSPITALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: A RESPONSE TO LOSITO

Robert J. Mulvaney
University of South Carolina

Prof. William Losito's incisive and sensitive paper explores the usefulness of restoring the metaphor of hospitality to our root conception of educational aims and procedures. In it he offers an implicit critique of some dominant modern philosophical assumptions, and suggests the substitution of novel epistemological and methodological moves in their place. Some may discern in his analysis a temptation to misplaced nostalgia. But much more is going on here than that. Hospitality was a necessary virtue in primitive cultures because of the life and death uncertainties involved in daily life. Hospitality is needed today, Prof. Losito argues, because of analogies suggesting dangers every bit as grave in modern life. As such I find in his paper an implicit indictment of the rationalistic optimism of modern life. The decline of hospitality is a sign of this deeper malaise.

Prof. Losito situates his critique within the context of a general objection to prevalent industrial and mechanical metaphors of educational practice. He roots these metaphors in the modern ideal of a unified science which he finds inadequate in dealing with the deeper psychological and spiritual problems of the human condition. Such pervasive instrumentalist metaphors in turn contradict, and exile from the realm of discourse, other metaphors more suitable to human needs, especially the metaphor of hospitality and its more general contextual metaphor, that of life as a journey. These metaphors are part of the fabric of the Greek, Jewish and Christian world-view, as represented in their dominant literary artifacts. Some recovery of these metaphors, a return to our roots so to speak, is necessary, particularly in establishing morally healthy relationships at home, in the schools and in professional psychotherapeutic situations. Prof. Losito does not claim immediate applicability of the restoration of the metaphor of hospitality. But the metaphor of hospitality can enrich the general setting of educational practice, and amounts to a diffused philosophical recommendation, useful in a program of general teacher education.

Much of what he says appeals to me. I would probably recast his complaints in more traditional ways, emphasizing the loss of organic and biological metaphors such as growth, and the accompanying conviction that schools owe as much to families as they do to society at large. But I am likewise both appalled and amused by the apparent growth of mechanical metaphors in educational practice, and by the pseudo-managerial language used to depict educational life, particularly in the case of administrators. Prof. Losito mentions the "CEO model" of the teacher. Such is the poverty of proper educational metaphors that we find some college presidents calling their vice-presidents and other key officers members of their "cabinets." So much for communities of scholars!

As part of an ameliorative project, Prof. Losito recommends recovery of the ancient spirit of hospitality, again not in any surge of romantic feeling, but in the perception that modern social experience is at least as dangerous, if not more so, that the experience of ancient or primitive man.

Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208

Journeying in pre-modern times was an extraordinarily dangerous activity. Perhaps it was a metaphor for life in general precisely because of the dangers involved. To receive primitive journeyers as guests was frequently necessary to save their lives. Even within cities, before modern times, life after dark was hazardous. There were no public police departments in Europe before the 17th century. Hospitality was not a supererogatory gift to the stranger, but frequently a duty of justice in the face of the harsh realities of daily life. Prof. Losito draws an analogy between such ancient dangers and the perils of the modern wayfarer. Hospitality recommends itself to modern social relationships precisely because, if anything, modern life is more dangerous than ancient.

But if such hospitality is to appeal to us, are we likewise to acquiesce in the dangers of life that make such hospitality necessary? There is a disturbing possibility that championing hospitality to modern sensibility may be a way of capitulating to the underlying causes that make such hospitality necessary. So homelessness (both real and metaphorical) calls for renewed hospitality. But does this mean that we should accept homelessness as a fact of life, or law of nature, such as primitive man accepted the perils of the highway or darkness? It strikes me that hospitality in this sense is a moral ideal in need of transcendence, as its root causes, poverty and mutual fear, need to be eliminated, not accepted as unavoidable dimensions of human experience. My question becomes: does reclamation of the ancient value of hospitality entail acquiescence in the social conditions that made such hospitality necessary?

Modern sensibility has lost much of the classical value of hospitality. But perhaps part of the reason for this lies in a properly modern insistence that individuality and its allied values of self-sufficiency, liberty and human dignity have a better chance of establishing the kind of peace and good order that will make classical protective hospitality unnecessary. Ideals of freedom and individual dignity are arguably entailed more in modern scientific procedures than they are in the complex of concepts and metaphors constituting classical culture. Not one of the three great ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato or Aristotle, ever criticized the institution of slavery. Aristotle, notoriously, in the first book of the Politics, claims some people are by nature slaves. And children were property, alienable like any other property. The myth of the abandoned child is common to Greek, Jewish and Roman cultures, as John Boswell has shown in his Kindness of Strangers. Is there any instance in classical literature, I wonder, where a child is received as a guest? Contrast all this with Hobbes, who holds that all men should acknowledge their common and natural equality, and with Rousseau with his own child-centered pedagogy. I am not claiming a causal connection between the decline of hospitality and the rise of personal freedom and autonomy. But it is the case that modernity brought with it a sense of self-reliance, dignity and personal worth, as well as intensified sentiments of solitude, alienation and loneliness. This may be a dimension of the irony of moral progress. We win something, but we lose something too.

We should reclaim, in a non-nostalgic and probably radically reconceptualized fashion, the ideal of hospitality and extend it, even programmatically (I think of programs such as "Invitation to Learning") to the public school. But in the process let us not claim too much (Lightfoot's "saving lost souls" is surely an inappropriate metaphor for the teacher -- teachers are not saviors), nor dismiss the real achievements of modern sensibility, particularly the sense of individual power and autonomy that we have inherited from the 18th century. No one should be homeless, really or metaphorically (at Carolina we call students without declared majors "academic boat people"). But the "free space" the guest requires, according to Nouwen and according to Prof. Losito, requires a set of categories (if not

metaphors) only gradually coming to our full awareness, and only dimly perceived in the tradition we may claim to be recovering.

But I wonder how much of this analysis Prof. Losito would in fact accept. Late in his paper he claims to abjure some of the "infelicitous aspects of earlier conceptions" of hospitality? Let me conclude by asking him what these are, and how they might help delimit the applicability of classical notions of hospitality to a modern educational setting.

INTEGRITY

OR

"HE WHO STEALS MY PURSE"

Judith T. Witmer, Ed.D.
Lower Dauphin School District

Preface

What's a practicing public school administrator doing addressing the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society? Who am I to risk being viewed as a high-handed amateur? Or worse yet a simplistic sophist? Admittedly a novice, I was drawn into educational philosophy through my interest in ethics. True to the code of "The Silent Generation" and a product of an educational system which did not encourage philosophical discourse, I privately read Plato, John Dewey, Alfred North Whitehead and John Locke; I later moved on to Derek and Sissela Bok, Daniel Callahan, Stephen Toulmin, Phillip Phenix and Stephen Pepper; I then discovered Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, Kenneth Strike, Alasdair MacIntyre; and, finally, I met Ted Fenton, Tom Lickona, Carol Gilligan, Dwight Boyd, and Lawrence Kohlberg. These latter five I came to know when, as a "camp follower" during the literature search for my dissertation, I attended Kohlberg's Symposium on School Governance in the summer of 1986, his Memorial in the spring of 1987, several conferences sponsored by the Association for Moral Education, and the 50th Anniversary Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society in March 1991. Today, I speak as another voice, a voice which has grown stronger, one which makes a plea for ethical principles and the integrity with which to promote them.

Integrity, a Personal Issue

There is nothing so important to one's personal and professional character as integrity, and there is nothing more personally and professionally important than protecting the quality of one's own integrity against infidels. As educators we should express a solid and unwavering belief in integrity as the keystone of the entire learning experience. No truly great persons, teachers or otherwise, have ever been reluctant to tell anyone what they believe or disbelieve. And no "greats" or "near-greats" have ever not revealed how they stand on any issue of consequence. Not limited to "greats," integrity is a quality that every moral person should be able to attain. It is a quality that all educators must possess if they are to "do right" by the public they serve.

Integrity, of course, goes beyond stating beliefs and taking stands. Integrity is in the essence of a person; it is one's very character. While ethics deals with what one does and how one conforms to accepted professional standards of conduct, integrity further implies incorruptibility and a holding firm to a personal moral code. Integrity begins with honorableness based on a sense of doing one's duty and having an unwavering regard for what is morally right. There are fundamental universal principles with

Correspondence: Lower Dauphin School District, Hummelstown, PA 17036

which all civilized persons agree; persons of integrity live their personal and professional lives by these universal principles, going far beyond giving them lip services. Persons of integrity cannot live any other way.

The person with high principles will carry out alll actions based on truthfullness, candor and fairness. Being a person of integrity means following one's conscience and demonstrating trustworthiness and incorruptiblity to the degree that one is incapable of being false to a trust, responsibility or pledge. Being such a person is a conscious choice and requires carefully weighing every decision as to its being right and equitable. Such decision-making is not easy, and that is probably the main reason why the concept of decisions based upon ethical principles has, until recently, been left out of typical educational discourse.

Integrity - Personal and Public

Should a person remove the mantle of personal integrity in the public arena? In fact, can he? Can a person whose beliefs are grounded in philosophical principles set these beliefs aside when she becomes an administrator? Does a kind of situational ethics take over when one deals in the complicated realm of making managerial decisions? Does the fact that the results of managerial decisions impact on others more than the results of personal decisions, make a difference in how those decisions are made? John Ladd, in addressing the moral relationship of individuals to organizations, calls attention to the paradox that individuals make corporate decisions based on the goals of the organization and not on personal belief (presuming there is a conflict).[1] Pat Howlett, who conducts workshops on ethics, states that ethical problems are not between right and wrong but between morality of (personal) principles and (corporate) situations.[2]

While it is not the purpose of this paper to dwell on corporate morals, it might be interesting to note that the new world managers, termed by Peter Heller as "supermanagers," are identified as having the following essential characteristics, identified as the five eyes: Intelligence, Independence, Identity, Iconoclasm and Integrity. In the case of IBM, integrity implies binding commitment, a pledge to customers to stand behind IBM's products and to resolve any customer problems related to the company. This integrity was the crucial element in making IBM a giant in computers.[3] The customer could depend upon the integrity of the company. To IBM and its customers, integrity fit the definition established early in this paper: "Integrity begins with honorableness based on a sense of doing one's duty and having an unwavering regard for what is morally right." In IBM's case, integrity became synonymous with the corporate identity.

Integrity in an individual is also firmly rooted in honorableness, in a commitment to one's word, to justice, truth-telling, honesty, and concern for others. In a sense, integrity is respect for the personhood of other individuals to the extent taht one who has integrity can be completely depended upon to act upon the principles of fairness and justness.

This is not to say, however, that a person of integrity is rarified. Certainly not. Conflicts in particular situations one must face are inevitable. In particular situations, how does one resolve the conflict between such values as truthfulness and loyalty, candor and kindness, freedom and equality, or justice and compassion? Even more difficult, how do persons of integrity make value choices if they are

in positions of power or authority in which their decisions often affect large numbers of people? How do they resolve the moral conflicts? Hampshire believes that the resolution of such conflicts is based on reason as well as by the way in which we typically regard ourselves and others, and by the range of stable dispositions, attitudes and emotions that incline us to act as we do."[4] Thus, persons of integrity call upon their personal standards as well as their reasoning powers. Hampshire, in his views of public and private morality, stresses the importance of a leader developing explicitness of reasoning and the ability to be able to explain the basis for his moral decisions, both as a defense of the choices that he is following and as an explanation of his following them. A leader needs to be understood as to how he understands the basic moral issues.[5]

Integrity in Educational Leadership

Educational leaders, in particular, who have undertaken to earn the trust of the public they serve, must demonstrate responsibility and integrity. What might be overlooked in a lawyer or businessman comes under scrutiny in an educational administrator because educators are entrusted with the public's children. School administrators are expected by the public to make all of the right choices for all of the students under their charge. By becoming educational leaders, persons accept the obligation of integrity to do what is morally or ethically required in all circumstances.[6] Unfortunately, it is this obligation which is also most elusive to measure and most difficult to instill. In addition, the educational community, well-aware of this expectation, has always presumed its membership to be able to handle all situations requiring good judgment; it has presumed the integrity of its leaders.

Every function of the administrator's role and position involves making decisions based not only upon the standards of the school and community, but also according to sound ethical judgment. And what is that? How do administrators know they are basing their decisions upon moral and ethical principles? How do they test their integrity? First, these administrators must have a firm foundation for decision-making based upon a system of ethical beliefs grounded in philosophy. Second, they must have a clear understanding of such concepts as human justice, equality, and freedom, as these are basic to ethical decision-making in a democratic society.

While no one would presume to imply that all administrators can find ultimate truth in the study of philosophical theory, they must still approach their decisions with the belief that there is such an ideal. As Broudy states, while a philosophy of education hold no consensus of ultimate truth, this does not mean that ultimate truths do no exist nor that some minds have access to them.[7] Educational administrators need decision-making skills based upon philosophical reference points. And they must be committed to searching for truth. They need what Cooper has termed a "moral imagination."[8] This is the ability to project the consequences and defense of one's choices. Cleveland advocates this approach by suggesting that administrators ask themselves, "If this action is held up to public scrutiny, will I still feel that it is what I should have done, and how I should have done it?"[9] The educational administrator is thus placed in a dilemma of responsibility to find the true solution, or at least the ideal choice, based on what is closest to the truth.

Finding the Way

As a first step, a person in a position of educational leadership must make decisions in line with a professional code of ethics. A few years ago a task force representing six national professional organizations developed a Statement of Ethics. In addition to 10 "Do's," the statement declares the following:

> An educational aministrator's professional behavior must conform to an ethical code. The code must be idealistic and at the same time practical, so that it can apply reasonably to all educational administrators. The administrator acknowledges that the schools belong to the public they serve for the purpose of providing educational opportunities to all. However, the administrator assumes responsibility for providing professional leadership in the school and community. This responsibility requires the administrator to maintain standards of exemplary professional conduct. It must be recognized that the administrator's actions will be viewed and appraised by the co.nmunity, professional associates, and students.[10]

However, as Dexheimer concludes, ethical philosophers from Aristotle to Phenix, Barnard and Maslow have all indicated that the real source of ethical behavior exists within the individual and not in any code of ethics.[11] This is also the stand taken by popular authors such as Blanchard and Peale.[12]

Now, the question is, does this source of ethical behavior exist "naturally" within an individual or can it be learned by this individual? Bok succinctly phrases the whole philosophical dilemma in his definitive article on the subject, "Can ethics be taught?" Bok's conclusions became the touchstone for moral education in higher education. Lee also strongly supports the belief that ethics can be taught. He says that, while often the subject of ethical training elicits synicism, paranoia or laughter, ethics can and must be taught. He further states that "rarely can an individual make ethical quandaries disappear simply be resolving to 'do the right thing'."[14] Further support of this belief comes from Joline Godfrey of the Polaroid Corporation. She asserts that since ethics is not a set of rules, but a complex set of ideas, there is no easy way to get people to behave ethically; however, it is possible to get people to think about ethics.[15] A more important move is that taken by the Hastings Center which undertook a systematic study of the state of the teaching of ethics in American higher education. Their assumption is evident throughout: "Ethics can be taught to the widest range of students with the widest range of backgrounds at the widest range of institutions."[16]

Despite the doubts of those who have reservations about the plausibility of teaching ethics, there is a strong movement for the advocacy of teaching ethics to those preparing for and practicing in the field of educational administration. Sears was one of the early reformers calling attention to the need for ethical training. He propounds that ethics must take its place beside law, science and philosophy in the study of management.[17] He further specifies, "It should be a part of a school administrator's preparatory program of study to learn that nearly every question he will deal with has possibilities of involving him in question of ethics."[18]

In 1951, through studies of the SSCPE, a program was launched to improve the preparation of educational administrators.[19] In the 1960's, Halpin suggested that there are three major ways of knowing (corresponding to the three levels of culture defined by anthropologist Edward T. Hall): 1. formal, 2. informal, 3. technical.[20] All three, but especially the formal which is taught by precept and by admonition, imply that values (ethics) can be taught. In the early 1980's, guidelines for the preparation of school administrators were developed by school practitioners in cooperation with professors of educational administration. This proposal was presented at the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration in 1982 and at the American Educational Research Assocaition Conference in 1983.[21] Also in the 1980's, Cooper and Boyd told of the evolution and the need for the ethical training of school administrators. They reviewed a program orginally designed for the training of Fortune 500 executives who spent several weeks at the Aspen Institute studying literature, drama and philosophy.[22] This formed the basis for a similar training of school executives.

The belief in the need for ethical training in all professions continued to increase as the realization becomes apparent that in today's complex society most people, professional or not, cannot make clear judgments based only on their feelings and their knowledge of content. Their decision-making should also be the result of specific training in making ethical decisions. T. L. Cooper says that in addressing any ethical choice one wants to move from a situation which confronts him with a quandary to a course of action which will resolve it.[23] Dexheimer in his studies calls for a "new dimension to the gradaute training programs for chief school administrators...centered about the student having to make decisions in situations where ethical behavior is in question.[24] Sergiovanni and Carver call for a philosophy of administration partly based on theoretical and empirical foundations as a basis for an applied science of educational administration. They believe that the school leader must develop the ability to sort through both perspectives of science and of values in making decisions. In other words, there msut be a belief pattern for the decision-making.[25] Pepper, who advocates an empirical approach to ethics, also believes that training is necessary in reaching ethical decisions.[26] In addressing the subject or training principals to be more effective leaders, Peterson calls for in-service training in problem-solving based on experiences which shape the values of administrators.[27] Leys comes to the same conclusion when he suggests that part of the intellectual instruction in ethics be given several years after young people have embarded upon their careers and ahve made some of the choices to be used as a basis for discussion.[28] Perhaps Crittenden best summarizes the need for training in ethical decision-making by stating that if values are developed adequately through education and experience, persons should be able to perceive the morally significant features of situations and make choices accordingly.[29] Human values can be taught, according to the belief of many educators and philosophers, through the study of what is called the liberal arts, the humanities, general studies, or great books. While these approaches are not synonymous, they are similar in their belief in a classical and a common culture. William Bennett, the former Secretary of Education, believes that shared values can be and should be taught.

> "There is not Court decision," Mr. Bennett replied, "that precludes the following things: a) saying that these are values that most of us share; b) these are values that we have inherited; or that have endured for us, by virtue of the Judeo-Christian tradition; c) these are values that Jews and Christians hold very important to them; d) the experience of mankind is such that these values can be attested to and vouched for."[30]

Losito expresses his concern that ethics can be taught by incorporating applied moral philosophy into the general on-going education of professionals.[31] Such is the belief also of Berger and others who addressed philosophy, values and ethics at the October 1988 Convention of UCEA.[32]

There are some who believe that the teaching of ethics is best done through experiential learning. Although this theory is not as widely followed as some of the others, Morgan and Rotunda contend that real life ethical problems rarely come up in a form that is easily resolvable by general principles.[33] The National Association of Elementary School Principals also reports that experiential learning by principals is important; experiential learning is here defined in terms of learning the norms and values after a principal is in his position.[34]

In 1985, Schlaefli, Rest and Thoma pooled the results of more than 50 studies of moral education programs. Their conclusions are that direct discussion of dilemmas and personality-development approaches produce modest gains in moral reasoning.[35] Kimbrough, in his course of study for administrators, strongly advocates group analysis and discussion of cases pertinent to real-life situations. The American Association of School Administrators endorses his case study method using formal discussion as "perhaps the best approach to a complex subject (ethical decision-making)."[36] Brown and Herrnstein, in explaining Blatt's group discussion technique for raising moral reasoning, say that there is evidence that a group discussion technique can effect change in moral reasoning of some generality and staying power.[37] Kattsoff has also used moral situations for the development of moral character.[38] The Association for Moral Education at its November 1988, 1989, 1990 Conferences offered sessions on ethics, values and, in particular, moral dilemmas;[39] this seems to be part of a growing trend, although still more hypothetical than actual. The findings of the moral developmentalists offer the strongest support for the use of moral dilemmas, as it is their test criteria which was used to measure the moral reasoning skills exhibited after the participants underwent training through moral dilemma discussion. Even though test criteria for ethics is still imprecise, it appears that the moral discussion method is the one of preference as it has been the only method to show measureable results.

The problem here, however, is that so few books or programs are available on the training of educational administrators in making ethical decisions. While there are several, though not many, sources for case studies and dilemma discussions on general ethical problems, there are very few found with ethical dilemmas directed at educational administration. Prior to 1985, there was only one, Case Studies in Educational Administration: An Information Storage and Retrieval System by Hovat, Bridges, and Sroufe in 1965. In 1985, Kimbrough's Ethics was published, and in 1988 Strike, Haller, and Soltis co-authored The Ethics of School Administration. Kimbrough's text was a disappointment, but the one by Strike, Haller, and Stoltis is what has been needed. It is a blend of ethics and educational administration.

The final point to consider is the monumental work of Kohlberg. It is likely that it is his singular contribution to the fields of education, philosophy, and psychology that laid the foundation for the approach used in the discussion of ethical decision-making. It is he who convinced most others in the field that decisions based on universal principles of justice are better decisions than those based on rules; they are better because they are decisions upon which all moral men could agree. In the words of Thomas Lickona, "If I were teaching a course in ethics, I would teach Kohlberg...."

The implication here is that educators must pay more careful attention to the ethical practices of their membership. Further, there is a pressing need for courses of study to be developed for the training of educational administrators in making ethical decisions, and for education professionals themselves to accept the research findings of those who call for training programs. This training is important, for, even though educators with integrity face each decision with truthfulness, candor and fairness, they still will find themselves in the middle of ethical dilemmas. Through training in ethical decision-making, they will be more confident that their decisions are grounded in ethical principles and will be better able to defend their choices as being just.

Finally, as educators, it is most important not only to be principled but also to extol the merits of such essential virtues as honesty, probity, respectability, fidelity, honor and justice. Educators are the models which children see as the truth; therefore, it is imperative that we reject the view, now running rampant, that "each individual has the right to live his own life." The more education one has, the more socially responsible he becomes. **Only the ignorant have the luxury of leading their own lives.** As educators we must talk about honesty. We must demonstrate a deep and passionate concern for integrity - in the classroom, in personal relationships, in the use of language, in community life and, most of all, in ourselves.

What we stand for, what we say and what we do - these are the true marks of who we are.

---

1. John Ladd, "Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations," Ethics, Education and Administrative Decisions, ed. Peter Andre Sole (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 145.
2. Pat Howlett, "How You Can Stay on the Straight and Narrow," The Executive Educator (February 1991): 19.
3. Robert Heller, The Supermanagers, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1984), 370.
4. Cited in Brian Crittenden, "The Most Context of Decision-Making in Education," Sola, 18.
5. Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 50.
6. A. H. Golman, The Moral Foundation of Professional Ethics (Totowa: New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), 9.
7. H. S. Broudy, "Between the Yearbooks," Philosophy and Education, ed. Jonas F. Soltis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 33.
8. T. L. Cooper, The Responsible Administrator (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1982), 23.
9. Ibid., 24.
10. Richard Dufour and Robert Eaker, "The Principal as Leader: Two Major Responsibilities," NASSP Bulletin (September 1987): 83.
11. Chester LeRoy Dexheimer, Jr., "The Administrative Ethics of Chief School Administrators: A Study in Accommodation" (Ed.D. diss., The University of Rochester, 1969), p. 59
12. Kenneth Blanchard and Norman Vincent Peale, The Power of Ethical Management (New York: William Morrow, 1988).
13. Derek Bok, "Can Ethics Be Taught?" Change 8 (October 1976): 26-30.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

14. Chris Lee, "Ethics Training" Training 23, no. 3 (March 1986): 30-33+.

15. Ibid., 39.

16. Daniel Callahan and Sissela Bok, eds., Ethical Teaching in Higher Education (New York: Plenum Press, 1980): 61.

17. Franklin Parker, "Moral Education, U.S.A.: Background and Trends," College Board Review 137 (Fall 1985): 15.

18. Ibid.

19. Orin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Framework for Educational Administration," Administrative Behavior in Education, eds. Roald B. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), 135.

20. Andrew W. Halpin, Theory and Research in Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 288.

21. John R. Hoyle, "The AASA Model for Preparing School Leaders," eds. Joseph Murphy and Philip Hallinger (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 92.

22. Bruce S. Cooper and William L. Boyd, "The Evolution of Training for School Administrators," Administrative Training, eds. Murphy and Hallinger, 20.

23. Cooper, Responsible Administrator, 20.

24. Dexheimer, "Administrative Ethics," 61.

25. Thomas J. Sergiovanni and Fred D. Carver, The New School Executive: A Theory of Administration, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 312-313.

26. Stephen C. Pepper, Ethics (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960).

27. Kent D. Peterson, "Principals' Work, Socialization and Training: Developing More Effective Leaders," Theory Into Practice 25 (Summer 1986): 151-155.

28. Wayne A. R. Leys, Ethics for Policy Decisions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 359.

29. Brian Crittenden, "The Moral Context of Decision Making in Education," Ethics, Education and Administative Decisions (A Book of Readings), ed. Peter Andre Sola (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 18.

30. David Wagner, "Bill Bennett's Dilemma," National Review, June 19, 1987: 30.

31. William F. Losito, "Is Ethical Conduct Among Professionals Attainable?" USA Today, May 1983: 24.

32. Mark S. Berger, "What Philosophy Brings to Administrative Practice" and George J. Crawford, Howard E. Ebmeier and Michael Imber, "Values and Ethics: Their Role in the Preparation of Educational Administrators," University Council for Educational Administration, 29 October 1988.

33. Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda, Problems and Materials on Professional Responsibility, 3rd ed., University Casebook Series, (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, December 1986), 14.

34. Peterson, "Principals' Work," 152.

35. "Preaching, Practicing, and Prodding: What Works in Character Education?" The Harvard Education Letter, January 1987: 2.

36. Ralph B. Kimbrough, Ethics: A Course Study for Educational Leaders (Arlington, Virginia: AASA, 1985), Foreword.

37. Roger Brown and Richard Herrnstein, "Moral Reasoning and Conduct," Psychology (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975, reprint), 324.

38. Louis O. Kattsoff, Making Moral Decisions (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 277.

39. Dwight Boyd, "Moral Dilemmas of Moral Teaching." Pittsburg: The Association for Moral Education, 11 November 1988.

RESPONSE PAPER TO

"INTEGRITY OR 'HE WHO STEALS MY PURSE'"

Deborah J. Eaker, Ph.D.
North Carolina State University

Much like the question asked by the author of this paper, Dr. Witmer, you might ask why a sociologist is responding to a paper concerning integrity and issues of ethics? I would like to assume that it is taken for granted that I am a person of integrity; nonetheless, I would also presume that is insufficient "expertise" for determining my eligibility to respond to a paper on the topic, as any number of others would qualify if that were the only requirement. What I do assume is that I was asked to respond to this paper for two reasons: First, as a sociologist, I perhaps bring a vastly different perspective to the review of this paper than would another philosopher and, second, I am currently finishing up some work of my own which intersects with some of the work cited in this paper, i.e., that of Carol Gilligan and others. Given my own work and my faculty affiliation within an educational leadership department, the intent behind this response is one of creating dialogue much more than one of critique, to ask questions about and expand our thinking in regard to issues of ethics within educational administration.

I will begin this response by briefly summarizing several points from Dr. Witmer's paper that capture its essence for me. Afterwards, I will respond to points within the paper that precipitated further thought for myself. Finally, I will end by suggesting an additional or alternative process we might consider within administrative decision-marking practices.

In large part, I wholly agree with and support Dr. Witmer's observations and suggestions regarding integrity and ethics within the realm of educational decision-making. She begins by arguing that "integrity . . . goes beyond stating beliefs and taking stands." With this statement I absolutely concur. She leads us to consider the complexities involved in balancing our personal ethical principles with those of the organization. Although I will not pursue this idea at length in this response, it is curious to me as a sociologist that the research she quotes fails to recognize that organizations are merely creations of collectives of individual people. As such, organizational culture and decision-making presumably reflect the personal ethics of those who make up the organization. As a collective creation, we can furthermore presumably change organizational ethics to the extent that these do not reflect the personal collective ethic we support.

With this point made and despite our seemingly disparate views of organizational ethics, it is clear that Dr. Witmer asks an <u>essential</u> question: She asks "how do persons of integrity make value choices if they are in positions of power or authority in which their decisions often affect large numbers of people?" In answer to this, she supports the development of explicitness regarding one's reasons for decisions and the ability to explain to others the reasons for such choices, which she argues are moral

---

Correspondence: College of Education and Psychology, Box 7801, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-7801

choices. The development of such abilities within educational administrators, she suggests, must be based in "a system of ethical beliefs grounded in philosophy" and, she argues, administrators "must have a clear understanding of such concepts as human justice, equality, and freedom. . . ." Finally, she essentially promotes two courses of action as the means for the development of these administrative sensibilities: First, she calls for further development and implementation of ethics courses within administrative education, particularly those based in the moral discussion method using real life cases a la Kohlberg. Second, she argues for the advocacy for and acceptance of such training by educational professionals at all levels.

There is little I disagree with in what Dr. Witmer proposes, as I noted from the start, so I'll begin by addressing a point that needs clarification to my mind. In the first paragraph of her paper, Dr. Witmer mentions her sojourn into the works of Carol Gilligan and Jurgen Habermas as being influential in her study of educational philosophy and ethics. Since she does not mention either of these authors later, it may be that she does not agree with much of what they suggest. If so, I should stop here, for my points may be moot. However, since she introduced these names as foundational for her ideas, the remainder of this response will basically raise some issues that I believe logically come out of the works of Gilligan and Habermas.

At the risk of insulting many of you, I will speak briefly about the works of Carol Gilligan as contrasted to that of Lawrence Kohlberg since I believe the distinctions in their works are important to this response. Dr. Witmer, appropriately I believe, states that Lawrence Kohlberg argued for decisions based on universal principles of justice rather than rules.[28] Carol Gilligan, conversely, proposes that there is a problem with making moral choices strictly from a universal justice perspective, particularly for women. She sees that Kohlberg's stages of moral development, which subordinate relationships to rules and rules to universal principles of justice, are contrary to the ways in which women tend to make moral choices. Gilligan states that "women's sense of integrity appears to be entwined with an ethic of care, so that to see themselves as women is to see themselves in a relationship of connection."[29] Thus, Gilligan contends that women make ethical decisions within the context of relationships, which are certainly particularistic rather than universal in nature.

While I find the gender linkage between caring and women to be problematic and potentially reinforcing of devaluing stereotypes, on a strictly pragmatic level this issue seems to be important for at least two reasons. First, as more women move into the ranks of educational administration, a model of ethical decision-making based in universal principles of justice may indeed be personally and professionally conflict-producing. Second, and I believe perhaps most importantly, since the majority of teachers are female while administrators remain largely male, this asserted difference in ethical orientation to decision-making may be at the root of major misunderstandings and even resentments between teachers and administrators. What this suggests, then, is that much of what fails at the school level may be at least partially explained by differences in orientation to integrity and moral choice.

The second concern I would raise regarding Dr. Witmer's ideas about ethics and decision-making arise out of the work of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas argues that all knowledge is reflective of vested interests and that, as such, the potential for ideological domination is always present.[30] Although I certainly am not suggesting that Dr. Witmer's proposal is to promote administrative domination, I am concerned that there is a total lack of mention of any of the other parties important within schools --

teachers, students, and parents. This omission seems to imply that the knowledges and positions of these participants are not important to ascertain and evaluate within administrative decision-making. Thus, although the stand for ethical decision-making being suggested is absolutely needed, the position taken in the paper appears to reinforce an administrative hierarchy, albeit one that is presumably more ethical and just in its' choices. It seems to suggest the ethical training of educational administrators in the absence of the voices of the other participants within schooling. Such a position, I content, whether intentional or not, promotes paternalistic management within the context of an altruistic rhetoric of integrity and fairness.

This point leads me to my final one -- what I referred to initially as an additional or alternative process to consider within the realm of administrative ethical training and decision-making. As stated earlier, Dr. Witmer argues for the development of an ability to explain one's moral choices within an organizational context. I would like to further suggest that educational administrators should not only develop moral decision-making skills via methods of case study discussion, but that they should also gain skills needed to collect evidence from those at all levels of schooling. With such collective evidence, they are enabled to make decisions outside of the bureaucratic vacuum. Certainly, most effective administrators do make it a practice to talk with teachers, students and even parents. However, this practice is often seen as extra or a nice thing to do when there is time, rather than as essential. Even to those administrators who consider such interpersonal management skills essential, the process of collecting information and evidence for decisions is rarely a systematically instituted, articulated process.

Given this observation, therefore, what I would like for the author to consider, as well as all of us within the various areas of education and educational administration, is a negotiated process similar to what Habermas termed the ideal speech situation.[31] Habermas conceives of such a situation as being one of free and uncoerced discussion, a discussion in which the knowledges of all parties to the situation are given access to the discourse. Additionally, all such knowledge is subjected to examination and reflection within this ideal speech situation.

I am, of course, not naive as to both the ideological as well as merely pragmatic considerations which will be raised to such a suggestion. It goes without mention that a negotiated process which includes at least a representative of all recognized parties becomes complex, potentially time intensive, and structurally complicated. If instituted widely, it has broad ranging implications for school restructuring and policy making. Despite these potential hurdles, and while whole-heartedly supporting the idea of training in ethical decision-making for administrators, I contend, nonetheless, that such decision-making should be systematically informed by participation and information from all levels.

In conclusion, I would urge Dr. Witmer and the rest of us to consider the earlier points made in this response. Additionally, I would like for us to consider what the possibilities of a negotiated process of ethical decision-making within educational administration might produce. This sort of negotiated process, I believe, goes another step beyond merely taking a stand for integrity and ethics within education.

1. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981).

2. Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), 171.

3. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

4. Jurgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," in H.P. Dreitzel (ed.), Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1970).

COMPETENCY, MASTERY AND THE DESTRUCTION OF MEANING

Warren Strandberg
Virginia Commonwealth University

As educators search for more effective ways to instruct our children, they are frequently drawn to "teacher-proof", pre-packaged instructional programs. These programs often claim to have systematic instructional designs, structured and sequenced so as to provide the learner with a degree of competence or mastery not attainable through informal teacher initiatives. Common assumptions include the belief that knowledge, skills and even attitudes can be examined analyzed and isolated in a manner that can generate a hierarchical organization of related learning tasks. The argument is that once these tasks are identified and their order determined, the behaviors required to complete these tasks can be isolated, the conditions under which the behaviors occur specified and ultimately the classroom conditions created which will assure the acceptable performance of these behaviors. While the argument is most closely associated with the development of lowerlevel skills, it can be found also in calls for the development of higher-order thinking. While linked most closely with conventional instructional materials, it is represented also in computer-assisted approaches to the teaching of problem solving and critical thinking.

Two considerations appear to be drawing educators toward systematic, technologically-oriented instructional programs. One is the public demand for accountability. Educators face growing public pressure to define instructional objectives in a manner that outcomes can be quantitatively measured, recorded and reported to the general public. They are responding to a societal demand for greater productivity and guaranteed, certified results. Another consideration is their desire for professional status. Many educators, mistakenly believe that greater status is achieved the more they are perceived more like engineers, than craftsmen. As a consequence, they turn to more systematic and explicit approaches to teaching/learning.

While the concerns of educators are understandable, their solutions lack a sensitivity to certain epistemological concerns. Inherent in their efforts to create an educational technological is a mechanically-oriented perspective which reduces the learner to a kind of disembodied mind. Rationality is viewed as independent of our bodies. The thinking being is conceived of as purely mental, and thinking itself is detached and devoid of any emotional, imaginative or social dimension. That leads to a view of reasoning as purely mechanical and to algorithmic computation as the model of human reasoning. When applied to teaching/learning setting, it is an invitation to a kind of clarity and explicitness which ultimately contributes to the destruction of meaning. In speaking about the nature of knowing, Michael Polanyi warns that

> ...unbridled lucidity can destroy our understanding of complex matters. Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is affaced, our conception of the entity is destroyed.[1]

It is Polanyi's concern about the misplaced search for lucidity that is the focus of this paper. Modern-day curriculum makers deliberately seek "lucidity" in the name of instructional progress and professional development. I believe that there are extreme dangers in the search for such clarity. What happens for

example, to children's growing bodily awareness of their world when teachers try to be lucid about those things that children know but cannot tell? Do we destroy meaning when we articulate the particulars of something in the actual "coming-to-know" of that entity? Do we destroy meaning when the "coming-to-know" of an entity becomes nothing more than abstract symbol manipulation which takes place at the expense of any recognition and cultivation of intellectual embodiment (where understanding is automatic, unconscious, and without noticeable effort as a part of our normal functioning)?

CBE

Competency-based Education (CBE) and Mastery Learning (ML) advocates adopt just such a search for lucidity in the learning of complex matters. Both seek a degree of clarity in educational content which they believe will improve the quality of instruction. The issue is whether their drive for clarity is at the expense of learners and their struggle to capture the rich meaning of complex entities.

CBE contains several elements including task analysis, the writing of precise objectives, the selection of appropriate learning strategies and the reinforcement of correct responses.[2] For the purposes of this discussion, my attention will be directed to task-analysis and how it contributes to the generation or destruction of meaning. Ivor Davis, a long-time leader of the CBE movement, states that "one of the purposes of task analysis is to expose their [the tasks] component parts and reveal their basic ordering."[3] The fundamental assumption underlying this movement holds that reality is completely and correctly structured in terms of fundamental entities, properties, and relations. That structure exists independent of any human understanding. The question is whether our understanding of the world around us and our participation in its conception can be reconstituted into natural entities called "tasks" which have the potential to be broken up into parts without loosing meaning or destroying our awareness of the role we play in shaping that meaning.

CBE advocates believe that any subject matter whether cognitive knowledge, skills, or even attitudes, can be considered legitimate material for task analysis. They assume that these different types of subject matter have an independent existence and can be considered self-contained as well as independent of the particular learner. The content or task under consideration, once isolated, is then broken down into what are called component parts. The concepts or behaviors required for the task are then identified and the conditions under which they will be learned are determined. Finally, a criterion for determining competency or mastery of the concept or behavior is defined.

A major problem I have with this approach is the perception of school subject matter or content as self-contained and independent of the individual learner. For good teachers instinctively look for connections within and between subject matter, and between subject matter and learner, believing intuitively that content takes on additional meaning as these connections are established. CBE educators ask that teachers act contrary to these intuitions. They ask them to consider subject matter as having an objective identity, independent of persons and, in most cases, other content.

After identifying which academic subjects, skills or attitudes are to be included in a formal instructional program, the next step for the CBE technician is to divide that content into 'natural' components.

> One way of doing this is to think of a topic (or job)as a hierarchical organization of levels or components, each of which describe the job in successively greater detail.[4]

Remember that this ability to decompose knowledge is not limited to physical skills. Mental activities of all sorts are seen as capable of being broken up into component parts.

Obviously, content cannot be broken down endlessly. There is a point at which CBE experts would argue that the decomposition must end. That point is identified as the smallest meaningful unit.[5] But how does one come to identify and then describe these "smallest" units of learning? The criterion that Davis sets is that the so-called task element "should be complete in itself, a complete fact or idea."[6] It should be of such a nature, says Davis, that it can be formed in a simple declarative sentence with only one action verb. The implication is that all properties are either atomic or consist of logical combinations of atomic properties. Facts or ideas represent or mirror the real world and that our language corresponds to those concepts. The entities of the world form objective categories, with each natural entity corresponding to some category. While Davis cautions us not to identify and articulate any more task elements than are "intellectually necessary," he never fully explains the nature of that necessity or whether it may be experienced differently by different people. Presumably, the intellectual necessity is limited to the number of natural entities in the world and the categories that represent those entities.

After the most elemental task units have been identified, they then must be placed into some sort of "natural" or order. Davis hints that the logical order of sequence can be drawn from the subject matter itself. Clues as to what that natural order might be, can be found in what he calls the traditional rules of sequence, viz., proceeding from known to unknown, simple to complex, concrete to abstract, and observation to reasoning.

After the smallest meaningful units have been identified and placed into some hierarchical order, they must then be translated into some intended behavior impled by an action verb. Once translated, the teacher is in a position to generate a learning experience which solicits the intended behavior. The learning experience is framed typically in terms of what the teacher expects the student to do, what questions she expects him to answer, what changes in behavior anticipated, etc. Having exhibited the prescribed behavior(s) in a proper fashion, the student is declared to have learned the task. He then moves on to the next "task" in the sequence.

Mastery Learning

Similarly, Mastery-learning advocates, who believe that almost any person can learn anything "if provided with appropriate prior and current conditions of learning,"[7] see the learning unit or task as central to the goal of mastery or understanding. Benjamin Bloom, for example, feels that what is to be learned (which in his mind could be nothing more than a chapter in a textbook, unit of a curriculum or any other separate part of a course) can be broken up in an objective manner. His claim for objectivity suggests again that the knowledge under consideration can be considered independent of the individual learner. The content stands alone. Independent judges, Bloom suggests, can discover the "natural" pieces

of the larger knowledge "chunks". Once the learning task has been defined and the "natural" elements identified, the relationships among these many elements can then be made explicit.

In contrast to Davis, Bloom is reluctant to speak of a natural or logical order for the elements of all tasks. However, he does see the need to perceive all elements of the learning task as related to other elements. Some elements, for example, are seen as necessary prerequisites for learning the more complex elements. In fact, Bloom claims that there is a "lawfulness" in the relationship between the different elements of the learning task. He sees these elements as fixed by the "intrinsic nature" of the subject matter which mirrors reality. Moreover, the logic which governs the nature of subject matter also determines the arrangement of pedagogical tasks, or what Bloom refers to as "the logic of pedagogical relations." Once the natural sequence of the individual elements is known, the subject matter can be properly taught by moving from one element to another, progressing only after each element is properly understood of mastered.

While Bloom believes that there is a lawful relation among the elements of a learning task, he does not believe that all learning tasks contain a hierarchical arrangement of task elements. In his mind, a large number of learning tasks have elements which can be treated as isolated units. Presumably, the lawfulness of which he speaks extends only to the division of large chunks of knowledge into smaller pieces and not to the order and arrangement of those elements. Thus for some content, it is possible to have a variety of different organizations. Individual elements which have no place in a hierarchical order can be arranged, in Bloom's thinking, to suit many different purposes.[9] For example, individual elements might be arranged primarily for economical purposes.

In summary, educators like Davis and Bloom believe that subject matter has an independent existence and thus can be considered as an objective, independent entity. Consideration of the individual learner and his idiosyncrasies is not necessary for describing and organizing the content to be learned. The subject matter to be learned is made more explicit and thus more accommodating to the learner by its division into smaller natural units or elements which are reflected in the categories we use. Where possible, those units are then arranged in a natural or logical order. The teacher is considered successful when the student with his disembodied mind has mastered each of the elements in their proper logical order. The determination of success is usually in the form of a criterion-referenced test, administered at the end of every unit or element, signaling whether the student is to proceed on to the next unit.

Higher Order Thinking/Computers

The perspective described above is generally associated with the acquisition of lower-level knowledge or skills. However, that same kind of thinking can be found in discussions about the development of higher-order thinking, especially as it relates to the use of the computer. The mind is seen perceived as an information processing machine and higher-order thinking is identified as involving the interrelationship of knowledge and naturally-existing algorithms which are applied to the solution of a problem. A good example of this view can be found in a recent National Society for the Study of Education Yearbook on Microcomputers and Education. Janice Patterson and Marshall Smith, in their article, "The Role of Computers in Higher-Order Thinking,"[10] view higher-order thinking as sustained cognitive effort directed at solving a complex problem. The mind is seen as an information processing

machine comprised primarily of data and the application of rules. A person who is thinking at a higher level is concisely, deliberately and with cognitive effort proceeding through a linear series of problem solving steps. With the right amount of knowledge and the proper schema explicitly defined, any problem can be solved algorithmically. As a consequence, they advocate that teachers dwell on the interrelation among facts and explicit rules both of which have an existence independent of the individual. The rules are those heuristic strategies or generalizable techniques which are programmable into computers. The presumption is that these heuristic strategies can be taught to young people through the use of the computer and that these learned formulas or algorithms transferable to other domains of learning.

Polanyi

In contrast to those who would look upon subject matter as an independent entity eligible for task analysis or placement in a linear series of problem solving steps, Michael Polanyi views knowledge as including that "part which we ourselves necessarily contribute in shaping such knowledge."[11] Failure to recognize this personal element in all types of knowing leads to the destruction of meaning. For Polanyi, all knowing contains a personal quality, a tacit dimension, and that personal, subject element is an integral aspect of all knowing. The "unbridled search for lucidity", which Polanyi feels destroys our understanding of complex matters, occurs as the result of our inability to recognize and affirm the tacit dimension of all knowing. Once that dimension is understood, the epistemological weakness in CBE, ML, and computer-based models of problem solving and critical thinking become apparent.

My own critique of the contemporary approaches to instruction described above, is grounded in their failure to give recognition to the tacit dimension of knowing in their analysis of the teaching of subject matter. For I believe that they destroy an essential element contained in all knowledge. To establish this point, a brief explanation of tacit knowing is necessary.

Polanyi identifies two basic kinds of awareness. One he calls subsidiary (or tacit) and the other focal. While most of his examples deal with only one kind of knowing, viz., perceiving or skillful performance, all other types of knowledge have these same two qualities. In the example of the hammer driving a nail, Polanyi observes both kinds of knowing. While the focus of attention in driving the nail into the wood is obviously on the hammer hitting the nail on the head, yet in a very different sense and at the same time, one has a subsidiary or tacit awareness of the handle striking the palm and fingers. One is attending to both kinds of awareness, yet as Polanyi observes, in very different ways.

> The difference may be stated by saying that these feelings are not watched *in themselves* but that I watch something else by keeping aware of them. I know the feelings in the palm of my hand *by relying on them for attending to the hammer hitting the nail.* I may say that I have subsidiary awareness of the feelings in my hand which is merged into my *focal awareness* of my driving the nail.[12]

We are aware of all the particular sensations in the hand but only through the act of focusing our attention on something else, viz., the focal target of hitting the hammer on the head of the nail. The functional relationship between these two kinds of awareness Polanyi calls a "from-to relation." We know tacitly, i.e., have an awareness of subsidiary elements (the particular sensations in our hands) only as we

move from them toward the object of our focal attention.[13] The foundation or ground of tacit knowing are the particulars or elements that we are aware of when focusing our attention on something else. "Such integration cannot be replaced by any explicit mechanical procedure"[14] Shaping or integrating of these particulars in a person's search for meaning is what Polanyi identifies as tacit awareness or understanding.

Compare Polanyi's perspective to the approach toward knowledge and understanding nurtured by the CBE and ML advocates. They introduce students to the disconnected parts of a subject with the expectation that through deliberate exposure to the particulars, students will gain an understanding of the whole. The logical organization of the parts is supposed to guarantee a composite view of the comprehensive entity. But in their method, the learner is denied the opportunity of gaining experience in generating his own integrated perception of particulars tacitly, i.e., without having to identify those particulars in some direct or focal way.

Most important in my consideration of meaning is the claim by Polanyi that the meaning of something lies not in the particulars of which we may be aware subsidiarily, but in the focal target which is the meaning of the subsidiaries. Not visa versa! The focus of our awareness is given meaning through the tacit awareness of the particulars. The comprehensive entity, which is the focus of our awareness, is <u>not</u> given meaning through the shifting of focus to the particulars. Yet this appears to be the perspective of CBE and ML advocates who would lead a student's search for meaning by directing focus on the particular elements. They try to make that which is known subsidiarily, known focally. But as Polanyi argues, it is the act of shifting focal awareness from the comprehensive object to its elements that destroys meaning of the comprehensive entity under consideration. The problem of focusing on items or elements known originally only subsidiarily, is that the subsidiaries cease to serve as they once did, viz., in support of a focal integration.

When CBE and ML educators focus on those elements which contribute to an understanding of a comprehensive entity, they change that awareness into something else. The subsidiary elements take on a different kind of meaning when focused upon directly. In effect, we destroy the tacit meaning they had when serving in a subsidiary capacity. Curriculum development experts who try to make focal awareness more manageable for the learner by focusing directly on the subsidiary elements destroy the tacit meaning contained in the particulars of that domain. Tacit meaning is present in all our understanding but can be destroyed when the particulars of that awareness are focused upon explicitly. So Polanyi is not merely claiming that the subsidiary elements are hard to identify or distinguish. Rather he is arguing that the unspecifiability of tacit meaning is logically necessary. We fool ourselves when we think that we have successfully specified the elements when in fact we have ended up with something quite different.

The destruction of meaning by specificity need not be permanent. As Polanyi notes, a pianist will paralyze his performance by focusing directly on what he was tacitly aware of, viz., the movement of his fingers over the keys. Meaning is regained when the focus on subsidiaries is redirected back toward the original focus. Thus the accomplished pianist can shift from a local awareness of the tacitly known elements and back again, always knowing that tacitly known elements do not have the same meaning when focused on directly. But the issue is different for the learner in the school setting. For the student is just beginning to learn some knowledge or skill and has not experienced the "phenomenal

transformation" undergone by the expert or knowledgeable person. His initial exposure to content in a CBE or ML setting is a direct focus on the elements which have never undergone a tacit transformation. The implication is that once the elements are focused on directly and in some natural or logical sequence, the meaning of the complex subject matter (of which the elements are parts) are not what they appear to be. For the elements, when focused upon directly, take on a different meaning from what they had when they were known tacitly.

On the surface, Polanyi's comments seem to imply a kind of intellectual laziness or blindness, an unwillingness to use our analytic tools in search for better understanding and technique. What could be wrong with analyzing the knowledge of the expert, getting in touch with the tacit dimensions of that understanding and then focusing on those elements in the instructional program? Many curriculum theorists believe that understanding can best be gained by constructing an explicit rendition of tacit awareness. For knowledge to be taught, it must be made both manageable and efficient. These needs necessitate a deliberate analysis of the subsidiary elements for the purpose of constructing elemental learning units. They would argue that the elements of a tacit integration are all tied together in a logical fashion and that can be reasonably unraveled by means of a logical analysis of the connected elements.

But again, the reason why analysis won't work is because tacit integration is not the same thing as explicit inference. Moving from premises to conclusion or from parts to whole is not the same as integrating subsidiary elements as they "bear on a focus." What is present in a tacit integration has an intentional element and only that "can be carried out . . . by a conscious act of the mind."[14] For Polanyi, focusing on particular elements destroys tacit meaning by removing the intentional dimension of individual consciousness. That dimension attends to the subsidiary elements through its attention to the object of knowledge and cannot be replaced by any explicit procedure based upon some mechanical model. "It can only be lived, can only be dwelt in.[15]

The task of the educator would be to help the student dwell or live in the complex object. That may sound like nonsense until one begins to look at the current emphasis on measuring competency and the breakdown of complex objects or acts into explicit elements. Take reading for example. Because educators find it difficult to measure their success in teaching reading, they conceptualize reading as a collection of interrelated skills around which competency can be measured. Mastery of these skills is then portrayed as the intentional reading act. But in the process, they fail to heed the warning that reading comprehension, and not decoding or other related reading skills, is the most serious problem area facing children. Or consider the message of the National Assessment of Educational Progress which reports that the major problem with student writing is not with any number of isolated skills so much as it is with the quality of thinking and organization. By focusing on the explicit elements of the reading or writing process, educators endanger the cultivation of tacit understanding. They destroy the meaning of such complex acts as reading or writing and inhibit the development of the complex activities associated with higher order thinking. What we are buying for our educational dollar is clarity and simplicity for the sake of measurement and accountability, but at the expense of cultivating meaning. We should heed Polanyi's warning, "By looking very closely at the several parts of a whole, we may succeed in diverting our attention from the whole and even lose sight of it altogether."[16] Given the degree of disengagement presently found in our schools, one would have to think that public education has done an admirable job of diverting that attention.

On the constructive side, Polanyi would underline the importance of our bodies in the search for meaning. As knowers, we are not some kind of disembodied mind acting independently of any bodily functioning. "Hence in all our waking hours we are subsidiarily aware of our body within our focal knowledge of our surroundings. To be aware of our body in terms of the things we know and do, is... an essential part of our existence as sensuous active persons."[17] This bodily character is a fundamental element of our subsidiary awareness. Our bodies are basic instruments for the intellectual and practical control of our world. Thus, in a fundamental sense meaning is embedded in our bodies.

George Lakoff, in *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* suggests that the problem lies in our objectivist legacy easily detectable in the CBE and ML traditions. In that tradition,

> we view rationality as being purely mental, unemotional, detached--independent of imagination, of social functioning, and of the limitations of our bodies and our memories. It is our objectivist legacy that leads us to view reasoning as mechanical and to glorify those kinds of reasoning that in fact *are* mechanical. It is our objectivist legacy that leads us to view machines that are capable of algorithmic computation as being capable of human reason.[18]

Lakoff persuasively argues that conceptual meaning must be construed in relation to the nature and experience of those doing the thinking. That means giving consideration to "the nature of our bodies, our genetically inherited capacities, our modes of physical functioning in the world, our social organization, etc."[19] Like Polanyi, Lakoff believes that meaning must be understood in terms of embodiment. We all have embedded in our bodies genetically predetermined capacities as well as certain collective and individual physical and social experiences. Our focal awareness, even when it takes on a conceptual quality, arises from and is tied to our subsidiary, preconceptual bodily experiences. Our focal awareness, as expressed in conceptual structures, is understood and has meaning only because our subsidiary awareness of preconceptual structures. The problem of course is understanding how our focal awareness, as expressed in abstract concepts and reason, can be grounded in preconceptual, subsidiary, bodily experiences.

This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis of Lakoff's excellent description of our preconceptual experience except to mention briefly some of its basic features. First, Lakoff argues that there are certain built-in schemas that structure our bodily experience preconceptually. These schemas have a logic of their own which is known subsidiarily. Correlations between elements of these preconceptual structures generate metaphors that map that preconceptual logic into abstract conceptual systems. "Thus, what has been called abstract reason has a bodily basis in our everyday physical functioning .... That allows us to base a theory of meaning and rationality on aspects of bodily function."[20] As Mark Johnson puts it in *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason,* it is because the body is in the mind that our preconceptual experiences are meaningful.

A final comment on what Lakoff calls the Algorithmic and Disembodied Mind positions, viz., the view that "every cognitive process is algorithmic in nature, [that] thought is purely a matter of symbolic manipulation, [and that] human reason is completely abstract and not dependent in any way on human bodily experience."[21] Lakoff has no difficulty with the claim that some significant cognitive precesses can

be simulated. The position he thinks is indefensible is the one that claims that the mind is really algorithmic and disembodied in nature. That position holds that one can know significant things about the human mind by studying the computer-based simulations of the mind. The fundamental problem is simply the lack of what Lakoff calls "conceptual embodiment." Without such embodiment, thought is meaningless. Computational models of thought simply do not account for what makes symbols meaningful to the person doing the thinking. That is because understanding the symbols is external to the algorithm. For something to be meaningful, it must be connected in some fundamental way to perception, motor abilities, and imaging capacities, those aspects of the body of which one is aware subsidiarly. Thus serious educators must construct an adequate theory of the mind, one that takes into account how the content of our thinking is related to our bodily experience.[22] They must move away from the "mind-as-machine" advocates who would have us believe in the separateness and independence of the mental as it focuses on the problematic. While computer programmers may someday be able to simulate all types of conceptual activity of the human mind, they will never be able to explain the meaning of those simulations. For that meaning can only be captured in explanations which incorporate the dependence of the body upon the mind. The emphasis on the body underscores the claim by Polanyi that "all knowing is action--that it is our urge to understand and control our experience which causes us to rely on some parts of it subsidiarily in order to attend to our main objective focally."[23] Both that urge and the parts of our experience that we rely upon subsidiarily are bodily in origin. Educators must come to a better understanding of the nature of the bodily origins of meaning and to learn how to cultivate the meanings embedded in those origins. Creating disembodied knowers or teaching subsidiarily known awareness in an atomistic, explicit manner is not the answer.

As someone concerned about the destruction of meaning in our schools, I would urge a stronger affirmation of what may appear to some as a truism, viz., that meaning can be understood only via our real experience with the world. We educate as though we do not recognize the fundamental belief that meanings do not exist independent of human construction. I believe that the categories we use to understand our world are tied very intimately to our experience and its subsidiary awareness. Attempts to free our conceptual understanding from its embodied quality, as educators are wont to do, is destructive of meaning. Personally, it would be rewarding to pursue Mark Johnson's argument that subsidiary image schemas structure our experience preconceptually and that the conceptual metaphors which we generate to construct our abstract domains are themselves motivated by those preconceptual structures that inhere in our everyday bodily experiences. The question for educators is how to cultivate those preconceptural structures so as to enrich our imaginative understanding.

---

1. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, (Garden City: Double Day and Company, 1967), p. 1.
2. Ivor K. Davis, Competency-Based Learning: Technology, Management and Design, (New York: McGraw-Hill Co. 1972), p. 7.
3. Ibid-, p. 91.
4. Ibid., p. 38.
5. Ibid., p. 38.
6. Ibid., p. 41.
7. Bloom, p. 7.

8. Ibid., p. 23.
9. Ibid., p. 24-25.
10. Janice Patterson and Marshall Smith, "The Roles of Computers in Higher-Order Thinking", Microcomputer and Education (Chicago: The National Society for the Study of Education, 1986).
11. Michael Polanyi, Meaning (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975).
12. Ibid., p. 33.
13. Ibid., p. 34.
13.5. Ibid., p. 41.
14. Ibid., p. 41.
15. Ibid.
16. Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 29.
17. Ibid., p. 31.
18. George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 183.
19. Ibid., p. 266.
20. Ibid., p. 278.
21. Ibid., 338-340.
22. Ibid., p. 348-349.
23. Polanyi, Meaning p. 42.

RESPONSE TO

COMPETENCY, MASTERY AND THE DESTRUCTION OF MEANING

Jackie Blount
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

In his paper, Dr. Strandberg argues compellingly that current pressures have led many educators to adopt mechanistic approaches to instruction such as Competency-Based Education, Mastery Learning and some computer-based tutorials. Designers of these approaches seek to break subject matter into ever-smaller chunks, arranged and ordered so that students can master each. Strandberg demonstrates that these "technologies" epitomize what Polanyi describes as the search for "unbridled lucidity." When teachers, aided by these instructional techniques, direct student attention to the particulars, or as Polanyi expresses, the subsidiary elements of a subject, they may unwittingly hinder students' development of tacit knowledge. It is in the tacit dimension that one's conception of an entire entity and its' meaning reside. Thus Strandberg holds that when mechanistic teaching techniques fragment subjects into small parts, meaning or tacit knowledge is destroyed. Perhaps more accurately stated, he holds that students in technology based curricula have difficulty in developing tacit knowledge in the first place, before it has a chance to be destroyed.

One need only look at the often bored, restless faces of school students to develop the "tacit" understanding that they do not highly value rigidly mechanized schoolwork. As Strandberg points out, students may develop isolated academic skills, but often have difficulty with comprehension or with expressing the larger meanings of their work. Perhaps as he explains, students subjected to these modern curricula fall victim to the phenomenon Polanyi feared when he stated: "Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the entity is destroyed."[1] I propose that an alternative meaning may be attached to this vision of bored students. Then I will discuss other points where elaboration is needed, I think.

First, rather than holding that knowledge is destroyed by these learning technologies, I suggest instead that students develop powerful insights in such classes, perhaps, though, not the insights the teacher may have intended. For example, educators who design competency based lessons aim to "apply learning principles to the direct and deliberate shaping of behavior,"[2] as Davies asserts in his carefully organized text, Competency Based Learning. These educators essentially view students as little more than objects to be engineered with predetermined, precise, mechanical steps. Students who believe that they must be led through lessons a step at a time, mastering each carefully organized component before moving on to the next, effectively absorb this teacher attitude of "student-as-object." The fact that the teacher directs student pace, the content of every unit, the voices heard in classroom conversations and student behavior all provide subsidiary clues to the overwhelming tacit understanding that teachers control student development. The student comes to believe that he/she must remain passive in the wake of the teacher's actions. Such classrooms are far from meaningless for students or teachers even though students may not necessarily ingest the content-related meanings overtly intended by lesson designers.

Essentially, as Strandberg explains, the person who hammers a nail can do so by focusing on the comprehensive act rather than on the numerous individual muscular movements needed. Similarly, an instructor may begin a lesson with the focal awareness of helping students understand content. The chunks of the lesson, then, serve as the subsidiary elements of this intent. The instructor, however, also works to control and direct students through use of lesson chunks. As a carpenter seeks to drive a nail so does such an instructor control students. For the student who has never developed a tacit understanding of the content itself, his/her focal awareness moves from the lesson chunks to the tacit knowledge that the teacher is the ultimate authority in the classroom.

A second point to note is that teachers who use competency based materials may originally seek to convey subject matter as clearly as possible. However, they may themselves lose touch with their tacit understandings as they focus on the particulars of lessons. As Strandberg explains, "it is the act of shifting focal awareness from the comprehensive object to its elements that destroys meaning of the comprehensive entity under consideration." Similarly, Polanyi illustrates that a skilled performer such as a pianist can destroy her ability to perform a piece if she shifts her attention from a focal awareness of a piece in its entirety to the subsidiary elements of her fingers' minute, coordinated movements. She may reaccess her tacit understanding of the piece, though, by shifting her focus back to the larger flow of the music. Those who possess tacit knowledge, then, may temporarily lose that knowledge, regaining it by changing their point of awareness.

On the other hand, Strandberg explains that a student who moves through a Mastery or Competency-Based curriculum cannot make this shift because he/she acquires the subsidiary portions of the material without necessarily having first developed a tacit understanding or sense of meaning of the content itself. Essentially, having stayed at ground level for each plodding step of a lesson, the student has no larger vantage from which to understand the material. Rather than focusing on how school students fail to develop tacit understanding of overt currucular content, it would be useful for Strandberg to discuss how it is that pianists come to possess tacit knowledge of performance pieces to begin with. Surely many of them break their movements into ever smaller parts as they master portions of a composition at a time, just as the designers of learning technology chunk lessons for students. How is it that the expert experiences a "phenomenal transformation," or the development of a tacit understanding mysteriously stitched from subsidiary experiences? Specifically, what is it that separates a student in a mastery learning class from an experience of phenomenal transformation? Perhaps it is a significant difference between the case of the pianist and that of the student.

Thus my third point for consideration is that the pianist chooses for herself how to break material down. The student, subjected to mechanical lessons, receives information already broken down by presumed experts. These lesson designers probably possess rich tacit knowledge of course content (at least until they begin to focus on ever-smaller details). When the material is broken down, the designer consciously chooses to do so. The student, on the other hand, is required to accept pre-packaged learning units for consumption. Issues of will, choice and control, then, become important factors in the discussion of tacit knowledge. Strandberg alludes to these issues when he points out that "tacit integration has an intentional element and only that can be carried out . . . by a conscious act of the mind."

In a related point, he highlights Polanyi's view that knowledge includes the "part which we ourselves necessarily contribute in shaping such knowledge."[3] Our failure to recognize this personal element leads to the destruction of meaning. Strandberg believes that the "contemporary approaches to instruction described above, are grounded in their failure to give recognition to the tacit dimension of knowing in their analysis of the teaching of subject matter." Perhaps he could go further to say that these approaches fail to give recognition to students' abilities to produce meaning. It is not the mere existence of tacit knowledge that is important, but also that individuals can actively create it. The mechanistic model supported by Competency Based Learning and Mastery Learning would ignore this ability to create. Is it possible that to acknowledge the ability to create tacit understandings is contingent upon one's freedom to choose to understand? It would be interesting to see further attention given to this relationship between individual choice and phenomenal transformation.

In spite of these concerns, I believe that Strandberg has capably explained that by preferring rigidly defined curricula such as Competency Based Learning, many educators are in danger of "looking very closely at the several parts of a whole, . . . diverting . . . attention from the whole and even los(ing) sight of it altogether." His analysis of the mind-body problem effectively supports his arguments. He explains that it is through our own bodies that we come to develop tacit understanding of our experience. It is the act of pouring ourselves into our bodies, and by extension the tools we use, ideas we manipulate, that we come to dwell in them and gain tacit knowledge. No one else can force us to dwell within our collected subsidiary sensations to give our experiences meaning. Since no one else lives within our individual bodies, no one can provide us with our own meaning. And thus students cannot be expected to respond as predictably as would a machine.

I close with an observation. As I read Davies' book, Competency Based Learning: Technology, Management and Design, I noticed that only once does the author discuss the meaning that students attach to lesson units.[4] In this instance rather than discuss the notion, he quickly refers the reader to the writings of another author. "Management" and "control" are mentioned frequently, though. In the end, I agree with Strandberg that meaning and tacit knowledge are concerns far from the focal awareness of the purveyors of these mechanical learning systems. However, to effectively speak out against such practices, I believe that we should perhaps also direct our own focal awareness to issues of control and personal choice.

---

1. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 18.
2. Ivor K. Davies, Competency Based Learning: Technology, Management and Design, (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1972), 7.
3. Michael Polanyi, Meaning, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975).
4. Davis, Competency Based Learning, 7.

THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION REPORT ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND BEYOND: A SYMPOSIUM ON SPORT AND SOCIETY

John B. Haynes
James Madison University

I. OVERVIEW

The South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society's 1991 theme for the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting is: "In Other Voices - Expanding the Educational Conversation."

Thank you for coming to this experimental session featuring a panel program, multimedia presentations, and an open forum centered on "Sport and Society." The intent of this first effort is to stimulate debate and to promote dialogue among us concerning sport issues, current college sports reforms proposed nationally, and the topic of sportsmanship, fair play, and ethical conduct. Hopefully, this approach will be a different conference experience for you as SAPES participants to provide conceptual issues, alternative reform models, and dynamic videotape programs which will effectively facilitate open inquiry and sharing of mutual philosophic concerns.

When I proposed the idea of a sport symposium to the SAPES Program Committee, they were very receptive as a venture to involve SAPES professors in this area. I invited Dr. J. Gordon Chamberlin, Director of North Carolina Poverty Project, because of his interest in the work of the Knight Foundation Commission (KFC) on Intercollegiate Athletics. He knows Dr. William C. Friday, a KFC Co-Chair, well through his Poverty Project networking with key leaders across the state. We both agreed to plan a different kind of format to enhance discussion of various views among symposium participants with time for soliciting written responses.

Dr. Chamberlin's paper "Sports and the Culture," provides us with provocative arguments on the roles of spectator sports in contemporary society. His claims and suggested solution to current abuses at the university level are consistent with a few of the more radical alternatives being promoted by some experts today. The total split of sports and the university toward a professional state school results.

My presentation today will utilize a workshop format, including posters, some curricular materials on exhibit, selections from several exciting videos, an update on college sport reform, copies of the KFC Report, question period, and written reactions. As editor of the SAPES Newsletter, I invited members to obtain a copy of the Commission's report, Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics, to review prior to the conference. As recommended reading also for those

---

Correspondence: Kinesiology Dept., James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA 22807. (An audiotape of this SAPES program session is available by request)

people who are unable to attend this year, the report provides an excellent reference source and classroom tool for debate (37 pp. and photos). Write to: Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 301 South Brevard Street, Charlotte, N.C. 28203. You should also know that a one-year follow-report, with data and legislative NCAA actions, is expected in March, 1992.

II. THEME

Focus on Knight Foundation Commission Report and ethical conduct.

III. SUB-THEMES

Brief background on lifetime sports and wellness concept; recent activities of the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance (AAHPERD); U.S. Olympic Committee education activities; drug abuse issues; sportsmanship and fair play trends; U.S. Tennis Association Schools Program; National Sportsmanship Day; USOC Symposium on Coaching Education; alternative models for college sports within high education; KFC Report formula (1 + 3) toward significant change; and NCAA and NAIA action plus role of Congress. "Beyond" in symposium topic refers to philosophic issues, such as the role of athletic on campus, the extent of faculty involvement, and ethical conduct.

IV. FORMAT - LIFETIME SPORTS AND SPORTSMANSHIP

Multi-media format for this portion of the symposium: posters on structure of AAHPERD as umbrella professional organization (six separate associations in such areas as health advancement, research consortium, leisure and recreation, sport and physical education, women's athletics, dance, and various councils); anabolic steroid abuse poster; President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sport school activities; AAHPERD's "Physical Best" fitness program (three levels; parental involement; educational, indivdualized goals for youth); USTA's "Sportstar" Kit on sportsmanship, UNESCO Fair Play Award; "National Sportmanship Day poster; and "International Charter of P.E. and Sport" (rights).

Portions of selected videotapes illustrating the sub-theme:

U.S. Tennis Association's video on the USTA Tennis in the Schools Program (this production emphasizes the importance of early instructionb y qualified teachers utilizing USTA resources in the schools; benefits of tennis participation as a lifetime activity, including wellness and social aspects; a successful approach to learning; sportsmanship behaviors are also taught in "A Game of Control" video based upon the "Sportstar" Kit with code of conduct certificate/patch; Dr. J, USTA spokesperson, explains his recently acquired love for the game.)

JMU "Learn-to-Ski Program" video (this student production made for the "JMU Today Show" describes the objectives, benefits, structure, and popularity of the physical education program taught at nearby Massanutten Ski Resort; three course levels, small-group lessons, car pools, and low-cost; as the campus coordinator for the past sixteen years, I have enjoyed directing this lifetime sports program in alpine skiing; pre- and post-tests on the slopes assess teh student's skill outcomes; written test covers two texts on skiing and wellness; average enrollment has been about 500 students; reasons for taking a ski class

include the Liberal Studies requirement, health and fitness, and outdoor sport; two outgrowths of this program have been the Ski Club and coed Racing Team.)

"National Sportsmanship Day" video (The Institute for International Sport, at the University of Rhode Island, conceived of the first event scheduled in April for 1991, with sponsorship by Merrill Lynch Inc. & Co. The video features many prominent personalities, including the "Ethics Fellows." The Institute has also organized seminars on ethics, media's role, and promoting human understanding. JMU has been selected as the "Model School" for the state of VA for 1992 due to past activities; a "Junior Ethics Fellow" selected; March 3, 1992 is new date.)

V. EXHIBIT - REFERENCE MATERIALS

Book: From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Moder Sports, by Allen Guttmann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); The Joy of Sports: End Zones, Bases, Baskets, Balls, and the Consecration of the American Spirit by Michael Novak (New York: Basic Books, 1976). Both of these authors discuss sport in a religious sense in ways similar to Dr. Chamberlin's assertions about the roles that sports perform in American society. In addition to the roles of "proxy war, entertainment, and economic stimulator," he states that they are linked to "spirit, identity, and beliefs." It is interesting to note that Novak writes in his book about a "Holy Trinity of Football, Basketball, and Baseball," within the idea of "seven seals," including competition. He maintains that sports are secular or civil religions. Guttmann extends this analysis to observe that in this secularism, the Roman model, rather than the Greek athletic model, is the closest to modern sports. The uniqueness of modern sports, according to Guttmann, can be discussed in terms of seven interrelated characteristics: secularism, equality, specialization, rationalization, bureaucracy, quantification, records.

Also, for an excellent anthology of current literature, refer to Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, edited by William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Publishers, 1988). Part IV, "Sport and Ethics," contains many articles relevant to the symposium topic of fair play, ethical conduct, and the spirit of sportmanship (i.e., drug testing, huamn equality in sports, success and failure in athletics; extensive bibliographies in each section). Perhaps a "reawakening" to ethical values (vs. Big Business model) may develop within educational circles as a result of legislative trends (Title IX, others).

News Items: As a graduate seminar project, my JMU students compiled relevant articles on college sports issues by reviewing a department collection of the editions of The Chronicle of Higher Education and the NCAA News published in the last seven years. As background from an historical perspective, as well as timely treatments of the persistent problems and recent events, I found these items to be most helpful. Many copies on display for this symposium will also be of interest to you as a basic framework to examine why the current college sports scene is so complicated, and demands our concerned involvement.

VI. FORMAT - KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION REPORT VIDEO

KFC video for Trustees: Because an effective videotape program was mailed only two weeks ago to all college and university presidents (CEOs), it is good timing in terms of our session today. As stated in the video, the next step to insure implementation of this eighteen month long study (cost of $2 million)

is a review of the Commission's findings by these key individuals. The KFC panel consists of twenty-two college, business, and political leaders. Over ninety experts were interviewed during the study. This is the most comprehensive effort in seventy years. The names of the KFC, including the Co-Chairs William C. Friday and Theodore M. Hesburgh who are Emeritus Presidents from UNC and Notre Dame, were listed in the SAPES Newsletter with my summary of their activities. This descriptive video program is also available from the Charlotte office.

Edited excerpts from the KFC video: Creed C. Black, President of the Knight Foundation is introduced after an opening statement about the scope of athletics big-time football to small college swimming), and an historical reference to the one hundred year tradition of "adding richness and vitality to our universities" which has made for a better college experience. Typical comments identifying distrust because of scandals and excessive money making are repeated on tape. Mr. Black stresses the fact that Commission members listened more than anything else during the period of the study to coaches, conference commissioners, athletic directors, student-athletes, and faculty reps included in those interviewed. He explains that this brief video is a review of the recommendations and an update on teh KFC's progress. "If genuine reform is to come about," concludes Mr. Black, "and if our institutions are to regain the credibility as it slips away, the next step is up to you, the presidents and trustees of our colleges and universities. Real change is in your hands." This is a cornerstone of the report but some ahve questioned whether or not these key players truly desire to make effective reform. Another point of discussion here might be the voice of such groups as SAPES!

The video narrator cites the statistics: 1/4 million athletic participants with enjoyment by fans, alumni, and student-athletes. "Athletics are an important and uplifting part of college life." Phyiscal skill and grace, the educational role of coaches, and alumni pride in their universities are given as background to the problem. "The vast majority of this activity takes place without the slightest hint of scandal...but over the past ten years more than 1/2 our largest universities have been penalized for rules infractions. The cost has been high: a loss of public confidence." Data from a recent Lewis Harris poll: 75% agreed that intercollegiate athletics are out of control; 83% said yes in response to the question, "Has money become the dominant concern?" Most important, "Have rules violations undermined the universities as places to learn ethics and integrity?" 83% general public again said yes. He concludes this section of the tape by stating, "In other words, the universities most valuable commodity, its integrity, has been eroded in the public mind, simply by the actions of those schools that put winning ahead of all else."

"Once public confidence is lost," asks the narrator, how can it be regained? According to the Knight Commission, the answer is for university administrators to reassume control of college sports." The analogy of the "Athletic Snowball" as described in the literature by Chuck Corbin is an appropriate way of thinking about the narrator's next summary of current conditions: "Over the years, that control has been surrendered to athletics departments, to powerful coaches, to alumni and boosters, and to television executives who supply much of the money that flows to college sports."

Commission proposed model "1 + 3" is explained. (greater "presidential control" beyond the current trend in this direction; three areas of: academic integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification). Chief executive officers should exert even more control within the NCAA, their conferences, and on campus.

Quotes by leaders in the video program: Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, in reinforcing the respectives roles of trustees and the college president states, "You are the 'Guardian of the Gate', if you will, and you have to stand there sometimes alone, but remember, we're with you, and we're going to back you up." (Note: at Notre Dame, Novak and others have emphasized that athletics, especially football spirit, have a fantastic impact on the school's image and student benefits). Richard (Dick) Schultz, KFC member and NCAA Executive Director: "The president has to make a tought decision regarding a popular coach or a popular program; the trustees can't waffle if they start to get pressure from alumni. They have to stand strongly behind that president because that's the only way that we will ever be able to guarantee and have integrity in intercollegiate athletics." When I attended the exciting U.S. Olympic Committee's Symposium on Coaching Education held las month, I learned from LeRoy T. Walker, USOC Treasurer and KFC member, that the prospects for reform look good because of Dick Schultz's strong support.

Academic integrity: fulfilling the fundamental premise that athletes are students as well. The video narrator notes that in a typical Division I college, only about 1/3 of basketball and football players graduate within five years. "The others are often discarded after their eligibility has been used up." Athletes under this proposed model would not be admitted unless they are likely to graduate. They would not play unless they are progressing toward a degree ("No pass-No Play." Financial integrity: all revenues generated by athletics and all the expenditures would be under the direct control of the administration. This new policy, for example, would insure that outside income contracts are negotiated by the university. Certification: "audit of academic health." NCAA currently requires an annual financial audit of the university's athletics department. The KFC Report calls for a total review through NCAA certification. "Basically it matches four ingredients: admission; academic progress, graduate rates, and basically the conduct of the athletes. All of those things will have to match the same profile that has been established for the student body in general." Summary: certification - check-up to determine if these standards compromised.

KFC Report News Conference: The video script includes the March, 1991 unveiling of the concepts underlying the report. Dr. Friday, Co-Chair and Chancellor Emeritus of UNC, detailed the thrust of the Commission's concerns: "The point that we wish to make is that athletics can no longer stand apart from the oversight of the administrative organization of the institution or the governing board itself. It is as much a part of the university for these purposes as is the medical school, the college of arts and sciences, or any other of the constituents." National headlines and attention are also summarized in the video. Bill Friday continued, as reported on television, to state: "We are not going away...This will not be a report that will be put away and gather dust." The follow-through efforts now include meetings with the NCAA President's Commission, a wide variety of trustees, and different concerned organizations. Individual members have also appeared on radio and television to address the general public. The report has produced interest and active support.

Congress Hearings: "One fear is that if colleges don't take the necessary steps, then reform will be mandated from Washington," the video program announces. KFC recently testified before Congress, arguing against legislation that would regulate college sports. The case was based in part on the simple nature of the "1 + 3" formula that will effectively deal with the current abuses. Also, since the universities themselves (citing college presidents in particular) understand the problems best, they have

the solutions, they are the ones that have to solve the problems, and they should be allowed to solve their problems.

Statement of Principles: Some of the ten fundamental points are also featured in the video program. Thse include presidential authority and responsibility, graduation rates tied to the student body, equitable and fair treatment for all student-athletes. The preamble and list of principles will be described later.

Responses of Trustees: The statement has been disseminated nationally to the trustees and chairs of the governing boards. "The responses are that they support these principles; that they ahve a fuller recognition of their responsiblity in the area let's say in intercollegiate athletics; there are many who don't think that the trustees play must of a role at all; and sometimes trustees themselves may not take this as seriously as they should; but they are the ultimate authority in an institution, and therefore, unless they get behind these principles it is not likely that they are going to be adopted by schools."

Report Update: March, 1992 will be the date for a KFC Report to follow-up study.

VII. KFC REPORT - THE PROBLEM

In addition to the impact of television dollars, the report document notes that many of today's difficulties were identified in 1929 by a report from the Carnegie Fund for the Advancement of Teaching: corrupt recriting, professionals had replaced amateurs, "education was being neglected, and commercialism reigned." This continuing "great reversal of ends and means" which has led to the athletic enterprise taking the front seat over the real purposes of a university, is the root of the problem according to the KFC Report in the section on "Need for Reform." Non-revenue sports and women's programs still do not receive adequate support. The commercialism and negative attitudes in many cases give little credence to the learning context, and "the program" is "self-justifying."

The new mode structure outlined in the KFC Report is in response to these deep-rooted problems. The Commission believes that this is a "critical juncture" concerning the intercollegiate athletics system, with three possible futures:

1. higher education will put its athletics house in order from within;
2. athletics order will be imposed from without and college sports will be regulated by government; or
3. abuse - unchecked - will spread, destroying not only the intrinsic value of intercollegiate athletics but higher education's claim to the high moral ground it should occupy. (p. 7)

The premise underlying the specific guidelines of the new model, which has been recommended to implement the "clear choice," is to focus on teh student-athlete as the avenue for creating change for the benefit of both athletics and higher education. Respect for the dignity of the young men and women who compete and their role as students on our campuses is viewed as essential today.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

VIII. KFC REPORT - To the Faculty (Note: Thomas K. Hearn, KFC, Wake Forest Pres., has taught ed. philosophy, SAPES keynote; NCAA)

In response to a question during the symposium, reference was made to the voice of the faculty as outlined in the report to deal with possible abuses:

> You are the inheritors of a tradition stretching back through the centuries. It holds that the faculty is responsible for academic standards and protecting the curriculum. Your first responsibility is to that inheritance. If your institution offers classes or courses of study designed largely for student-athletes, you have fallen short. You cannot remain true to the tradition you bear by permitting athletes to masquerade as students.
>
> Your second task is to help insure that your institutional representatives to the NCAA are not confused about their purpose. The evidence presented to the Commission indicates that some faculty representatives have not fulfilled their potential as guardians of the academic interest. Working with the president, you must make it clear that these faculty members attend athletic meetings to represent the academic values of the institution. (p. 26)

IX. KFC REPORT - To Student-Athletes

The Commission states that the concerns of student-athletes have been given priority through the proposed reforms in athletics administration. Problems that are linked to letters of intent, limited grants-in-aid, and the need for schools "to deliver educationally even if you are injured and unable to play" are cited. The Commission states, "We plead with you to understand that --- unless you are one of the remarkably talented and very lucky --- when your athletics eligibility has expired your playing days are over." They must create their future in class. (p. 28)

X. KFC REPORT - To the National Collegiate Athletic Association

The formal report's message to the NCAA (both to colleagues in the schools within the Association and the NCAA staff "which directs the organization in their name contains several major points. As an introduction, the report does note that the NCAA has many critics. Also, that "some of the members of this Commission are among the organization's most severe critics; most of us are not."

The first point pertains to the necessity for the existence of "a governing, rulemaking and disciplinary body of some sort" as a rationale for the NCASS. It rightly observes that the "Commission cannot impose progress; major change has to grow from within and mature through governing bodies." The role of the NCAA President's Commission in the NCAA annual convention coming up soon in January will be a critical determinant in whether or not these reforms will actually be implemented through NCAA legislative action. Since the KFC centers the model on even greater control by the institutional CEOs, hopefully they can do it!

Another key point stated in the report is to remind all critics of the NCAA, especially higher education personnel, that it is not a strange "omnipotent force" but rather that "it is simply the creature

of its own members." This is a vital point because in spite of the "Big Business model" (vs. the "Sport-for-Everyone model) debate or the reality of media money, the NCAA is us! Sport historians have analyzed the collegiate "dilemma" in terms of equally unattractive alternatives. Most of these authorities would, however, leave some room for optimism. While the "Educational model" and the "Recreational model"-represent very different approaches to college sports as opposed to the "athletics in the Big Ten Conference is big business" idea (the late C.D. Henry's quote, Associate Commissioner, during my panel debate with Diane Wendt, AIAW leader, at the AAHPERD National Convention), some experts still project positive changes in the future. These views are held in part because of the "budget crunch," Title IX compliance issues, and student interests in club and recreational activities, as well as liability court cases. The Commission concludes that "Colleges and universities have only themselves to blame for its shortcomings, real or imagined; the power to change the Association rests entirely within their hands." (p. 29) The complex NCAA rules are cited also.

As individualized faculty members teaching at colleges and universities, we must recognize the potential role in helping to effect significant reforms in athletics. Yes, simply being aware of the inherent conflicts between bases for policy in the worlds of higher education and sports is not sufficient. But these inconsistencies and public awareness of the serious issues in college sports can be an initial step toward a new structure focusing on the student-athlete. On the other hand, it has been evident in the sport literature that these are survival times of severe budget cuts. If schools are convinced that the visibility and prestige associated with highly competitive sports programs at the larger universities are important assets in defending against current constraints, then far-reaching priorty shifts may not happen in the near future. Reforms such as increased study time and the recent talk of strengthened academic standards beyond current Prop 48 policies, could lead to real environmental changes to support treating athletes as students. The raising of SAT scores for admission and related issues must be resolved in a careful manner with respect to minorities, as well as data gathered from the external studies supported by funding from the NCAA (longitudinal designs also).

The SAPES symposium participants raised questions regarding other bureaucratic remedies beyond the conventional approaches. Several radical solutions to the abuses have been reported: Pro teams should fund college programs as minor league systems, with students as a public relations arm of the university; pay athletes, not classes; financial need-based grants; share T.V. $ in all sports!

XI. KFC - REPORT - PRINCIPLES FOR ACTION

The Commission recasts the "one-plus-three" model in terms of ten principles. Presidents are urged to utilize these principles as "a vehicle for serious discussions" within the colleges and universities, with a particular focus on the key role of the governing board. "Each principle is significant. Each deserves a separate conversation. Together they can define what the university expects, and how it hopes to realize its expectations." (p. 30) Note: see diverse mission.

A Statement of Principles

Preamble: This institution is committed to a philosophy of firm institutional control of athletics, to the unquestioned academic and financial integrity of our athletics program, and to the accountability of the athletics department to the values and goals befitting higher education. In support of that commitment,

the board, officers, faculty, and staff of this institution have examined and agreed to the following general principles as a guide to our participation in intercollegiate athletics:

1. The educational values, practices and mission of this institution determine the standards by which we conduct our intercollegiate athletics program.

2. The responsibility and authority for the administration of the athletics department, including all basic policies, personnel and finances are vested in the president.

3. The welfare, health, and safety of student-athletes are primary concerns of athletics administration on this campus. This institution will provide student-athletes with the opportunity for academic experiences as close as possible to the experiences of their classmates.

4. Every student-athlete --- male and female, majority and minority, in all sports --- will receive equitable and fair treatment.

5. The admission of student-athletes --- including junior college transfers --- will be based on their showing reasonable promise of being successful in a course of study leading to an academic degree. That judgment will be made by academic officials.

6. Continuing eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics will be based on students being able to demonstrate each academic term that they will graduate within five years of their enrolling. Students who do not pass this test will not play.

7. Student-athletes, in each sport, will be graduated in at least the same proportion as non-athletes who have spent comparable time as full-time students.

8. All funds raised and spent in connection with intercollegiate athlete programs will be channeled through the institution's general treasury, not through independent groups, whether internal or external. The athletics department budget will be developed and monitored in accordance with general budgeting procedures on campus.

9. All athletics-related income from non-university sources for coaches and athletics administrators will be reviewed and approved by the university. In cases where the income involves the university's functions, facilities or name, contracts will be negotiated with the institution.

10. We will conduct annual academic and fiscal audits of the athletics program. Moreover, we intend to seek NCAA certification that our athletics program complies with the principles herein. We will promptly correct any deficiencies and will conduct our athletics programs in a manner worthy of this distinction.

The Commission concludes the report by indicating that hopefully these ten principles will be a part of the NCAA's developing certification program. Also, the KFC takes the position that these principles should be employed as a yard-stick to evaluate the success of this new external audit program and basic ends. "Ideally, institutions will agree to schedule only those colleges and universities that have

passed all aspects of the certification process: Institutions that refuse to correct deficiences will find themselves isolated by the vast majority of athletics administrators who support intercollegiate athletics as an honorable tradition in college life." (p. 32)

XII. UPDATE (Subcommittee on Certification - NCAA Council)

The NCAA Presidents Commission adopted a three-year strategic plan this fall, with presidential authority and institutional control its focus in 1992, and certification as a primary discussion topic. As background, it is important to know that the 1991 annual Convention resolved that the voluntary two-year pilot certification program (Div. I; 36 schools will ahve taken part by July, 1992) be reviewed as a progress report for the next year's meeting. Further, this resolution required that the NCAA Council consider legislation for the 1993 Convention to establish a mandatory certification program. Last April, the Council established the "Subcommittee on Certification." Legislation for a continuing certification program will be recommended this coming spring for the Council's review. The pilot program review criteria by the special subcommittee will include: procedural guidelines, the self-study questions, topic areas, time frame for the schools to complete the process, and operating standards identified by the participating institutions. Consequences: the proposed process is bieng conceived not as a punitive effort, but rather as a goal of moving schools toward certification. An opportunity would be given within a reasonable time frame to corect problems. The next step would be probationary status of one year, followed by action resulting in a "restricted membership category" (NCAA Bylaw 20.3.5.1); the final step in cases where the identified concerns are not addressed during that year would be to reclassify the institution as a "corresponding member." It is interesting to note that the Division III subcommittee of the Presidents Commission and the Division III Steering Committee of the Council to date do not think that the certification program should be extended to incldue Div. III institutions.

XIII. AAUP POSITION

Here are some recommendations of the American Association of University Professors: (a) Institutions should use admission standards for athletes that are comparable to those for other students. (b) A faculty committee should monitor admissions policy, courses, academic progress, and graduation rates for athletes. (c) The faculty committee should be able to "seek appropriate review" of apparent abuses of academic integrity in the promotion of athletic programs. (d) Freshman eligibility is "ill-advised." (e) Student-athletic obligations and a schedule that minimizes overnight travel. (f) Athletes should not be segregated from other students in housing, dining, and other areas of campus life. These proposals for change were reported in the cover story, "College Sport Must Deliver on Its Promise," the last in a five-part series on graduation rates for Div. I basketball, USA Today, June 21, 1991.

XIV. COMMENTS BY SAPES SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS ON KFC REPORT

The following informal comments were recorded on reaction sheets after the program session in response to the basic thrust of the KFC Report, Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics.

These responses will appear in the 1991 SAPES Proceedings. Also, immediately after our symposium on "Sport and Society," Dr. Gordon Chamberlin had the opportunity to meet personally again

with the Commission Co-Chair, Dr. Bill Friday. Gordon shared the ideas expressed during the conference session, including the particular points included in my presentation. "Since he is very much interested in collecting various reactions to the work of the Commission and welcomed input from philosophers," states Gordon, "I put together the pages, and also sent him a copy of the SAPES Newsletter, indicating the pages on which you had summarized the work of the Commission." The role of alumni as described by Douglas S. Dibbert, Executive Director of the UNC General Alumni Association and KFC member, is also discussed in this newsletter article from different perspectives. Recent Sports Illustrated editorial writings and Mr. Creed C. Black, President of the Knight Foundation, in responding in a follow-up letter to SI are cited also. (April, 1991) Kit Morris, KFC Staff Director located in Charlotte, NC, recently discussed the pilot program of the NCAA on independent certification with me by telephone (Sept. 17). He stated that there have been different reactions to the KFC Report: about 90% positive during conversations with the various groups identified in the report; 10% negative responses --- 8 out of 10 individuals feels that the Commission did not go far enough --- others stated, "Don't fix it if it's not broken!"

Here are the SAPES comments from several professors attending our symposium which wree given to Dr. Friday concerning the KFC Report: (Note: My comments are listed here first for SAPES Proceedings)

(John B. Haynes)
- "One-plus-Three" formula: these changes are long overdue.
- The key is the certification aspect by external group for all facets.
- All institutions need to follow these principles (10) --- the mission of each school is a critical variable specified in the formula guidelines, plus these educational values (not just Div. IA revenue sports).
- The NCAA Convention in Januay will be an important indicator of support. More changes will be needed also (i.e. ethical conduct and sportsmanship)
- I am very interested in fair play, sportsmanship, and ethics in college sports, areas beyond the scope of the report's standards. The athletics program must involve: administrators, coaches, athletes, sports medicine personnel, the media, faculty, etc. --- all groups must work together to achieve these aims.
- Role of faculty: a greater role for faculty members should be outlined, given the emphasis on athletics as an important part of the collegiate mission and experience (i.e. faculty senate + faculty representaives + each professor).
- Specific guidelines for how college and university presidents should be involved are missing in order to provide specific directions. The recent attendance trend at NCAA meetings and the NCAA Presidents Commission involvement are key. (Div. IAA)

* * * * *

(Other Participants)
- This program of reform fails to deal with one of the major culprits: the obsession with national rankings. The fear of showing up poorly in national rankings prevents genuine reform from being carried out. (Div. II)

* * * * *

- I don't feel knowledgeable about the report, not enough to write reflectively. At my school It doesn't seem to be a problem, and I admire schools that put academics first. (Div. II)

* * * * *

- Reaction: a bit of cynicism. Why, if the presidents truly want reform, have they done so little already?
- Disappointment: there seems to be no serious consideration of expanding good intramural sports to replace intercollegiate sports entirely. (Div. II)

* * * * *

- I doubt that vesting the responsibility in the president will change conditions materially.
- Funneling all sports revenues through the university/college will because public opinion will be negative when the true nature of the sports engine is known.

* * * * *

- The document appears to reflect greater concern about the welfare of the extra-curricular activity, sports, than about the primary function of the university.
- No justification is given why this extra-curricular activity receives so must attention, funding, facilities, etc., when it provides participation for so few than is given to other extra-curricular activities with greater educational significance.
- The document assumes for presidents of colleges and universities the role of a CEO in business, but fails to recognize the distinctive educational function of the university in society as different from business.
- Giving greater power to the president without a cclear statement of the distinctive role of the university provides no frame of reference for basic decisions about the relation of sports to the rest of the institution.

* * * * *

- What's going to make trustees support presidents when they fire abusive coaches, athletic directors, etc.?
- What's going to make trustees discipline presidents when they do not keep a tight rein on athletics?
- The cry for "more power to the presidents" sounds very must like what has happended in public school systems back in the early 20th century. So, today we have bureaucratic, hierarchical, "accountable" school systems that simply do not work very well. Is this going to happen to higher education?
- Is it axiomatic that competitive athletics is necessary to higher education?
- If so, why do some of the world's greatest universities get along very well without them?

* * * * *

- Who can be against the Knight Commission Report's spirit? My reaction is to wait and see. "Reform" is measured in terms of outcome. There is no outcome yet on the "Knight Report." (Div. IA)

* * * * *

- What does "presidential control" say about faculty control?
- Graduation rate --- does this end up with "basket weaving" majors?
- Athletics as an integral part of colleges and universities --- is this good? (Div. IA)

XV. A FINAL NOTE

If you did not obtain a copy of the KFC Report at the SAPES Annual Meeting at Furman University in Greenville, October 4-5, 1991, you can receive a copy by writing to: The Knight Foundation, Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 301 South Brevard Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28202. The first mailing of over 10,000 reports was sent to presidents and chancellors in both

two- and four-year institutions, athletic directors, faculty representatives, senior women administrators, and other leaders. Since that time, several thousand requests for copies have been received by the KFC office. The media hae given must attention to the findings of the Commission. NCAA Executive Director Dick Schultz predicts a four-or five-year lag before the publication of graduation rates (school-by-school, sport-by-sport, divided by gender and race) generates a real impact toward change (USA Today, June 21, 1991). The KFC Update Report will be available March, 1992.

SPORTS AND THE CULTURE

J. Gordon Chamberlin
North Carolina Poverty Pro;ect

My concern in this discussion is with the various roles "sports" performs in contemporary society, focusing particularly on the significance of spectator sports for the society at large.

The importance of sports in this country hits us every morning (or afternoon) when we unfold a newspaper. In Greensboro, at least, it seems that more space is given to sports than to any other event in the world. This is a phenomenon worth analysing and puzzling over for its meaning. Whether shaped by the culture or shaping the culture, considering the place and influence of sports is crucial to understanding the United States.

It is easy to say right off that for many in our violent society the two most violent sports, football and hockey (elsewhere it is soccer) are the most popular. But we need to step back and look at the roles in general of the five biggies: football, baseball, basketball, hockey and soccer.

I

Mildred and I drove into the yard of my second cousin, out in Gordon, Nebraska, and even before entering the house we were engulfed in a cloud of gloom with parents and four children sad and in despair. "What has happened," we asked. "Nebraska just lost to Oklahoma."

The Big Red is not just one part of the athletics department of the University of Nebraska; it is part of the University's contribution to the entertainment of all Nebraskans, including the Chamberlin family living more than 400 miles away. With television, distance is wiped out. While the stadium in Lincoln seats twice the population of the city, that day the "TV Stadium" accommodated most of the people of two states, Nebraska and Oklahoma.

The gloom in the Chamberlin household was not just about poor "entertainment." The loss reflected on the status of the university and of the state. A similar scenario was duplicated that Fall afternoon in hundreds of colleges and universities across the country where losing teams failed the good name and spirit of their alma maters. But at the same time the hundreds of winners reflected the pride, identity and spirit which makes their schools winners. Sports provides entertainment, including the attractions of skill, teamwork, grace, precision, control, endurance but eventually these are smothered by a deeper urge of both players and fans, for in Vince Lombardi's words, "winning is everything."

Correspondence: 911 Ridgecrest Drive, Greensboro, N.C. 27410

II

Move to Columbus, Ohio, where Ohio State is playing (as I recall) none other than Oklahoma, with eighty thousand fans very quiet because Ohio State is losing. After a busted play the errant player came off the field to be greeted by his angry coach who slapped his face. How dare he fail in his duty to the university, and to Woody Hayes! That event had its ugly parallel to General George Patton slapping an American soldier in a hospital in Italy (that was five wars back, of course, World War II) whom he accused of being a malingerer.

Football and hockey can function as little wars, offering the thrill of vicarious battle -- sports' second role. At least now we do not follow the tradition of the Mayan ball court where losing teams were decapitated. Our fascination with fighting, seeing sports as battle, was evident in reverse when the Gulf War was watched as a game. And Stormin' Norman made the connection in a strangely confusing way by calling a very well-planned secret hiddenball end run a "Hail Mary Pass."

III

A third role for sports is economic. North Carolina is now blessed: the Duke Blue Devils have become Numero Uno in collegiate basketball, and we are powerhouses in football and soccer, but the state is the scene of a tug-of-war over the location of a baseball team.

Durham, North Carolina, home of Duke, is also the home of the Durham Bulls. One problem is that they play in a small stadium. The other is that they are owned by a Raleigh businessman, James Goodmon, head of a large radio/ television company. He wants to move the team to a new stadium located between Durham and Raleigh where it would be the anchor of a Sports Park with three other arenas for hockey, soccer and tennis.

An article about this contest between the two cities in the February, 1991 issue of Business/North Carolina, quotes Mr. Goodmon as saying, "Every time I fly into Charlotte, I see the coliseum, and I think about what it's done for them. They're several years ahead of us in terms of recognizing the economic benefits of pulling the community together around sports and sports facilities. . . . You've got to watch people who believe in something as strongly as I do," he says, "They're dangerous."[1]

Sports performs three roles -- entertainment, proxy war, economic stimulator -- but all three point to something deeper, to spirit, identity, and as Mr. Goodmon noted, to belief, in other words, to its religious role.

IV

Last year a television crew, at the football stadium of Lynchburg College in Virginia, was interviewing Jerry Falwell (also College President) who claimed he wanted to develop a Protestant team that would beat Notre Dame. When asked about the relation of that goal to his evangelistic goals, Falwell shot back, "there is no conflict, Jesus was a winner." That is sports shaping theology. Orel Hershiser seems to agree, "Just because I'm a Christian doesn't mean I'm a wimp."[2]

Then there was Connie Scramlin who, according to a wire report on June 21, "loved the Detroit Tigers so much that she decided to pay tribute to them in death. . . At her funeral she will be buried in a casket draped with tiger lillies trimmed in midnight blue and orange, the team's colors, and emblazoned the team's emblem." The funeral music will be, "Take Me Out to the Ballgame."[3]

This curious religiosity captivates millions; each sport has its rituals; the sacred temples accommodate thousands of devotees every night of the week for basketball, and for football on Sunday (church services have to be out in time for the game) where most worshippers are seated farther from the action than in the back pew of the cathedral.

In consequence of this devotion, life is no longer seen as a pilgrimate, or is the goal of life service to mankind, or devotion to the Kingdom. "Game" becomes the metaphor for the meaning of life, and religious terminology gets mixed up with what goes on in the arena or on the field. At the Super Bowl (years ago) Franco Harris's lucky catch in the last seconds of the game was called "The Immaculate Reception," and when all hope for a touchdown is gone a frantic quarterback, putting it all in the Lord's hands, serves up a "Hail Mary." Then years ago there was a wonderful pop star singing, "Kick Me Lord Over the Goalposts of Life."

The mixing of sports and religion is not a superficial matter. The devotion to sports testifies to a basic troubling human paradox. Every form of religious devotion -- whether to one's country, business, race, ideology, book or divine being -- has its attractive beneficent appeal. Traditional religions offer comfort, assurance of having the truth, spiritual fellowship with the faithful and access to divine favor. Yet all forms of religious devotion are idolatrous when they elevate some object, whether rhetoric, rule, book or theology, as an instrument to distinguish the good from the bad, the saved from sinners.

Sports' beneficent parallel is entertainment, fellowship of fans, escape from daily troubles, admiration of singular accomplishment, and ecstasy of triumph. But its central commitment is to competition, and its idolatry is making losing essential to winning. When competition is accepted as the basic dynamic of life, success is to be applauded and losers are supposed to accept defeat as an indication of inadequacy, the rationale many have for those in poverty. It is a corrupting religiosity which lack the transcendent claims of justice.

Webster is dead wrong. In my dictionary sports is defined as "an amusing or interesting pastime; a diversion." In contemporary United States sports provides the religious meaning and ethical context for denial of social responsibility. Losers deserve what they get.

V

And there are implications for the university. In a column in The New York Times, April 16, 1991, titled "Competition vs Excellence," Alfie Kohn discussed proposals of the United States government to make educational systems more competitive.

> The very word 'competitiveness,' a favorite of educators, economists and politicians, suggests a fundamental confusion between excellence, on the one hand, and the desperate quest to beat people, on the other.

> It may be that the goal of producing an adequately skilled labor force in order to raise corporate profitability cannot be reconciled with the goal of getting children to become thoughtful readers and lifelong learners. But even if we choose to cater to corporations, we should review recent surveys of managers: Their top complaint about employees is that so few know how to work well with others.
>
> Indeed, wherever would they have learned that skill? In most classrooms, students are forced to work against each other, competing for gold stars, grades and recognition. The lesson that all competitio~ teaches is that everyone else is an obstacle to one's own success.[4]

When winning is life's central good, its ethics is shaped by a whole panoply of devices for winning from prowess to deception. After Dennis Martinez of the Montreal Expos pitched a perfect game (no hits, no runs, no errors; at least in baseball one can be "perfect") Brett Butler of the losing Dodgers said, "He was keeping everybody off balance, and that is what baseball is all about."[5]

VI

One way for a university to escape the claims of the athletic department and the assumption that what happens on the football field or the basketball court determines the spirit of the school, is to eliminate sports from the institution. Every state should have a sports school preparing professionals for the multiple specialties involved in the vast, hugely profitahle domain of sports.

In such an institution special departments would be needed for each sport. Of course the "liberal arts" would have ample material for their general fields of history, health, finance, architecture, psychiatry (the Yankees now have their court psychiatrist) writing and psychology. Surely there would be endowed chairs: the Haynes Chair in Philosophy, the Friday Hesberg Chair in Management, with Michael Jordan teaching Flying, and Falwell could be the Chaplain.

And in Nebraska such a school would let my second cousin and his four children feel good about Nebraska while the University in Lincoln could get back to doing what a university ought to be doing.

---

1. Business/North Carolina, February 1991, p. 18.
2. Greensboro News & Record, article, "Spirituality & Sports," June 20, 1991.
3. Greensboro News & Record, item, "A Tiger fan to the death," June 21, 1991.
4. The New York Times, Op Ed Page column, "Competition vs. Excellence," by Alfie Kohn, April 26, 1991.
5. Greensboro News & Record, item, "PERFECTION: Montreal's Martinez hurls perfect game," July 29, 1991

INVENTING POSTMODERN EDUCATION:

LIFELONG LEARNING OR CHILDHOOD SCHOOLING?

A PROPOSAL FOR LOCAL ACTION

Charles Tandy
University of Missouri-Columbia

Modernity introduced the idea of inevitable progress. But with the postmodern twentieth century, rapid social change became identified with a new dis-ease called future shock. Yet the rational form of America's system of public schooling remained stuck in the modernity of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, this paper seeks to answer the question, "Can American society --specifically, its system of public education -- be made more responsive to the dangers and opportunities of rapid social change?"

Modern Education as Childhood Schooling

If nineteenth century modernity embodied a spirit of certain progress, then with the postmodern twentieth century we find a sense of uncertainty and questionable progress. Thus today's crises in education may be viewed in the context of, or as a symptom of, postmodern times. In this light, then, let us proceed to invent a new system of public education meant for the postmodern world.

If we are unaware of the modernity-postmodernity context, then our conversation about education and other societal issues will be constrained. We may come to believe that we are doing much and accomplishing little. We will be losing the societal or educational battle without understanding why.

We talk about the contemporary crises of education. We rearrange the chairs on the deck of the titantic stage of public relations, or even in the classrooms, but the outer structure or rational form of our educational establishment remains rooted in the modernity of the nineteenth century. The rational form of American public education is that of an educational monopoly consisting of discipline based (i.e., subject separated) courses and competitive grades for the purpose of socialization.

As we face the twenty-first century, our system of public education remains focused on the short term schooling of children for citizenship in a modern nineteenth century nation-state. Our educational tunnel vision continues to ignore the imperative of lifelong learning for living a good and meaningful life in the postmodern world. It seems that the need for personal wholeness and autonomy grows as society becomes more complex and specialized. The need to examine life and find it worth living seems greater today than ever before. Most of us instinctively realize that there is more to life than obtaining information about a specialized function or field of knowledge (thereby serving as a cog in a machine). Humans value, choose, and act; humans seek meaning, autonomy, growth, wholeness.[1]

Correspondence: 169 Smith Hall, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO 65201

Postmodern Education as Lifelong Learning

Adler insists that "we can and should do something to mitigate the barbarism of intense specialization, which threatens to be as destructive in its own way as the abandonment of specialization would be.[2] For such barbarism, Adler offers a solution:

> Of all the creatures on earth, human beings are the least specialized in anatomical equipment and in instinctive modes of behavior. They are, in consequence, more flexible than other creatures in their ability to adjust to the widest variety of environments and to rapidly changing external circumstances. They are adjustable to every clime and condition on earth and perpetually adjustable to the shock of change. . . . general, nonspecialized schooling has the quality that most befits human nature. That is why, in terms of practicality and utility, it is better than any other kind of schooling.[3]

Learning fixed outlooks and methods served a purpose in the past -- a past of relatively slow social change involving relatively known and recurring situations. But, for long term survival of a society undergoing rapid social change -- lifelong, or innovative and self-directed, learning is required. In a world of rapid social change, education should be in the business primarily of producing lifelong learners, rather than stuffing students with knowledge and skills soon outmoded.

According to Knowles, "Our society has as great a stake in the continuing education of adults in a world of accelerating changes as it had for the education of children in a stable world."[4] What rational form, then, ought our system of public education take? Based on the postmodern dual imperative of self improvement and world betterment (maximum melioristic actualization of self and world), it seems our system of public education should ideally be tailored 1) to fit each unique person 2) for the purpose of responsible lifelong living and learning. This means there is no reason that formal public education should either end with adolescence or be taught as if adults were children.

Congruent with the postmodern imperative, Knowles has proposed a new system of public education fit for adults.[5] Public education must be expanded from teaching children -- to educating both children and adults how to melioristically actualize self and world. The postmodern world is one of continuing transformation and continuing uncertainty. Our society and its system of public education must be made responsive to the dangers and opportunities which come with rapid social change.

We can no longer afford to limit public education to children and to school houses. Today's adults would like to take control of their own lives if they only knew how. A postmodern system of education which will respect the autonomy of adults can be made highly cost effective, like the public library system.

In 1981, Lawrence A. Cremin stated: "'We may be living through a revolution in education which may be as fundamental as the original invention of the schools."[6] Six years earlier, Cremin had written that each family, church, employer (etc.) "has a curriculum"; accordingly, "the theory of education becomes the theory of the relation of various educative interactions and institutions to one another and to the society at large."[7]

Viewing education, then, in this way -- as an ecological system -- suggests that any cultural system (family, church, employer, etc.) "can be conceptualized as a system of learning resources": "when it is so conceptualized, one perceives the organization and delivery of educational services in a different way from the . . . view of education as a mosaic of educational programs conducted by a plethora of largely unconnected institutions."[8]

In order for each member of a community to consciously have all the community's learning resources at fingertip, Knowles suggests an alternative system of public education fit for adults, oriented toward each unique person and life plan. Many adults attempting to use the system for the first time will no doubt require orientation in making the transition from dependent to autonomous learning. Communities in every region of the planet may establish their own lifelong learning resource system and become a holistic learning community.

Knowles suggests four steps in creating a learning community.

First: survey the community to identify all resources for learning, including institutions, churches, agencies, unions, cooperatives, clubs, businesses, farms, the media, fairs, exhibits, parks, zoos, etc. People are resources too, whether actively employed or retired. The individual student is also a resource: for example, the learner has aspirations, dreams, curiosities, and interests.

Second: assemble, categorize, and coordinate the above information into a data bank (files and/or computers).

Third: establish a policy making mechanism. Knowles suggests "adhocracy" or "flat" administration as mentioned in A. J. Cropley's Towards A SYstem Of Lifelong Learning.[9]

Finally: devise the practical procedures or logistics for using the lifelong learning system. Knowles emphasizes the importance of having a satellite learning center within walking distance of everyone in the community. Each center would have available a procedure, or a variety of alternative procedures, for helping one learn how to use the system in designing one's own flexible life plan for improvement (including recreational, social, group, and fun activities).

According to Knowles, the system would be prepared to assist persons (via testing, learning contracts, or otherwise) in developing verifiable competencies for performing certain life roles such as being a learner, self, friend, family member, change agent, worker, leisure-time user, and world citizen. The teacher's role in the new system would be, primarily, that of helper/facilitator of learning and of learning resource broker, rather than lecturer or instructor. In learning the new role, educators may find A. J. Cropley's Lifelong Education And The Training Of Teachers helpful, as well as Hurley and Ray's report.[10] The educator's psychic reward system should shift from getting rewards by controlling children to getting rewards by empowering learners.

Learning to learn is a key to human betterment, but will those who are illiterate be able to learn to use the learning system? According to Bergevin, the individual and society are related at a foundational level; it makes no sense for education to be devoted solely to either individual or societal

values.[11] Bergevin sees the democratic way of life as the sensible goal of a balanced education. Accordingly, he maintains that the "marginal citizen" must be given "special treatment" by educators.

Although some students may learn best by using a very traditional approach and some by using a very individualistic approach, it may be that in the longrun most will find mutualism (cooperation) as most compatible.[12] Some of those choosing mutualism may use the andragogical contract approach of Knowles, which consists of seven steps: 1) setting a climate; 2) mutual planning; 3) diagnosing needs; 4) formulating program objectives; 5) planning a sequential design of learning activities; 6) conducting the learning experiences; and, 7) evaluating the learning.[13]

In 1983, Edward T. Lewis, President of St. Mary's College in Maryland, preached against "the gospel of success at all costs," "the radical loss of a sense of one's place in history," and "indifference to moral questions." Lewis observed:

> During the past 10 years or so, it has become increasingly clear that most college-age students have little, if any, knowledge of Western culture. . . . As a result, many students have no sense of their past, no sense of their roots. They are victimized by a sort of solipsism. . . . Locked in a concern for the immediate and strictly personal, they possess little sense of the shared values of a community. They sincerely believe that one must decide for oneself -- with no responsibility to the past, no obligation to the future. For the most part, they recognize only an obligation to survive. . . . It leads to an arrogance that only those who have no sense of their own history can possess. . . . I hear an isolation that is almost total, a sense of community that is nearly undone.[14]

Earl J. McGrath suggests that the liberal arts colleges are about "the only class of institutions of higher education left that are willing to concern themselves seriously with human knowledge and wisdom in the broad and the development of the whole student -- his character and personality as well as his intellect."[15] Admiral Rickover emphasized that citizens merely educated to be well-trained experts "'are potentially as dangerous in the proper functioning of our democratic institutions as are uneducated workers when they handle complicated machinery.'"[16] John Stuart Mill likewise said that "'men are men before they are lawyers or physicians.'"[17]

An actualizing or general or holistic education, according to Fred E. H. Schroeder, "is so urgently needed, because so very many people are not card-carrying members of the human race. For some in slums, ghettos, jungles, and tundra, the membership cards have been withheld."[18] Yet for others, "the membership cards have not been denied, but spurned; spurned because of conceit, because cupidity, because of cruelty, because of bigotry."[19] "Most educational institutions are almost solely vocational schools," according to Schroeder's analysis, "and all educational institutions are sometimes vocational schools."[20]

There is a sense in which each person is a generalist and a specialist. Hopefully, on a lifelong basis, one becomes a better generalist and a better specialist. But especially for a person always in the process of becoming whole, the "latter, we insist, must not be permitted to encroach on the priority and scheduling of the former."[21] We must not simply educate the present for the present -- but also in

the past and for the future. We must not educate for partial human beings, but for whole human beings. Any endeavor which attempts to isolate education from ethics is inherently defective.

Elsewhere I have constructed a set of core interdisciplinary learning projects for use with the new postmodern system of public education proposed above.[22] This curriculum is based in part on Buford and Burhans.[23] The projects attempt to give the learner a general or holistic or interdisciplinary acquaintance with history, art, literature, and philosophy of ideas in human culture from its inception.

For the learner who freely chooses these projects (within the previously proposed lifelong learning system of alternative public education), the opportunity to become an intelligent and sensitive ("card-carrying") member of the world community is available without a college degree. Especially in today's postmodern world, lifelong holistic education or "interdisciplinarity as the philosophy of the curriculum" makes sense, for "failure to use the resources" of a complex system for the purpose of integration "is simultaneously to propose the failure of that system."[24] On the other hand, Rudyard Kipling's 1895 poem or lay, "In The Neolithic Age," suggests that "There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays, And every single one of them is right."[25]

The "Core InterDisciplinary (ID) Curriculum" I have suggested for melioristic actualization of self and world, is, then, only one of "nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays." Indeed, it may be argued that my way is too western, too American, and less integrated than it ideally should be. No philosophically compelling defense is offered; note, however, that each community or each individual (western or non-western) may modify the plan to better fit the goals of the program and of each unique learner. Indeed, I expect to improve the structure and content of the ID learning projects as I become more knowledgeable of non-western cultures. We ought not dwell on western history to the exclusion of all humankind's future. Moreover, since:

> education is the means of perpetuating culture from generation to generation, it is natural that the partiality of outlook endemic in the culture generally would be found also in education. Yet, this consequence need not follow. Indeed, the special office of education is to widen one's view of life, to deepen insight into relationships, and to counteract the provincialism of customary existence -- in short, to engender an integrated outlook.[26]

On the other hand, it may be argued that there should be at least one American version of the program for Americans, at least one Russian version for Russians, etc. For example, some historians believe that the miracle of Renaissance Florence resulted from a kind of nonspecialized interdisciplinary dialogue between the universal and the particular.[27] An early example would be Dante's Divine Comedy, written in the vernacular but with a universal sweep. Moreover, the culturally tolerant Florentines did not care for inquisitions. And there was free and actual communication within the great variety. Much of its humanistic studies, cultural activities, and educational endeavors took place outside the walls of formal educational institutions. There was a delicate balance between tradition and innovation, and a bond between thought and action. According to Brucker, this unique nonspecialized interdisciplinary forum -- between intellectuals and nonintellectuals, between social classes, between the universal and the particular -- promoted new ideas and opinions despite the economic difficulties of the time.[28]

Conclusion

Most who have reflected deeply on the matter seem to agree that rulers, decision-makers, and aristocrats throughout history have been well served by being educated as generalists (that is, to the extent they were in fact so educated).[29] It is also true that according to the democratic ideal, it is not "the aristocrats" but "the people" who rule and make decisions. And "the people," like the aristocrats of old, are not bound to act with intelligence and sensitivity. Knowles has emphasized that

> all the great teachers of ancient history -- Lao Tse and Confucius in China, the Hebrew prophets, Jesus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Cicero, Quinlian -- were chiefly teachers of adults, not children.[30]

The educational crisis is real, as we remember the famous words of Whitehead: "We must produce a great age, or see the collapse of the upward striving of our race."[31] We have no choice but to find a way to properly educate "the people" (the new "aristocrats"). If such a task falls primarily in the hands of the liberal arts colleges, then American society is indeed in very poor health. How many Americans ever attend a liberal arts college? Of those who attend, what is the "success rate" in adequately preparing students to become lifelong learners?

The political power of anyone not engaged in learning to melioristically actualize self and world is dangerous; in addition, "their uneducated leisure is degrading and will be dangerous."[32] Socrates used his leisure more wisely, yet the less wise considered him dangerous. For Socrates:

> Happiness is integrated selfhood, an inner harmony of the self with itself, integrity. Integrity can be achieved through the education of the will by insight. Insight can be trained by purposeful thoughtfulness --plain, hard, honest, humble thinking in the context of the triple dialogue with oneself, with others, and with the mysterious ultimate that lures man toward becoming truly human. On this basis Socrates insisted that virtue can be taught and he devoted his life -- and his death, deliberately accepted -- to this task.[33]

"Yet the substitution of machines for slaves gives us an opportunity to build a civilization as glorious as that of the Greeks, and far more lasting because far more just."[34] According to David Macarov:

> If the experience of the past is any indication, the workless society is not to be feared. In ancient Greece, which was a complete welfare state for citizens, the work was done by slaves -- free men were neither expected nor encouraged to work, since work, according to Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, made a person a bad friend, a bad patriot, and a bad citizen. What was the result of such a workless society? Only the beginnings of . . . arts and sciences too numerous to list. Freed from the day-to-day exigencies of making a living, people were able to be creative in widely different fields, enjoying life as they did so. There is no valid reason to believe that . . . humanity today will, or will be able to, do less. On the contrary, the workless society might usher in the most fertile period of imagination, creativity, and originality that the world has yet seen, raising mankind to a new threshold of self-fulfilling, happy lives.[35]

"Each generation, each nation, even each community [and each person] must work out answers to its own problems, in terms of its own values and commitments."[36] A given community may decide to gradually apply the new lifelong learning system to all public education, including elementary and high school education. Many differing approaches are possible and each community will have to decide what is best for itself. Certainly it is true that the roles of child and of adult differ. Moreover, as a matter of fact, children are not simply little adults. It may be that as a practical matter much modern and postmodern public education for children will look alike. Yet it may be that the new rational form, a postmodern ecological structure not unlike that just outlined, will make a substantial difference.[37]

---

1. S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York, NY: New American Library, 1951), chap. 10.
2. M. Adler, The Paideia Proposal (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1982), 72 .
3. Ibid ., 19-2 0 .
4. M . Knowles, Continuina Education ; The Role of the Professional Oraanization, report dated March 9, 1978 (Chicago, IL: Invitational Conference on Continuing Education for Health Professional Organizations , 1978), 4 .
5. M. Knowles, The Adult Learner ; A Neglected Species (Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Company, 1984).
6. Ibid ., 18 0 .
7. L. Cremin, "Public Education and the Education of the Public, " Teachers College Record 77 :1-12 .
8. Knowles, The Adult Learner, 18 1 .
9. A. Cropley, Towards a System of Lifelong Learning (Hamburg, West Germany: Unesco, 1980).
10. A. Cropley, Lifelong Education and the Training of Teachers (New York, NY: Unesco, 1978); M. Hurley and K. Ray, Training Networks: How to Establish Connections Statewide and Increase Expertise and Service Exponentially, report no. CE 800 077, ERIC Document Reproduction Service no. ED 241 806 (Coon Rapids, MN: Minnesota Interaction Influence Network, 1983).
11. P. Bergevin, A Philosophy for Adult Education (New York, NY: Seabury Press, 1967).
12. G. Conti, Principles of Adult Learning Scale (Ann Arbor, MI : University Microfilms , Inc ., 1978), chap . 2 .
13. M. Knowles, "Innovations in Teaching Styles and Approaches Based upon Adult Learning," Education for Social Work (Spring 1972) :32-39.
14. E. Lewis, Speech Given at Trinity Episcopal Church on October 16, 1983 by Edward T. Lewis (St. Mary's City, MD: Trinity Episcopal Church, 1983), 2-3.
15. E. McGrath, The Liberal Arts College and the Emergent Caste System (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1967), 8.
16. Ibid., 12.
17. S. Hook, P. Kurtz, and M. Todorovich, The Philosophy of the Curriculum: The Need for General Education (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975), 178.
18. F. Schroeder, Joining the Human Race (Deland, FL: Everett / Edwards), 2 .
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid ., 9 .

21. M. Adler, Paideia Problems and Possibilities (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1983), 38.

22. C. Tandy, "Lifelong Living and Learning in Postmodern America: A Set of Core InterDisciplinary Learning Projects," ERIC Document Reproduction Service no. [not yet assigned] (Washington, DC: Educational Resources Information Center, projected as forthcoming).

23. T. Buford and R. Burhans, Kentucky Southern Colleae Catalogue for 1965-1966 (Louisville, KY: Kentucky Southern College, 1965).

24. Hook, The Philosophy of the Curriculum, 232.

25. R. Kipling, Rudyard Kipling's Verse: Definitive Edition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1940), 342.

26. P. Phenix, Realms of Meaning (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 3-4.

27. G. Brucker, Renaissance Florence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), chap. 6.

28. Ibid .

29. R. Hutchins, The Great Conversation (Chicago, IL: William Benton, 1952) .

30. M. Knowles, "Innovations, " 33 .

31. W. Donham, Business Adrift (New York, NY: Whittlesey House, 19 31), xix .

32. Hutchins, The Great Conversation, 18.

33. C. Loew, Myth Sacred History. and PhilosoPhy (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 265.

34. Hutchins, The Great Conversation, 23.

35. H. Didsbury, Creating a Global Agenda (Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1984), 218-9.

36. R. Gross, The Teacher and the Taught (New York, NY: Dell Publishing Co ., 1963), IX.

37. I would like to thank Malcolm Knowles and Julie A. Hughes for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

WHAT IS A "POSTMODERN" EDUCATION AND WHAT DOES IT HAVE TO DO WITH LIFELONG LEARNING?

Roderic L. Owen
Mary Baldwin College

In his paper, "Inventing Postmodern Education: Lifelong Learning or Childhood Schooling? A Proposal for Local Action," Charles Tandy critiques the continuing domination of "nineteenth century modernism" over the American public education system; he denigrates the mechanics of schooling and equates this antiquated approach with an understanding of education as exclusively focused on childhood; he draws heavily upon the work of Malcolm Knowles, a prominent advocate of lifelong learning; and, he tantalizes us by offering a few highlights of the "Core InterDisciplinary (ID) Curriculum" that he has developed at his own institution. In a relatively brief essay, Dr. Tandy cites an astonishingly diverse range of educational theorists, philosophers and social commentators, ranging from Philip Phenix to Mortimer Adler; Stephen Toulmin to Suzanne Langer; and, from the Lynds (of **Middletown**) to John Naisbitt (of **Megatrends**).

Quite clearly, on the spectrum of philosophical method ranging from the narrowly focused work of analysis to the broadly conceived survey of major trends and issues, Tandy's essay leans toward the latter. Although I often find myself in agreement with the ideals espoused in this essay, it does suffer from its own ambitious scope and could benefit from a deeper analysis of terms; a clearer statement of the problem and issues; and a greater sensitivity to both the philosophical and the practical problems posed by an eclectic approach that seems to embrace the revived classicism of Hutchins and Adler, the idealism of the natural developmental approach espoused by Knowles (and many other contemporary advocates of lifelong learning), the interdisciplinary pedagogies proposed by McGrath and Phenix, and the more recent mysteries of post-modernism (as set forth by Agger, Bauman, Fogel, Griffen, Pefanis, Shaprio, Toulmin, Vattimo, et. al.)

In his opening paragraph, Charles Tandy states that his goal is to answer the question: "can [the system of public education] be made more responsive to the dangers and the opportunities of rapid social change?" His answer, of course, is "yes," if somehow the educational system incorporates the diverse range of ideals and pedagogies that fall under the rubric of "postmodern." That we are in a century of rapid social change is indisputable; fifty years before Alvin Toffler and John Naisbitt popularized this understanding of the human condition as trapped in an evermore rapidly accelerating spiral of scientific, technological, social and moral change, John Dewey had lectured and written at length about the severe inadequacies of a traditional nineteenth-century approach to education in a modern, industrialized, democratic nation-state. His focus on experimental method and a problem-solving pedagogy coupled with faith in natural human development and the structure of a democratic society

Correspondence: Philosophy Dept., Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Va. 24401

to nurture that development may seem naive today, but it does represent the first major attempt to "restructure the American public school system in response to rapid social change." It seems to me that any effort to move the educational system from the modernism of the past century to the postmodernism of the next millenium, must at least acknowledge the influence of American Progressive thought and practice from the 1930's through the 1970's.

Moreover, the question that Tandy poses is essentially an empirical one: "can American education be made more responsive?" The philosophical questions, however, need to focus on competing ideals and goals and on the meaning and purposes of education. In order to link the philosophy of postmodernism with the ideals of lifelong learning, Tandy must ask: "What does it mean to be responsive to social change?" "Why should the response to social change be the guiding principle in constructing an educational system?" "What exactly is 'postmodernism'?" "Would a postmodern philosophy of education establish 'response to social change' as a foundational value?" "How and why do the principles of adult and lifelong education connect to the philosophy of postmodernism?" By intuition and by experience as an adult educator I am myself convinced that there are, indeed, many intellectual connections, but we have yet to see a major work on this theme. If anything, the attempt to respond to these questions is more ambitious than the task Tandy has set forth in his essay.

In the effort to "invent" a postmodern educational theory, Tandy largely draws upon three disparate fields: the literature about the liberal arts curriculum and mission; the ideals and principles of American continuing and lifelong education; and, the very recent philosophy of postmodernism. As an "inventor" Tandy tinkers with selected ideas and values of all three, piecing them together in interesting, sometimes intriguing, ways. Yet, the manner in which Tandy identifies, uses, and connects each of these three areas raises questions. For example, Hutchins and Adler are noted for their ardent advocacy of a traditional liberal arts education, an education which in many ways could be characterized as "interdisciplinary" and certainly as one which is opposed to an exclusively specialized and professional forms of training. Yet, the liberal education espoused by Hutchins and Adler with its focus on the critical reading and discussion of the Great Books of Western classical civilization is markedly different from the interdisciplinary proposals of either Phenix (who redefined the ways we make meaning) or McGrath (who argued that the attempt to understand and solve social problems of the day should define the curriculum).

Also, with all respect to Malcolm Knowles, an acknowledged leader in the field of adult and lifelong education, his is only one of several significantly different voices in the field. For example, Cyril Houle in **The Design of Education** (1972) identifies and analyzes the problems with the formalized, over-theoretical education that prevails in the teaching of youth; in contrast, adult education, he contends, must be practical, systematic, situation-specific, and a cooperative endeavor. In their writings Ivan Illich (**DeSchooling Society**, 1970) and Paulo Freire (**Pedagogy of the Oppressed**, 1970) examine the relationships between knowledge, action, and power; their understanding of education is rooted in its political nature and the need for praxis, critical reflection followed by social action. Jack Mezirow, Professor of Adult and Continuing Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, has drawn upon the philosophy of Habermas to identify and describe a sequence of qualitatively different developmental stages ("A Critical Theory of Adult Learning and Education" in **Adult Education**, 1981). Mezirow views the purpose of lifelong education as the attempt to teach critical reflection in order to identify and then overcome the cultural and psychological assumptions that enslave us. We have not yet seen a feminist

theory of lifelong education, but in the thought of Nel Noddings, Sharon Merriam, and Carol Gilligan, the elements of such a theory already exist. In short, there is no single unified theory of lifelong education, indeed, many leaders in the field bemoan the continuing absence of a philosophic base. Nevertheless, the various practices and the general ideal of learning as a continuing process that occurs throughout one's life have, in this century, found their way into the cultural mainstream, reflecting (and sometimes helping shape) profound social, cultural, and economic changes. Tandy is absolutely right: this is a significant historical fact, and education in its entirety - teaching and learning, knowledge and the curriculum - needs to be reinterpreted and reconstructed in light of the underlying principles of lifelong education - whatever they may be.

Finally, what does "postmodernism" mean? Although the term occurs in this paper's title as well as in the titles of a quarter of Tandy's references, this is not at all clear. Over the past decade postmodernism has been popularly defined as: synonymous with the "New Age" movement; an avant garde means of refering to the post-industrial era; and as an artistic reaction against its stylistic predecessors, "realism" and "modernism." In philosophical terms postmodernism has its immediate roots in the French theorists Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, Baudrillard, and Lyotard and its deeper roots in phenomenology and linguistic structuralism. At the risk of great over-simplification, a juxtaposed listing of the philosophical ideals and concepts of modernism and postmodernism follows:

Modernism	Postmodernism
protection of individual rights	mutuality of responsibility
legal/contractual basis for morality	covenant basis for morality
justice defined in legal terms	justice defined in terms of caring
a rigid hierarchy of values	network of relational values
disemodied, trascendental reason	**Love's Knowledge** (Nussbaum)
knowledge as control	knowledge as personal engagement
abstract/theoretical understanding	cognitive value of emotional understanding
Science as the tool for controlling Being	Science as one form of making meaning

South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Meeting

Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting
October 4-5, 1991

Furman University
Greenville, South Carolina

IN OTHER VOICES
EXPANDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONVERSATION

SCHEDULE FOR FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4TH

11:00 - 12:45 **Conference Registration**
Atrium Lobby
Hyatt Regency Greenville

12:50 - 12:55 **WELCOME AND CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE**
Earle West, SAPES President
Redbud A

1:00 - 2:15 **FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION**

1) **In Search of a Calling**
Presenter: Thomas Buford, Furman University
Respondent: Peter Carbone, Duke University
Chair: Earle West, Howard University
Location: Redbud A

2) **Some Reconceptions in Educational Theory: Irony and the Art of Comedy**
Presenter: Frans van der Bogert, Appalachian State University
Respondent: Sharon Morrison, Marietta, Georgia
Chair: Michael Jones, Western Carolina University
Location: Redbud B

3) **Poets and Teaching**
Presenter: William E. Russess, Merrimack College
Respondent: Cheryl Southworth, Meredith College
Chair: Water M. Brown, North Carolina State University
Location: Redbud C

2:15 - 2:30 **Break**
Prefunction Area of Redbud Rooms

2:30 - 3:45 **AUTHORS' COLLOQUIUM**

A Logical Theory of Teaching: Erotetics and Intentionality
Co-author: James W. Garrison, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Values And Education
Editor: Peter Carbone, Duke University

Education in Democracy: Education's Moral Role in the Democratic State
Author: Robert D. Heslep, University of Georgia
Chair: Paul Bitting, North Carolina State University
Location: Redbud A

3:45 - 4:00 **Break**
Prefunction Area

4:00 - 5:30 **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

Conversation as a Romance of Reason
Presenter: Margret Buchmann, Michigan State University
Respondent: James W. Garrison, Virginia Polytechnic and State University
Chair: Anthony G. Rud Jr., North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching
Location: Redbud A

6:30 - 7:30 **Cocktail Hour, Hartness Pavilion, Furman University**
Entertainment by the Furman University Saxophone Ensemble

7:30 **Banquet, Hartness Pavilion**

Invited Guest Speech

Rethinking Education: Understanding Japanese Training and Education by Understanding Japanese Culture
Presenter: David Edward Shaner, Furman University

SCHEDULE FOR SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5

8:00 - 8:45 **Continental Breakfast on the Furman Campus, Furman Hall 135**

8:45 - 10:00 SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION

1) **Education as Hospitality: The Reclamation of Cultural Metaphore and Narrative**
Presenter: William F. Losito, College of William and Mary
Respondent: Robert Mulvaney, University of South Carolina at Columbia
Chair: Samuel Holton, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Location: Furman Hall 221

2) **Integrity or "He Who Steals My Purse"**
Presenter: Judith T. Witmer, Lower Dauphin School District, Pennsylvania
Respondent: Deborah Eaker, North Carolina State University
Chair: Bruce Beezer, North Carolina State University
Location: Furman Hall 130

3) **Competency, Mastery, and the Destruction of Meaning**
Presenter: Warren Strandberg, Virginia Commonwealth University
Respondent: Jackie Blount, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chair: Don Reeves, Wake Forest University
Location: Furman Hall 124

10:00 - 10:15 **Break**
Furman Hall 135

10:15 - 11:30 **THIRD CONCURRENT SESSION**

1) **Sport and Society**
Presenters: John B. Haynes, James Madison University
Gordon Chamberlin, North Carolina Poverty Project
Chair: Samuel Craver, Virginia Commonwealth University
Location: Furham Hall 221

2) **Inventing Postmodern Education: Lifelong Learning or Childhood Schooling? A Proposal for Local Action**
Presenter: Charles Tandy, University of Missouri at Columbia
Respondent: Roderic Owen, Mary Baldwin College
Chair: Richard Phillips, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Location: Furman Hall 130

11:40 - 12:30 **Annual Business Meeting**
McEachern Lecture Hall
Furman Hall